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Abstract
Oil terminals are complex infrastructures due to their diverse operational activities.
They are exposed to diverse risks because they usually operate in a dynamic environ-
ment in which safety barriers are sometime overwhelmed, leading to the disruption of
operations due to a high level of uncertainty. However, the ability of oil terminals to
minimise vulnerability and maximise resilience depends on the availability of the correct
anticipated information at the right time for a decision-making process.
An important finding from the reviewed literature revealed that uncertainties and
the unpredictability of the convergent effect of several hazardous factors have the po-
tential to cause major disruptions such as fire, explosion and transit accidents. The
consequences of these disruptions can lead to infrastructure damage and loss of life.
The common operational threats to oil terminal operations (OTOs) substantiates the
need for a holistic resilience model for operations in offshore/onshore terminals such as
berthing/unberthing, vessel manoeuvring, loading and oﬄoading, storage, etc. Due to
the uncertainties associated with these operations and the cases of reported incidents/ac-
cidents, this research focuses more on the aspect of loading and oﬄoading operations at
ship/terminal interface.
An emphasis on a resilience modelling approach provides a flexible yet robust model
for OTOs to address disruption proactively, particularly with constantly evolving haz-
ards and threats. This thesis introduces an innovative approach towards resilience mod-
elling based on a developed novel framework. The key aspect of the framework was
supported using three proposed models: (1) the integration of Utility Theory and Swiss
Cheese Model (UtiSch+), to evaluate the relative importance of the identified hazard
factors (HFs), (2) a Bayesian network (BN), to calculate the overall probability that a
specific hazard is present and, (3) an Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) - Prospect
Theory (PT) approach, as an important model for a strategic decision selection method.
An empirical study was conducted to test the validity the proposed models, using case
studies and Sensitivity Analysis (SA). The result obtained demonstrated that the mod-
els are effective techniques to obtain the relative weight of the identified Hazard Factors
(HFs) in order to prioritise them, for dynamic hazards probability evaluation and to
prioritise suggested resilience strategies in order of importance to mitigate hazard/risk
level. Evidently, the result revealed appears reasonable and appropriate for investment,
in order to support a strategic decision for the selection of a resilience strategy for
resilience improvement in OTOs.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Summary
Seaport and offshore/onshore terminals play an important role in freight transport.
Complex marine operational systems are exposed to diverse risks in their optimum stan-
dards due to the continual growth in system complexity. Ship/terminal interface and
interaction collectively provide the functionality needed by a system to attain its goal,
but they come under pressure due to the high level of uncertainty they encounter. This
chapter intends to discuss the research background, motivation, aim, objectives and hy-
potheses, and the challenges of carrying out the research with a view to justifying the
research area.
1.1 Background
Over the last few years, there have been a number of serious events relating to oil
terminals, such as the Mumbai High North Platform disaster (2005) collision, which
ruptured the flexible pipe system, causing 22 deaths; the Bunga Alpinia disaster (2012),
which caused a severe explosion due to lightning during the loading/unloading operation
leading to the deaths of three people; and the New York harbour oil terminal disaster
(2012) caused by Hurricane Sandy, which damaged infrastructures and the environment
and led to loss of life with high consequences. Other catastrophic accidents can be
found in the 22nd and 23rd edition of MARSH (1974 - 2013) and the ITOPF (2014)
statistical reports. These events resulted in economic losses for the terminal operators
and the countries as a whole. The threats posed by the riskiness of such platforms are
enormous, and as such require flexible yet robust risk analysis methods to tackle these
unpredictable outcomes (Farquhar, 1984).
Terminals play an important role in freight transportation. When an accident oc-
curs, a terminal cannot perform its desired functions, thus resulting in a failure (Baublys,
2007). A great number of factors such as man, machine, media, nature and management
(Ding and Tseng, 2012) influence the operation of a terminal and may cause its mal-
function. Safety in the design and operation of terminal platforms has become a prime
1
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concern for operating companies because hazards have a high potential financial impact
in addition to causing shut-down and failures implications (Elsayed et al., 2009). The
regular operations at oil terminal platforms will be discussed in this research, with more
concentration on understanding terminal behaviour as well as considering unforeseen
influences that may be internal or external in nature. For example, uncertainty concern-
ing damage to property by fire, premature death caused by accidents or typical storms
and wind, and the risks linked to terminal operations and management (Mokhtari et al.,
2012). Risk assessment of Oil Terminal Operations (OTOs) and ship interface is an
important process in maintaining the maritime industrys record for safe operations at
terminal platforms (Hess and Hess, 2010).
When dealing with oil terminal and ship operations, there are a lot of uncertainties
in such processes, thus to improve the standard of operation under high uncertainty is
essential within operational research (Hess and Hess, 2010); such operations could be
deterministic terminal behaviour, i.e. from ship navigation to the idle state, preparatory
state, transhipment state, closing state, repair and maintenance state, or stochastic
terminal behaviour, i.e. where the order of state and transition does not follow a logical
workflow due to unforeseen influences on regular operations. Therefore, there is a need
to investigate the uncertainties in OTOs, to improve the interface between terminals
and ships, which has a direct influence on operational life.
An investigation into the existing problems in oil terminal platforms is required.
This study will carry out a critical review on OTOs and the major hazards of Complex
Marine Operations (CMOs). Moreover, the study will propose a research framework to
present a preferred approach on oil terminal operations, and develop models to support
the proposed research framework. This research will consider the assessment of risk,
resilience models and regulatory guidelines in CMOs. Furthermore, it will investigate
stakeholders’ requirements in mitigating and controlling losses from operations. Finally,
the research will use a real case study to justify the uniqueness of the proposed research
framework and models in order to tackle uncertainties in real life.
1.1.1 Maritime Critical Infrastructure and Transportation (MCIT)
Ports have a design life of several decades that needs to accommodate todays needs as
well as tomorrows. They also represent a major infrastructure investment. Their present
volatility and complex and dynamic nature create new challenges for port planning
and design. In order to cope with the many uncertainties, the traditional systems
of engineering practices try to incorporate fundamental properties such as flexibility,
versatility, and adaptability into their plans and designs (Taneja et al., 2012). Recent
developments related to ports and shipping sectors, such as containerisation and trends
in logistics and transport, are placing increasing demands on ports (Alderton, 1999;
Meersman et al., 2008; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2008). Congestion in existing ports
and their hinterlands, insufficient water depth, changing environmental demands and
increased economic activity call for the adaptation of existing ports or, alternatively,
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strategic investment into new infrastructure (Taneja et al., 2012; Madni and Sievers,
2014).
The development, expansion and modernisation of ports, as well as the roads, rail
and inland waterway systems, which have often suffered from years of under-investment
or total neglect, are the major challenges facing many ports today. Harm to people as
a result of risky events in ports is usually reported in terms of number of casualties or
number of injured people, but could be addressed in financial terms. Consequences are
measured by economic loss; such consequences include loss of human life, material loss,
loss of public image and environmental damage. The key to the smooth and dynamic
operation of a system requires an added layer of complexity, for the system to exhibit
resilience in the face of eventualities in the operational environment (Madni and Sievers,
2014). MCIT failure frequency is measured in terms of number of accidents per year or
per operation (device or installation); therefore, todays systems have to satisfy a number
of requirements such as affordability, reliability, adaptability, security and resilience.
1.1.2 Offshore/Onshore Terminal Platforms: Risk Management Per-
spective
Over the last few decades, both the frequency and consequences of accidents related to
human activities have increased significantly due to the dramatic growth of industriali-
sation, which brought workers and the public in close contact with new technologies and
materials. While modern industry expanded, a generalised concern for health, safety
and environmental impacts began to spring up in most advanced countries. Archetypal
disasters that have paved the way for a general awareness of the hazards of industrial
activities, especially of those involving hazardous materials (often referred to as Haz-
Mat), have occurred in the nuclear industry: the Three Mile Island (1979) disaster and
the enormous catastrophe of Chernobyl (1986). These raised public concerns about the
risks entailed in industries and at the same time suddenly boosted the study of accident
frequencies and facilities reliability (Taneja et al., 2012).
According to the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (IS-
GOTT) (2006), an offshore/onshore terminal is a platform at the edge of an ocean, river
or lake for receiving ships and transferring HazMat and other oil cargoes to and from
them. These terminals have specially designed equipment to help in the loading/un-
loading activities. Cranes and storage tank farm facilities are often located very close
by. Critical to the functioning of offshore/onshore terminal platforms is providing access
to intermodal transportation, for instance, an intermodal node where goods are load-
ed/unloaded to/from vessels and sent to their destination, be it onshore or offshore. A
terminal platforms system could be thought of as a complex, often huge environment,
where several operations are carried out such as CMOs. Hydrocarbons are typically the
major commodities being explored, stored or transhipped at offshore/onshore terminal
platforms (ICS, 2006).
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Risk management (RM) is an integral part of safety assessment. RM is a process
where the adverse effects of risk are controlled or minimised to avoid any damage to
which an organisation may be exposed (IOSH 2000, Shang and Tseng 2010). A risk
may be conceptualised in terms of an event and consequence. For example, if A occurs,
then it causes B. Organisations quantify risk with two parameters: the likelihood that
a given event will occur and the impact of that event. For instance, NASA created
two-dimensional risk charts that use the likelihood of an event and the impact of the
event as either axis. Where high likelihood and high impact intersect, it denotes a
serious problem, whereas low likelihood and low impact are less important. Various
combinations in-between indicate serious, moderate and minor problems. Generally,
risks may require risk mitigation plans to alleviate the risk or move it to an insignificant
lesser level of importance (Madni and Sievers, 2014)
1.2 Research Motivation and Problems
Shipping/operational risk impacts associated with increased accidents can cause severe
explosion, damage to infrastructure and environment and loss of life with devastating
consequences. It has become apparent that the challenges of these risks/hazards are
so enormous that flexible yet robust risk analysis methods are required in order to
tackle such unpredictable events. This research study seeks to find a novel solution in
the face of a major disruption where a system could adapt, sustain and recover from
the uncertainties looming around oil terminal operational vulnerability. However, a
systematic methodology to deal with such issues appears to be lacking. There is a
need to move away from the current assessment techniques and focus on the proposed
resilience framework and models.
Important questions to be considered and answered at the end of this research are:
• Will the proposed research framework and models affect the operations on oil termi-
nals?
• What are the risks/hazards involved in oil terminal operations?
• What is the value of the proposed novel risk/hazard model(s) to OTOs?
• How do we implement the proposed research framework and models in case studies?
• Should operators attribute loss to normal errors in measuring risk/hazards, or rely on
improved techniques to rectify measuring of errors?
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The primary aim of this research is to investigate the uncertainties for oil terminal op-
erations in order to monitor, control and mitigate the operational risks. The proactive
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nature of this research will be beneficial in satisfying stakeholders requirements in con-
trolling losses from operational hazards. One of the best ways in which to enhance oil
terminal platform proactiveness is to meet the following:
1. Collect and review the literature and published material on the resilience modelling
approach, oil terminal operations, risk assessments, maritime safety and regulatory
guidelines.
2. Develop a research framework in order to integrate the necessary components to
present a preferred approach for oil terminal operations.
3. Based on the proposed research framework, develop models to support the pro-
posed framework using the Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese Model (UtiSch+),
Bayesian Network (BN) and Prospect Theory (PT) modelling techniques.
4. Conduct an empirical study to validate the research via data collection on oil
terminal operations to support the proposed research framework and models.
5. Case study analysis to justify the proposed framework and models.
1.4 The Scope of the Research
The intent of this research is to provide stakeholders with recommendations on appro-
priate methodologies for assessing risks/hazards under uncertainty resulting from oil
terminal operational systems, with the intent of satisfying stakeholders requirements for
controlling losses from OTOs. The risk components covered in these methodologies are
related to:
1. Oil terminals in the vicinity of highly active reputable ports; risks include the
current and change in probability of ship navigation, (un)docking, pipe trestles,
vapour handling, pumping, storage, loading and oﬄoading.
2. Consequences resulting from oil operation-related accidents such as environmental
consequences, consequences to the ship and port, and third-party consequences.
3. Other issues to be addressed in the study include effects on search and rescue
operations, oil spill monitoring, surveillance and security and their risk-reduction
measures.
4. All types of oil carrier vessels will be considered in this research, although the
focus will be on commercial vessels.
1.5 Research Methodology
This research adopted a qualitative and quantitative research method. An empirical
study was conducted and data were collected via questionnaire survey from experts,
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specialist, consultants and academicians with vast and relative experience of OTOs
from specific crude oil-producing regions/countries and countries where large amounts
of crude oil are being consumed/transported. The questionnaire was pilot tested and the
results of the pilot study were used to reword the questions. The reviewed questionnaire
was then used to undertake the empirical study via the internet. A link and a cover letter
were e-mailed to targeted expert participants and then followed up. Expert participants
such as; executive directors, senior managers, consultants, ship captains and academi-
cians with industry experience are the most knowledgeable individuals within a firm
who are able to answer all aspects of the survey. Data were collected through the same
web-link as soon as the respondent completed the questions. This research adopted an e-
mail questionnaire because it is easy to administer. Its advantage is that it reaches very
busy experts/participant/respondents in the shortest period of time. The data collected
was analysed using the Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese Model (UtiSch+), Bayesian
Network (BN) and Prospect Theory (PT) was used to determine the best alternative
among different alternatives for strategic decisions for resilience improvements.
1.6 Research Challenges
Various challenges were faced in the identification of hazards, risk/hazard evaluation
and reduction/mitigation of oil terminal operational hazards under high uncertainty in
this PhD thesis. There were also difficulties encountered in the application of advanced
computing models employed as a tool to address these challenges. The prominent chal-
lenges faced while conducting this research and how they can be addressed are described
as follows:
• The task of conducting Hazard Identification (HAZID): it was clear from previous
studies that there had been no comprehensive investigation of oil terminal op-
erational hazards. The confidentiality of resources in the oil sector has made it
even more difficult to conduct HAZID; thus, this research adopted a proactive ap-
proach. The use of a proactive approach can be justified in different studies (Ren
et al., 2008; Mokhtari et al., 2012; Salleh et al., 2014; John et al., 2016).Therefore,
a thorough critical appraisal of collected literature relevant to this research com-
bined with experts judgements from a brainstorming session using an identified
hazards checklist was used to reveal oil terminal operational hazards.
• Choosing the right methodology: to determine what kind of methodology and re-
search design can best answer the research question posed a challenge. Since no
similar investigation has been carried out on oil terminal platforms, an empirical
approach based on a mixed research method (qualitative and quantitative) was
adopted to deal with such challenges. Qualitative research aims to discover and
understand meaning, interpretations, ideas, beliefs and values, as well as to de-
scribe and understand experience of a problem. The quantitative research method
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is characterised by collection of numerical data, demonstrating the relationship
between theory and research.
• Development of a novel model for ranking hazard factors (HFs): understanding the
assumption behind the Utility Theory and the Swiss Cheese Model to determine
the relative weights of the HFs was a challenge. The Utility Theory was based
on experts behaviour to elicit a response to a question while the Swiss Cheese
Model incorporates several safety barriers for risk mitigation. This difficult task
was tackled by integrating the theory and the model to develop a novel technique
(UtiSch+) to determine the relative weight for further risk/hazard evaluation.
• Estimation of the failure probabilities of HFs that can lead to an accident on OTOs:
to estimate and facilitate the conversion of failure possibilities to their respective
failure probabilities is a major challenge due to uncertainty. This problem is solved
by adopting a dynamic model, the Bayesian Network (BN). The BN has been
established as an ubiquitous tool for modelling and reasoning under uncertainty.
The Netica (Netica, 2002) software is a robust BN software package. The software
imposes no limitations for missing random data or the absence of an observation.
The algorithms in the software can handle new evidence.
• The selection of the best strategy for resilience optimisation: on the other hand, the
selection of the best strategy for resilience optimisation is addressed as a multi-
attribute decision-making problem, and this was solved by adopting Prospect The-
ory (PT). PT is used to obtain overall prospect values (u(R)) from a number of
different strategic decision alternatives; the greater the u(R) from the set of al-
ternatives, the higher it will be classified in the list of best strategic resilience
decision
1.7 Achievement of the Research
The achievement of this research will be in the proposed novel resilience framework,
which is supported by the developed models. One of the model was implemented by the
integration of behavioural and conceptual technique. Behavioural characteristics can
play a key role in decision making during CMOs. The proposed framework can be used
by oil industry, terminal stakeholders and in the marine domain. A detailed researched
novel resilience framework was developed which presents a platform for techniques to
be built on, to improve the resiliency of a system. The proposed framework will help
in the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies for collect-
ing, analysing and interpreting data for OTOs. Another achievement this study will
present is the development of a generic methodology that will provide a platform for a
robust risk management model where hazards associated with a terminal’s operations
can be assessed and strategic resilience decisions can be made appropriately. Finally,
the proposed novel resilience framework and models will demonstrate their effectiveness,
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flexibility and robustness to tackle unpredictable events, as well as provide solutions for
real-life problems on OTOs.
1.8 PhD Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of seven chapters and follows a common writing structure: Chap-
ter 1 is the introduction. It states the research background, aim, objectives and the
generated research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical appraisal of the development of
risk management from a resilience, operational and regulatory perspectives for OTOs.
More so, the chapter provides an account of the uncertainties existing in oil terminal
platforms, giving details of the identified possible operational hazards. Chapter 2 review
resilience from an engineering perspective, as a strategy that could be used to improve a
system’s vulnerability to major disruption for OTOs. Chapter 3 discusses the proposed
research methodologies, qualitative and quantitative research method adopted and also
presents the proposed conceptual framework for this research. Chapter 3 also provides
an account of how specific models’ methodologies will be used to justify the concep-
tual framework for resilience optimisation. Chapter 4 is the first phase of the conceptual
framework. It reports the survey by empirical study, where the data collected were anal-
ysed using the integration of Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese Model. This was carried
out to determine the relative importance of the identified uncertainties that may lead
to a system’s failure. Chapter 4 will be the core step towards resilience that will lead to
the design of a strategic optimisation model. Chapter 5 is the second phase of the con-
ceptual framework. It provides a dynamic complementary analysis model which shows
the relationship between researched variables that could cause a partial/total failure. A
Bayesian Network (BN) model is used in this chapter. Chapter 6 is the third phase of
the conceptual framework. Prospect Theory (PT) is used to provide the much-needed
resilience strategy to reduce or mitigate risk/hazard. Chapter 7 discusses the results
produced in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and the merits and demerits of the model used in
the chapters respectively. Chapter 7 also concludes the PhD thesis; it summarises the
research results, limitations and the research’s contribution to knowledge. The chapter
ends with directions for further studies. Fig 1.1 shows the overall thesis structure.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Summary
This chapter is an appraisal of the important literature that has influenced the current
study. It discusses the operational overview of OTOs, risk assessment models, resilience
engineering literature, safety management and the uncertainties in oil terminals. It
also reviews the literature concerning the identified modelling techniques suited for this
research.
2.1 Introduction
A seaport is an infrastructure system for receiving ships and transporting cargoes and
people to and from its system. Basically, it is an inter-modal node where goods are
loaded and oﬄoaded to and from vessels and sent to their destination. Seaport systems
are complex environment due to their diverse operations (Ronza et al., 2007), it aid
in performing services in response to societal demand, providing infrastructure, oper-
ating procedures, management practices, and developing policies to accommodate and
facilitate its dynamic services. Seaport terminals have always been volatile due to new
demands placed on them. The growing volatility in maritime ports, stimulated by the
global trends of liberalization, economic expansion of Europe, and changes in producer
and consumer markets (China, India, Brazil, Eastern Europe) are adding to the uncer-
tainty surrounding port operation, planning, and investment (Taneja et al., 2012). The
requirements of vast vessels (requiring deeper drafts and longer berths) as well as the
optimisation in operational scale and scope have led to the demand for port expansion,
and this has been responsible for ports being built in close proximity to city centres (e.g.
the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam, Los Angeles), shifting operational activities towards
land. The increasing recognition of uncertainty due to port expansion has re-invigorated
researchers to explore other means and ways for seaports to display flexibility and more
adaptive capabilities. A significant amount of research is required before development
can get underway, i.e. the feasibility and consequences of planned changes relating to
management, stakeholders and infrastructures. Projects in the maritime industry are
11
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seen as engineering projects, which require a firm system approach to dictate significant
perception of problems, objectives, methods, criteria and solutions. In the maritime in-
dustry, performance measures are generally time, cost and quality. However, as seaports
seek to strike a balance between social, ecological and business needs and objectives, it is
being realised that soft issues are equally important. Stakeholders with multiple hetero-
geneous perceptions, values and interests are involved in safety, environmental impacts,
legal acceptability, political and social impact issues and there is a need to address such
an issues at the beginning of such seaport project.
The maritime industry, by nature, is very conventional and diversifying from the
norm, and has often proven to be difficult. Offshore/onshore oil terminal platforms have
continually been adapted to new requirements and regulations in design and operation.
Modern technologies have been absorbed into the maritime industry and these technolo-
gies are being used to address a whole variety of issues, including operational efficiencies,
environmental conditions and security. The impacts of such technologies such as bigger
vessels, new equipment configurations, new logistic concepts, new cargo handling con-
cepts, advancements in ICT leading to development of information systems such as GIS
(Geographic Information Systems), dynamic real-time control of operations, efficient
data collection and processing time, new camera systems, new gate processing systems,
and the introduction of radiation detection monitoring systems leads to increased ter-
minal productivity and efficiency, but new safety concerns on maritime infrastructures
tend to emerge (Taneja et al., 2012).
Oil terminals play an important role in freight transportation. When an accident
occurs, the terminal cannot perform its desired functions, which thus results in failure
(Baublys, 2007). A great number of factors such as human error, technical failure, media,
nature and management (Ding and Tseng, 2012) influence the operation of a terminal
and may cause its malfunction. The safety in design and operation in oil terminals is a
prime concern for operating companies because these hazards have a high potential for
failures (Elsayed et al., 2009). In this research, the regular operations of oil terminals will
be discussed, focusing on understanding terminal behaviour and considering unforeseen
influences that may be internal or external in nature (Mokhtari et al., 2011). A risk
assessment for oil terminal operations and ship interface (Hess and Hess, 2010) is an
important process in safety management.
Requirements and Interface Definitions
The definitions of requirements and interfaces result from a flow down of users and cus-
tomers needs through a process of refinement and allocation. Madni and Sievers (2013)
defined requirements and interface as verifiable agreements that specify functionality
and performance requirements within and between system components. Ship and ter-
minal interface is the first activity carried out between port operators and vessel crew
on arrival at any seaport before any major operation commences. Each requirement
and interface is verified through a process that typically involves analysis, inspection
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and/or demonstration. Interfaces enable communication and interaction between ele-
ments within a system as well as between the system and its environment. More so, they
are treated in the same way using common semantics because the two are intimately
linked and quite often viewed as the same. They both represent binding contracts.
For a clearer understanding of terms, certain key words and phrases will be used
regularly throughout this research. it is best to define them, such as:
• Risk is defined as a measure of the adverse effects of a hazard; The probability that
something unwanted can happen from a hazard (Hoj and Kroger, 2002; Hollnagel,
2008).
• Safety is defined as the absence of risk (Hollnagel, 2008).
• Hazard is a physical condition or situation with the potential to cause harm to people,
damage to properties, environment, plant, operation interruptions or increased
liabilities (HSE, 2004; Trbojevic and Carr, 2000).
• Hazard Factors (HFs) are external or internal causes of major hazards under high
uncertainty with unexpected consequences to people, properties, environment and
operations.
• Uncertainty can be defined as an unexpected event (due to improper information
concerning certain parameters) where there is the probability of a negative con-
sequences to people or other risk targets e.g ships, terminals or OTOs (Hess and
Hess, 2010; Taneja et al., 2012).
• An event is defined as an action or occurrence that take place at a determinable time
and place, with or without the involvement of humans.
• An accident is an event that results in injury or ill health (HSE, 2004).
• Accident barriers are an effective means against known risk, which are used reactively
or as a response to prevent the pathways of unwanted events from occurring and
to protect against their consequences (Hollnagel, 2008). They absorb shocks and
reduce system uncertainty.
• Incidents are near miss and/or undesired circumstances which have the potential to
cause injury or ill health (HSE, 2004).
• Resilience is defined as a function of systems vulnerability against potential disruption
with adaptive, avoidance and survival capabilities of recovering from the face of a
major shock, enabling it to continue its activities within a reasonable time frame
during and after a major accident(Wreathall, 2006; Mansouri et al., 2010).
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2.2 Current Practices in Maritime Safety
Previous research on port terminal safety has dealt with the major trends in ports, such
that, the identified driving force behind these trends are uncertainty (Taneja et al., 2012).
The subsequent question asked on the current safety approaches for port operation eval-
uations is, if it can cope with these uncertainties. Different literatures have mentioned
that the major limitations in the current safety practices are: (1) much focus is on port
infrastructure facilities but not enough on port operation and maintenance, and (2) ig-
noring uncertainties while planning, and confusing risk and uncertainty with each other.
Taneja et al. (2012) suggest the importance of reviewing how organisations currently
plan and deal with safety issues in ports to see how they deal with uncertainties.
A safety case covers all standards of management health and safety, the control of
major hazards identified within a system and it specifies how the risk involved are to
be managed or minimised (Sii et al., 2002). Following the public inquiry into the Piper
Alpha accident (1988) which claimed 167 lives, the response to the accepted findings of
the Piper Alpha inquiry launched a review of all offshore safety legislation and imple-
mented changes (Wang, 2002). In 1993, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) adopted by
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was the norm for a strategic oversight
of safety and pollution prevention in the maritime sector. FSA processes involves haz-
ards/risk identifying, hazard/risks evaluation and deciding on an appropriate course of
action to manage these hazards/risks. This provided a good platform for safety man-
agement practices. Trbojevic and Carr (2000) developed an improved methodology for
safety improvements in ports; the Integrated Safety Management System (ISM) which
entails hazard identification and qualitative risk assessment. In the ISM, controls for
managing hazards are developed and integrated into the Safety Management System,
thus establishing barriers to prevent hazards occurrences. The Safety Management Sys-
tem (SMS) in the ISMs was further developed, through a quantified risk assessment
that provides detailed assessment of risks/hazards and the identification /selection of
the most appropriate management strategies. This conforms with the requirements of
Port Marine Safety Code which applies to all UK ports, laid down by the department
for transport and monitored by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in consultation
with the industry. The implementation of a SMS is the most proficient way of allocating
resources towards safety. SMS implementation does not only improve working condi-
tions, but also positively influences employees attitudes and behaviours with regards to
safety, thus improving the safety climate considered as the basic component of a firm’s
safety culture in various models (Ferna´ndez-Mun˜iz et al., 2007). The purpose of SMS
is to ensure that the organisation is achieving their goals safely, efficiently and without
damaging the environment (Wang, 2002) therefore, high risk areas must be investigated
in detail and the approach for risk prioritisation discussed by management. Wang (2002)
proposed a proactive, risk-based goal setting regime introduced to the marine and off-
shore industries to increase the level of safety, yet noted that there can be significant
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uncertainties in the information and factors that are used in the decision-making pro-
cess (Sii et al., 2002). Uncertainties could be on the availability of data, estimates of
costs, time scales, risks/hazards, safety benefits, assessment of stakeholder views and
perceptions. Wang suggested that common sense can be used to ensure any uncertain-
ties are recognised and addressed but common sense is no longer acceptable in the 21st
Century due to new challenges such as technological advances, i.e. improvements in ship
design and navigation aids which have reduced the frequency and severity of shipping
incidents. The reduction of failures using technology has revealed the underlying level
of the influence of human error in accident causation (Hetherington et al., 2006).
In the past decade, there was an insight that the reliability of complex systems to
safely achieve operational goals depends on social structures as well as technical arrange-
ments (Mearns et al., 2003). IMO has continuously dealt with safety problems in the
context of operation, management, survey, ship navigation and the role of administration
because there are enormous penalties for the lack of safety in an organisation; lives lost,
damage to the environment, which the maritime industries want to avoid (Soares and
Teixeira, 2001). Data on accidents at sea have primarily been generated and investigated
by agencies affiliated with countries within which these accidents occurred or who flag
the vessels. There have not been a standardised accident reporting systems for marine
operations, thus possess a problem in trying to reveal causal themes from accident data
(Hetherington et al., 2006). Fig 2.1 shows the main percentage of the principal causes of
safety problems in maritime transportation and Fig 2.2 shows distribution of potential
annual loss in Maritime Transport System (MTS).
Figure 2.1: Percentage of the principal causes of safety problems (Soares and Teixeira,
2001)
In offshore safety analysis, safety-based design and operation decisions are expected
to be made at the earliest stages in order to reduce unexpected costs and time delays
(Wang, 2002). In hazardous environments such as onshore/offshore oil installations, it
is essential to audit safety climate of the workforce and management practices. The
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of potential annual loss in MTS (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000)
onshore/offshore oil and gas industry is distinctive because of the convergence of several
hazardous factors; among these are the potential for fire, explosion, transit accidents
and blowouts, work stress that can result from these threats, attendant priority of high
reliability operation, and the relative isolation of installations. There is a continual risk
of organisational shutdown or fatal accidents resulting from unanticipated actions of
employees on offshore installations.
Poor standards, human error and management shortcomings on marine casualties
motivated the introduction of the ISM which is directly related to the general operational
aspect of shipping. Industries have to show an effective safety management system
that addresses threats, and provide a proper control measure for dealing with these
threats (Soares and Teixeira, 2001). A limited amount of research has identified that
the best safety management practice are in the offshore industry (Mearns et al., 2003).
However, the shipping industry has a fairly good safety record but in all, maritime
incidents/accidents always have a high potential of catastrophes (Hetherington et al.,
2006).
2.2.1 Structured and Systematic Models in Maritime Safety: A Com-
parative Study
Different researchers have proposed different structured and systematic methodology
aiming at enhancing maritime safety. The Formal safety assessment (FSA) has been
gradually and broadly used in the shipping industry around the world since adopted
by IMO at the 62nd meeting of Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 1993 (Hu et al.,
2007). The FSA approach which is also an integral aspect of ISM, integrates quan-
titative risk assessment and a generic risk model especially frequency and severity as
a criteria (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000). To maximise marine safety, there is a need to
model hazards/risks in a logical way and safety-based decisions to be made confidently.
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As such, ISM provides safety engineers in the maritime industry an overview of the off-
shore safety case approach and formal ship safety assessment (Wang, 2002). The FSA
approach has been used on risk models in ship navigation, vessels, offshore/onshore
terminals, tank farms, container terminals, naval architecture, pipeline transportation,
and Maritime critical infrastructures and transportation (MCIT). The implementation
of ISM improves working conditions and organisations safety climate (Ferna´ndez-Mun˜iz
et al., 2007; Ren et al., 2008; Santos-Reyes and Beard, 2008).
Existing approaches to safety management represent a step forward in managing
safety but may not be enough to address the changing safety issues effectively in the
last few years (Santos-Reyes and Beard, 2008). A Systemic Safety Management Sys-
tem (SSMS) model was proposed as a sufficient structure, aimed at maintaining op-
erational risk within an acceptable range in a coherent way (Santos-Reyes and Beard,
2008, 2009).The model has a fundamentally preventive potentiality and when adopted,
it tends to make the probability of failure less than otherwise. The SSMS model intends
to help provide a structural organisation that may facilitate the implementation and
maintenance of safety culture as well as managing safety by treating an organisation as
both vertically and horizontally interdependent. Vertical interdependence uses the con-
cept of ’recursion’, thus favours ’relative autonomy’ which helps to maintain risk within
an acceptable range at each level of recursion effectively. The horizontal interdepen-
dence deal with the interrelationships amongst the various subsystems that form part
of system. SSMS can be applied in a reactive way, to examine a failed system or proac-
tively, to examine a system which has not yet failed, i.e. as a ’template’ to a past failed
system or a ’laid on’ for current un-failed system thereby leading to a more effective
safety management for the oil and gas industry (Santos-Reyes and Beard, 2009).
In the shipping industry, enhancing maritime safety involves a set of decision makers
focussing on the frequency and severity criteria in ship navigation. Models based on
Relative Risk Assessment (MRRA) present a risk-assessment approach based on fuzzy
functions and has already been used for the assessment of pilotage safety in Shanghai
harbour, China. It is a useful method to solve problems in the risk assessment of safety
system on ship operation in certain navigation areas such as oil terminals (Hu et al.,
2007). A fuzzy AHP model was used to identify attributes mainly in the navigating
services provided by port authorities in the context of regulators, maritime pilots, and
tugboat drivers. Hsu, (2012) used Dissatisfaction Attitude (DA) to determine the at-
tributes’ priorities enhancing port authorities to create policies for the improvement of
ship navigation safety within port terminals. The research recommended that operators’
personal capabilities should be enhanced, such as professional skills, communication abil-
ities, and work attitudes. A risk-based modelling approach was developed using fuzzy
extended fault tree analysis (FFTA) that combines the effects of organisational faults
and shipboard technical system failures under a unique risk assessment to enhance the
execution process of accident investigation in maritime safety (Celik et al., 2010). This
model was used to address the integration of FFTA into shipping accident investigation
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reports to ensure a consistent database and subsequent decision aid, to accident analysis
and prevention efforts in the maritime transportation industry.
Structural equation model (SEM) was used to develop a measurement scale, oper-
ationalising the safety management system concept, and subsequently calculating its
reliability and validity. This provided a tool for organisations to evaluate situation with
regards to safety management, as well as guidance on areas that must be improved, to
reduce occupational accidents (Ferna´ndez-Mun˜iz et al., 2007). SEM is more specific to
each type of process. Introducing variables relating to operational control or manage-
ment changes could make the model more specific to major risk installations. SEM was
also used for the analysis of marine accidents, grounded on large empirical data; the
Swedish Maritime Administration database containing marine accidents organized by
ship and variable and the model has both theoretical and practical values (Mullai and
Paulsson, 2011). SEM is proven to be complementary with the strength of multiple anal-
ysis techniques in explaining a structure, variance, and power of the identified leading
indicators (safety factors) of adverse events in safety-critical settings. It also provides
an orthogonal validation methods for the results (Grabowski et al., 2010).
Models such as the Swiss Cheese analogy model (Reason, 1997), the Bowtie model
(Hollnagel, 2008), the FSA (IMO, 2002), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree
Analysis (ETA) techniques (Ferdous et al., 2011), and other models (Leveson, 2004; Van
Drop et al., 2001; Li et al., 2009; Larsson et al., 2010) have been introduced or proposed
by experts in the fields with no reference to or systematic analysis of empirical data. Also,
a lot of models are based on theories or concepts, e.g. systems theory concepts (Leveson,
2004; Laracy, 2006; Larsson et al., 2010), the Bayesian Belief Network concept (BBN)
(Trucco et al., 2008; Merrick and Singh, 2003), Neural Networks (NN) concept (Hashemi
et al., 1995; Le Blanc et al., 2001), fuzzy logic (Sii et al., 2001), risk-based approaches
(Vanemand Skjong, 2006; Celik et al., 2010), simulation and expert judgement (Harrald
et al., 1998).
According to Harrald et al. (1998), theoretical framework is of little use in an analysis
unless there is relevant data to support it (Mullai and Paulsson, 2011). Analysts are
confronted with incomplete and misleading data that makes it difficult to use theoretical
frameworks and as a result, significant modelling assumptions have to be made in order
to produce valid results. The data issues are common problems in maritime safety and
that can be partly attributed to inadequate accident models (Huang et al., 2004; Celik
et al., 2010).
In summary, no single model has the capability of serving all systems, issues, and
needs in the maritime industry at all times. It is therefore relevant and important to
develop a model grounded on empirical data that would primarily make use of data con-
tained in the databases. As large-scale organisations and systems become more complex
and difficult to understand. Thus, with notable failure on organisational practices to
prevent disaster for safety critical systems, interest in identifying leading indicators of
adverse events in safety-critical settings has increased (Grabowski et al., 2010). Various
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governments are focusing on safety chain as a concept for structuring options for risk mit-
igation. Efforts are made to control low probability disasters, such as floods, hurricanes
and large-scale industrial accidents using safety chain concept consisting of proactive,
preventive, preparation, repression and recovery. A similar approach is adopted in USA
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2003, to address safety and
security issues (Jongejan et al., 2012). Fig 2.3 represents a safety chain for an effective
safety management.
Proaction
PreventionRecovery
PreparationRepression
Figure 2.3: Representation of an effective Safety Management Chain (Jongejan et al.,
2012)
Standard techniques from engineering such as resilience engineering and, risk analysis
and reliability engineering can be adopted for the reduction of risks. This can be achieved
by designing socio-technical systems in a way to ensure safe performance, although
the probability of an accident, however remote, will always remain. Industries and
organisations have long measured safety and organisational performance in safety-critical
systems, tracking accidents, near misses, lost time, resources, and personnel providing
early warning of impending failure to enhance safety (Grabowski et al., 2010; Jongejan
et al., 2012).
2.2.2 Outline of the Offshore Safety Regulations
The UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) with the assistance of the HSE have
published industries guidelines on a framework for risk related decision support. The
proposed guidelines could be beneficial for a wide range of applications under various
conditions. The guidelines describe a generic framework which is able to help decision
makers to identify a decision context for choosing an appropriate basis for decision
making. The proposed framework provides a means to assess the relative importance of
codes and standards, good practice, engineering judgement, risk analysis, cost benefit
analysis, company and social values when making a decision. It is an appropriate basis
to improve decision making which will result to a more transparent process to the wider
public.
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The guidelines were then transformed to regulation and were further refined into
the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974. In 1992 a draft of the offshore safety case
regulations was produced (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011). It was later modified upon
public consultation and opinion. The regulations came into force at the end of May 1993
and November 1993 for new and existing installations respectively (Wang and Foinikis,
2001). Offshore operators will have to submit operational safety cases for all existing
and new offshore installations to the Offshore Safety Division of the HSE. The case must
feature suitable use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as part of the demonstration
of the adequacy of preventive and protective measures. Formal safety assessment (FSA)
was then adopted for all member states of the IMO.
The subsequent years of application of the offshore safety case approach in the UK
based on field experience lead to the amendment of the safety case regulations in 1996
to include the verification of safety-critical elements. In 1996, offshore installations and
wells regulations (DCR 1996) (including design and construction, etc.) were introduced
to tackle various stages of the life cycle of installation. The regulations place more
emphases on inherent safe design, prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures
to be implemented, maintained and verified throughout the life-cycle of such installations
(Sii et al., 2002).
The main significance of the offshore safety regulations in the UK is the absence of a
prescriptive regime, which defines specific duties of operators and adequate means. The
regulations set forth high-level safety objectives, while leaving the selection of particular
hazard arrangements in the hands of the operator. For reason being that the source of
hazards of an installation are specific to its function and site conditions (Wang, 2002).
2.3 Oil Terminal Operations (OTOs) in Onshore and Off-
shore Terminals
In recent years, advanced computer technologies have been increasingly used to fulfil
control tasks to reduce human error, and to provide operators with a better working
environment. However, the utilisation of software in control system has introduced new
failure modes and created problems in the development of safety-critical systems. A high
level of uncertainty in failure data has been of major concern, which has been highlighted
in the UKOOAs framework for risk related decision support. Novel decision-making
models integrated in safety assessment are also required to make operation decisions ef-
fectively and efficiently (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; Wang, 2002). Furthermore literatures
reveal that operation is probably the main contributor of accidents in onshore/offshore
terminals. Increasingly, more study should be prioritised on CMOs and a formalised
risk assessment should gradually become more common in complex systems (Soares and
Teixeira, 2001). The offshore/onshore facilities identified as marine platforms are as
follows: (1) trans-shipment stations, (2) a maritime floating port terminal, (3) drilling
platforms, (4) crude oil recovering platforms, (5) crude oil production platforms, (6)
Chapter 2. Literature Review 21
linking platforms, (7) water injection platforms, (8) pumping platforms, (9) shelter plat-
forms, (10) telecommunication platforms, (11) crude oil measurement platforms, and
(12) flaring platforms (Villasenor et al., 2003). Offshore/onshore installations and ships
have constantly adopted new approaches, technology, and hazardous cargoes. Each ele-
ment brings with it a new hazard in one form or the other, therefore the lack of reliable
safety data as well as confidence in safety assessment in safety-critical operations has
been the two major problems in the safety analysis of such complex systems. To solve
such problems, further research is required to develop novel risk assessment model to
tackle uncertainties and also to adopt decision-making techniques on a rational basis
(Wang, 2002). In 2001, oil transportation rose to 12.8 trillion tonne kilometres (Ttkm)
as compared to 6.5 Ttkm in 1985. When dealing with ship and OTOs, uncertainties are
present in such processes, thus optimisation under high uncertainties is essential within
operational research. Such operations could be deterministic or stochastic terminal be-
haviour, depending on the processes (Hess and Hess, 2010). Tankers, usually large ships
are used for shipping oil cargoes in bulk. This has been the method of transporting
large quantities of oil around the world. The classifications of tankers according to their
capacity for transporting oil are as follows:
a) General Purpose (GP) tankers, with a loading capacity of under 38,000 tonnes,
b) Medium Range (MR) tankers, with a loading capacity of 38,000 to 50,000 tonnes,
c) Panamax tankers, which can access a Panama Canal and has a loading capacity of
50,000 to 79,000 tonnes,
d) Aframax tankers, with a loading capacity of 80,000 to 125,000 tonnes,
e) Suezmax tankers, with a loading capacity of 125,000 to 200,000 tonnes and also can
access a Suez Canal,
f) Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tankers, which has a loading capacity of over
200,000 tonnes, and
g) Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC), generally considered as super tankers because
they are ships capable of carrying above 250,000 tonnes.
When tankers, super tankers and liquid bulk carriers were first introduced, their sizes
and draft (especially VLCC and ULCC) prevented them from docking at many existing
docks. This required them to discharge their cargo into floating storage unit with the
aid of a Single Point Mooring facility connected to a Pipeline End Manifold which then
oﬄoads visa-vis and termed a lightering operation. A typical super tank has a very poor
manoeuvrability, and are vulnerable to grounding due to uncertainties while operating
close to terminals and shorelines. Operations involving oil carriers include manoeuvring
(with or without tugs), navigations, berthing, (off) loading, bunkering (vessel re-fuelling)
and transhipment of oil generally performed with raiser pipes or hoses.
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A number of novel techniques and innovative platform layouts have been tested and
implemented in the last few decades, to make onshore and offshore infrastructures safer.
Most important, loss prevention and risk assessment are now taken into account in com-
plex marine operational systems and many conceptual techniques are available for risk
identification, assessment, reduction and prevention during operation. HAZOP (Wang,
2002; Berenguer et al., 2011),FMECA (Wang, 2002),what-if analysis, preliminary haz-
ard analysis had been used for operational hazard identification. FTA and ETA models
(Ronza et al., 2006; Ferdous et al., 2011) were used to establish failure or, forecast the
effects of anticipated failure and several of them have been implemented into computer
programs. Other more structured methods used are the Quantitative Risk Analysis
(QRA) and the inexpensive Qualitative Risk Analysis (QRA). Qualitative risk analysis
is based on using a risk matrices (occurrence, consequences and severity ranges) while
quantitative risk analysis adopts algorithms that allow the risk level associated with an
operation be described by means of number or score (Ronza et al., 2007). More focus
on conducting risk analysis that is specifically tailored to the operational phase of a
selected infrastructure has become inevitable (Chen and Chen, 2010).Fig 2.4 shows a
generic OTOs in an offshore/onshore terminal.
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Figure 2.4: A Generic Oil Terminal Operation (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000)
Whilst tankers and bulk carriers are loaded with no more than two different haz-
ardous materials at a time, they are complicated with highly dynamic interactions among
several operating systems. The fact that there are situations in which information is
incomplete or imprecise, as well as views that are subjective or endowed with linguis-
tic characteristics, the presence of uncertainty is inevitable. Researchers have proposed
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fuzzy-based method to perform risk assessment at seaports and offshore terminal oper-
ations (Ren et al., 2005; Elsayed, 2009; Mokhtari et al., 2011; Tang et al., 2011; Ding
and Tseng, 2012).
Most of the criteria used to assess the operations and technological processes of oil
terminals are interlinked, and are called optimality criteria. The criteria of optimality
should be considered as being random rather. Tang et al. (2011) proposed a multicrite-
ria fuzzy optimisation model using fuzzy set theory to improve oil terminal operations
and safety during berthing and mooring. The model considered vessel motion and line
tensions and their non-uniformity coefficients as criteria. The analysed result shows
that the proposed model is applicable in structural improvement in oil terminal layout.
Offshore/onshore terminals are platforms where operations such as the Single Point
Mooring(SPM) are employed. Accident while carrying out a complex operation between
SPM equipments and a ship platform can cause serious losses. The possibility of reduc-
ing risk and increasing safety is of optimal importance and as such Paulauskas (2009)
analysed dangerous situations with ships and SPM equipment at berth. Elsayed et al.
(2009) proposed a probabilistic multi-attribute risk model, where multi-attribute Utility
Theory is used to combine the effects of different consequences into a unified utility
measure during loading and oﬄoading operation of LNG ships at ship and terminal
interface. The identified risks were assessed and ranked in terms of severity.
At an Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) presentation held in Houston, Texas,
USA (2010), it was advocated that due to most practical risk analysis, problems are char-
acterised by a large set of interrelated uncertain quantities and alternatives. Bayesian
Network (BN) as a tool will further develop operational risk management system be-
cause it accounts for risks inherited or generated during the operational phase as well
as epistemic uncertainties introduced from changes during the operational phase itself
(Ren et al., 2008). Even though BN has not yet been proven to be effective in OTOs,
other researchers have proposed the use of the bow-tie mode (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000;
Hollnagel, 2008; Mokhtari et al., 2011; Shahriar et al., 2012) approach to assess risk in
port terminals. An empirical study was conducted on the effects of safety climate on
terminal operation, focusing on employees perception, and SEM was used for decision
making purposes. The study identified that managing safety behaviours, safety train-
ing programmes and co-workers safety behaviour will help reduce injuries and accident
(Shang and Lu, 2009).
2.4 Uncertainty Perspective in the context of Maritime
Operations
Incomplete information concerning relevant parameters may stem from a partial lack of
data, either because these data are too expensive to collect or the data are impossible
to collect. Thus, to confront uncertainty is a most challenging task. Over the past three
decades, a number of uncertainty theories have emerged where pieces of information
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takes the form of fuzzy sets of possible values (Mauris, 2013). A significant amount of
study has been directed towards terminal and port management problems, but there
are still problems associated with ship and terminal interface where uncertainty due to
natural disasters, human error, mechanical failure, communication and how the organisa-
tion conceptualise uncertainty during complex marine operations come into realisation
(Hess and Hess, 2010). Future demand, vessel size, long-term space requirements for
port expansion, and future operational requirements have been identified as the major
uncertainties for port and terminals (Taneja et al., 2012).
Uncertainty can be looked at in two distinct perceptions in a decision-making con-
text: first, uncertainty might be referred to as the parameters of uncertain probabilities
associated with a particular outcome of a decision or set of outcomes, where the ex-
tent of this uncertainty is known or at least knowable; secondly, uncertainties arise
under conditions where such probabilities and outcomes cannot be precisely specified
or are unknown. However, such definitions provide little information. Therefore, for
the purpose of this research, uncertainty will be assumed as situations where there is
the probability of a negative consequences to individuals or other important risk targets
(ships, terminal and OTOs). There is a fruitful relationship between possibility and the
probability views of uncertainty representation. Possibility allows the systematisation of
notions that already existed in the probability practice of statisticians under an incom-
plete developed form (Mauris, 2013). It is traditional to deal with uncertainty through
the use of probability theory (Markowski et al., 2010).
Some of the most troubling risk and safety management challenges of our time are
characterised by uncertainties (Cox, 2012). Where, when, and how to prepare for future
effects of climate change to reduce risks/hazards of catastrophic failure, and trying to
anticipate and defend against credible threats and other adversarial risks/hazards for
robust and adaptive risk analysis methods are not yet as familiar to many risk analysts
for confronting uncertainties on OTOs. Fig 2.5 describes different uncertainty levels in
an operational environment.
2.4.1 Sources of Uncertainty in OTOs
According to a Process Safety Analysis (PSA) carried out during a chemical process, the
prediction of future accident scenario of risk, related to unwanted release of dangerous
substance were identified. Three main process components were observed; the first com-
ponent comprises of a typical qualitative analysis while the second and third components
are for quantitative analysis (Markowski et al., 2010). Models used in a PSA usually
provide a single value of risk level as an output, whereas it is generally acknowledged
that there are substantial uncertainties presented in every component of PSA. A single
risk value represent only one possible output result, belonging to a risk distribution that
reflect an uncertainty in an input data and models used in PSA. Therefore, uncertainty
in a risk process can be described as an imperfect prediction of risk in a PSA.
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Figure 2.5: Suggested taxonomy of uncertainties (Walker WE, Marchau VAWJ and
Swanson D, 2010)
Each component in a PSA has its own specific function, model and input data
required, therefore there are different uncertainty sources related to the above-mentioned
components in terms of PSA. It is convenient to distinguish the three main types of
uncertainties:
1. Completeness uncertainty,
2. Modelling uncertainty, and
3. Parameter uncertainty.
The Completeness uncertainty refers to a question if all significant phenomena
and relationships were considered. This type of uncertainty is difficult to quantify but
it is considered a major contributor to qualitative hazard analysis. Modelling uncer-
tainty refers to the inadequacies and deficiency in various models used to assess accident
scenario probabilities and consequences (Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006). The availability
and validity of these models may enable the assessment of different degrees of belief in
each model, thus it is a major type of uncertainty for consequence assessment. Param-
eter uncertainty is a subjective type of uncertainty where knowledge is elicited from
experts, which is often incomplete, imprecise and fragmentary. The imprecision and
inaccuracies on the parameters which are used as an input for PSA models are inherent
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because the available data are usually unknown and inaccurate before an accident occur,
and the inference process need to be based on the incomplete knowledge. However, there
is an opinion that parameter uncertainty is easy to quantify.
There are different available approaches for uncertainty analysis: classical statistic,
probabilistic, sensitivity analysis and possibility approach. One of the ways in analysing
the different types of uncertainty is by using the fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic is an ideal con-
cept for representing vague issues in risk assessment. It presents a degree of membership
function, indicating a possibility that certain phenomena will occur where there is no
sufficient information to use other probabilistic methods. Another advantage of fuzzy
logic is, the analysed uncertainties are not separated from the actual risk calculations
but are built within the model calculations, depending on how the input parameters
are defined. The use of fuzzy logic for risk assessment in various aspects of process
and complex systems were undertaken in previous studies (Ren et al., 2005; Yuhua and
Datao, 2005; Elsayed, 2009; Ren et al., 2009; Hejazi et al., 2011; Shahriar et al., 2012).
Fig 2.6 shows a good example of uncertainty approach in process safety analysis (PSA).
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Figure 2.6: Uncertainty approaches in PSA (Markowski et al., 2010)
Complex dynamic systems require good understanding of the uncertainties surround-
ing them. The operations of offshore/onshore systems are often associated with high level
of uncertainty due to operations under ever-changing environments leading to a range
of possible accidents (Ren et al., 2009). The question of how to deal with unpredictable
and uncertain events lingers within the research domain. Uncertainty is usually divided
into epistemic and aleatory uncertainties within the offshore and onshore terminal op-
erations: epistemic uncertainty is represented by insufficient data and lack of knowledge
about the system, resulting to inadequate hazard identification whereas aleatory uncer-
tainty stems from the variability of known quantities due to randomness of the system
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itself (Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006; Pasman et al., 2009). Addressing uncertainty on
OTOs is critical towards dealing with unforeseen events within the offshore and onshore
terminal platforms. Fig 2.7 shows OTOs having a similar type of uncertainty as PSA.
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Figure 2.7: Uncertainty approaches for OTOs as adapted in Markowski et al. (2010)
ETA and FTA have been used to address Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) release,
petrol oil release, risk analysis of oil and gas pipelines, and runaway reaction in a reac-
tor. Further research developed and proposed Fuzzy-based and evidence-theory-based
formulations to address data and dependency uncertainties (Ferdous et al., 2011). It is
important to propagate, characterise and represent uncertainty accurately to conduct a
reliable analysis (Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006). The level of uncertainty associated with
an operation in a terminal is proportional to its complexity, which is caused by vague
known relationships among various entities, and the stochastic behaviours exhibited by
these terminals. Complex dynamic systems in the maritime industry are characterised
as environmental, engineering and economic systems. They involve human interaction
and intervention; where majority of inputs and outputs are not captured analytically.
A nonlinear behaviour with an uncertainty feature require methods that combine both
expert judgement and human knowledge when developing a reliable model.
Researchers have demonstrated the use of a preventive or corrective action techniques
such as the bow-tie approach. The bow-tie technique integrates the FTA and ETA in
a common platform for decision making and risk management processes, but it is not
able to characterise model uncertainty that arises due to vagueness and lack of data.
Fuzzy logic was employed to further minimise uncertainty on maritime infrastructures
(Shahriar et al., 2012). On oil terminal platforms, a thorough study on what can help a
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bit more to monitor, mitigate and control uncertainties is required and this study aim
toward realising such further step.
2.5 Risk Management Perspective: Examining Current
trends in Ports and Oil Terminals
Various parties (operators, shipyards, regulators and government) in their respective
working contexts are very often involved in a sequence of events leading to an accident;
this is the most critical issue in developing an effective risk or accident analysis. One good
example of an error is an operator on-board ship operation, whom is presumed as the
final act of a long and complex chain of organisational and systemic errors (Trucco et al.,
2008). The IMOs suggested guidelines for safety management (see Subsection 2.2.2) has
been effective, and the approach has supported the identification and evaluation of risk
control option at the international panel of different European countries. However, the
significant reduction of risk and safety concerns for OTOs come into context. Risk is
present everywhere: nature itself is a cause of a disaster, thus, what is done, where it
is done, with what technology, materials or facility, and in what safety conditions, are
all integral in a risk assessment. Man, machine, media, nature and management have a
greater influence in CMOs and may cause its malfunction (Ding and Tseng, 2012). Risk
countermeasures can be taken proactively to reduce the possibility of a loss.
2.5.1 Risk Management: A Genuine Concept in Maritime Safety
In maritime operations, decision analyst faces having to make decisions at all time where
an outcome is uncertain. Taking a corporate strategy perspective of Risk Management
(RM), and understanding the risks involved will produce an enhanced performance, e.g.
if A occurs, then it causes B, therefore RM is defined as the eradication or minimisa-
tion of the adverse effect of risks to which an organisation is exposed (IOSH, 2000).
Researchers such as Eloff et al. (1993), British Bankers’ Association (1999), Head and
Hom (1988), Sung (2005) and Cheng (2005) defined risk management from a different
perspective, but their definitions had the same purpose to develop a systems for con-
trolling risk in advance, thereby establishing a set of efficient strategies to achieve an
effective protection and control of risk. More so, to reduce the probability of the risk
and avoid damage from the risk (Shang and Tseng, 2010). As systems continue to grow
in scale and complexity, an added layer of complexity is introduced when the system has
to exhibit resilience in the face of contingencies in an operational environment, thus risk
management activities are an integral part in satisfying the various needs of stakeholders.
The term ”risk” may be conceptualised in terms of an event and impact, for example,
some industries quantify risk with two parameters: the likelihood that a given event will
occur and the impact of that event (Madni and Sievers, 2014). Risk management during
marine operations subsumes operator’s deployment, transition from existing system to
new system, operations, maintenance, security and the environment. Mokhtari et al.
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(2011, 2012) proposed a RM framework for seaport and offshore terminal operations
and management. The proposed framework consists of three main phases, namely:
• Hazard identification
• Risk assessment
◦ Risk analysis
◦ Risk evaluation
• Risk mitigation
2.5.2 Hazard Identification (HAZID)
HAZID remains the first step taken to identify initiating failure events with the potential
to cause harm to people, damages to properties and the environment. Empirical stud-
ies revealed that the techniques recommended in various research to conduct HAZID
includes: (a) Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP), (b) Failure mode and effective
critical analysis (FMECA), (c) What-if, (d) Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) and, (e)
Progressive loss of containment analysis-optimising prevention (PLANOP) (Wang, 2002;
Pasman et al., 2009; Marhavilas et al., 2011; Groso et al., 2012). Most of the aforemen-
tioned techniques have their advantages and disadvantages; they can be exploited alone
but according to Groso et al. (2012), the combination of two or more HAZID techniques
gives a better result to identify a specific hazard in a complex dynamic system (Groso
et al., 2012).
HAZID on offshore/onshore oil terminal facility is carried out in order to identify
potential hazards which can result to failure of terminal infrastructures with high con-
sequences. It is also implemented in an organisation to examine operational procedures.
The process of conducting a HAZID can differ due to available resources and the system
being evaluated.
In CMOs mainly OTOs, HAZOP is a significant technique in a hazard identification
processes, and can be complemented by PHA or What-if techniques. HAZOP is an
organised methodological technique for analysing hazards and operational concerns of a
system. When there is a deviation from the normal operation, HAZOP helps to identify
how unsafe the operation can become. HAZOP is a clearly structured technique which
provides rigidity for focusing on system element and hazard. HAZOP can be used to
scrutinise operations at ship and terminal interface, ensuring all potential hazardous
situations have been noted and the resultant identified deviation in operational design
are examined to find possible root causes and consequences. Generally, HAZOP assist
in risk identification and consequences, root causes, and corrective measure.
Though HAZOP is time consuming and expensive, the What-if technique (a brain-
storming approach in which a group of experienced participants familiar with the subject
process raise the question what-if?), is used as an approach to complement a HAZOP
process, thus, making it more convenient. PHA is a safety analysis tool for identifying
Chapter 2. Literature Review 30
hazards, causal factors and effects, which provides indication of system risk. It is eas-
ily and quickly performed, inexpensive and provides meaningful result. For an effective
PHA to be carried out, a safety analyst requires information from the designed operation
and a preliminary list of the identified hazards of previous operations.
2.5.3 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an essential and systematic process for assessing the impact, occur-
rence and consequences of human activities on systems with hazardous characteristics.
It constitutes a needful tool in the safety policy of a company. Risk assessment helps
to study how hazardous events or states develops and interact to cause an accident. It
is aimed at assessing risks and the factors influencing the level of safety. For instance,
shipping involves a sequence of distinctive phases between which the status of ship func-
tions changes; the major phases include (a) design, construction, and commissioning,
(b) entering port, berthing, unberthing, and leaving port, (c) loading and oﬄoading,
and (d) decommissioning and disposal. The failure of any of these system may cause
disastrous consequences. Risk assessment can be carried out in respect to each maritime
dynamic critical system. The probability of occurrence of any failure event and its pos-
sible consequences can be assessed using various risk assessment techniques such as (a)
the qualitative, (b) the quantitative, and (c) the hybrid techniques (Marhavilas et al.,
2011).The qualitative techniques are based on the safety managers engineering ability
and his/her analytical estimation processes. The quantitative techniques are processes
where risks are considered as quantities. They can be estimated and expressed by a
mathematical relation, with the help of recorded accidents data of a work-site. The
hybrid techniques present a great complexity due to their ad hoc character. Generic
data or expert judgements can be used in risk assessment (Wang, 2002). The state of
safety can only be known by analysing risks/hazards.
2.5.4 Risk Analysis
Over the past three decades, research on an improved and effective seaport and off-
shore/onshore risk analysis has constantly been undertaken. The main issues on these
risk analysis were how to deal with unpredictable and uncertain events (Ren et al., 2009).
The transportation of large quantities of hazardous materials can explode, burn or be
released into the environment, with a potential to cause harm to the life and health of
people, damages to structures and environment, therefore, risk analysis can be improved
and adopted to minimise risk to people, operators and management. A risk analysis is
necessary because it reveal the areas where unacceptable high risks are present in a
system, so that additional protective or proactive measures can be taken. According to
previous researches, risk analysis is performed in various degrees of detail (Mullai and
Paulsson, 2011), three methods come into context: (a) the qualitative (b) the quantified
and (c) semi- quantitative risk analysis methods. The qualitative risk analysis remains
the lightest form of analysis (Pasman et al., 2009) where subjective estimates are made
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(risk ranking) and the results estimated in a risk matrix. Bragatto and Pirone (2011)
used a bowtie approach for the assessment of the personnel risk at an Italian industrial
port.
On the other hand, the quantitative risk analysis requires technique and exper-
tise to analyse possible events with potential harmful impact. With the emergence of
probabilistic approaches for risk analysis in offshore/onshore terminals and maritime
transportation (Clark and Besterfield-Sacre, 2009), uncertainties are taken into context
to further improve maritime safety. The quantitative techniques adopted for maritime
risk analysis includes FTA/ ETA, BN and Fuzzy Set Theory (FST).
Fault Tree Aanalysis and Event Tree Aanalysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) and Event tree analysis (ETA) are two distinct methods
that develop a logical relationship among events leading to an accident and also they
estimate the risk associated with such accident (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000; Marhavilas
et al., 2011). ETA is a technique used to describe the consequences of an event (initiating
event) thereby estimating the likelihood (frequency) of possible outcomes of an event.
FTA estimates the likelihood (probability) of the basic occurrence of an unwanted event
as well as the contribution of different causes leading to the unwanted top event.
FTA helps to conduct a QRA on two major assumptions (a) the likelihood of basic
events is assumed to be exact and precisely known, which is not often true due to inherent
uncertainties such as vagueness of critical complex system, variant failure mode, poor
understanding of failure mechanisms, and defining the relationships of basic events (b)
the interdependencies of basic events in fault tree are independent (Ferdous et al., 2011).
In offshore and onshore terminals, FTA is a technique used for conducting a quantitative
risk analysis to predict the probability of hazardous incidents and to identify the most
important risk contributors. A typical fault tree consists of a top event, basic events,
and the logic gates to determine the causes of failure (Mokhtari et al., 2011). Performing
a QRA using FTA requires applying logic gates on a combination of failures and their
occurrence probability (OR gates, AND gates). An event occurs when a gate output
changes state. Input such as good knowledge in design, systems, personnel training
and accident history are required to conduct a FTA, and its output consists of a fault
diagram, which exhibits the root causes of an accident. If the fault tree is evaluated, the
identified system failure is defined as the top event (Ferna`ndez-Garcia et al., 2012). FTA
has been combined with other probabilistic risk analysis methods to produce a better
result. FTA is suitable for investigation and management of multiple cases of failures,
reliability, and maintainability (Yuhua and Datao, 2005).
On the other hand, ETA uses an inductive approach to determine the consequences
of an undesirable event. The consequence of event follows a series of paths to which
probabilities are given. The outputs of ETA are accident outcomes, risk probabilities,
causal sources and safety requirements. The main disadvantage of ETA is that it cannot
be used to study multiple failures on the same initiating event (Groso et al., 2012). The
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integration of FTA with ETA is possible. Ferdous et al. (2011) used both techniques
to assess uncertainty in a QRA framework of a process system. Fig 2.8 and Fig 2.9 are
examples of a typical FTA and ETA
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Figure 2.8: A standard fault tree symbol (Wang, 2002; Ferdous et al., 2011)
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Figure 2.9: Sample of a conventional event tree (Ferdous et al., 2011; Jongejan et al.,
2012)
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST)
Fuzzy-based methods have been employed to perform risk assessment in many research
domains (Ballı and Korukog˘lu, 2009; Celik et al., 2010; Hejazi et al., 2011; Ding and
Tseng, 2012; Shahriar et al., 2012). It is a powerful mathematical tool for modelling
industrial systems, nature and humanity under uncertainty (Ballı and Korukog˘lu, 2009).
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Extensive research has been performed using FST and the basic advantage of a fuzziness-
based method is its ability to deal with vagueness in a fuzzy environment and its tolera-
bility to linguistic or imprecise data (Elsayed et al., 2009). Fuzzy set is a class of objects
with a range of grades of membership. FST is developed on a fundamental concept of
set which is either a member or non-member. A crisp, sharp and definite distinction
exists between a member and non-member for any well-defined set of entities in this
theory and there is a very precise and clear boundary to indicate if an entity belongs to
the set (Ballı and Korukog˘lu, 2009; Celik et al., 2010). Such a set is characterised by a
membership (characteristic) function, in which each object is assigned with a grade of
membership ranging between 0 and 1 (Ren et al., 2005). The theory allows operators,
navigators and programmers to apply FST in a fuzzy domain.
Balli and Korukoglu (2009) used Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP) and
TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) methods in
developing a fuzzy decision model to select an appropriate operating system for a com-
puter system of an organisation. Ding and Tseng (2012) proposed a systematic fuzzy
risk analysis steps to evaluate safety operations, using the linguistic value of FST as
well as conducting an empirical study at Kaohsiung port container terminals in Taiwan.
Yuhua and Datao (2005) analysed the failure of oil and gas transmission pipelines by
combining fuzzy set theory with fault tree analysis (FFTA). More so, Celik et al. (2010)
developed a risk-based modelling approach using FFTA to enhance the execution pro-
cess of shipping accident investigation (SAI). Elsayed et al. (2009) used fuzzy set rule
base and a fuzzy inference for the risk assessment of liquefied natural gas carriers dur-
ing loading/oﬄoading operation at terminals where FIS is an alternative approach to
the qualitative risk matrix techniques. Hejazi et al. (2011) assessed new factors such
as probability of failure detection and economic disbenefits of failure occurrence using
some set of generalised fuzzy numbers. Shahriar et al. (2012) combined the bow-tie
approach with fuzzy logic to develop a model to deal with uncertainty for oil and gas
pipelines. The combination of fuzzy logic and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) was used
to determine uncertainties of input data as well as simulating models, used for process
safety analysis (Markowski et al., 2010). Hu et al. (2007) developed a risk assessment
approach based on fuzzy function to solve a problem of ship navigation safety practice
in Shanghai harbour, China. At seaport and offshore terminals, FST has been combined
with the bow-tie approach and evidential reasoning for risk analysis and decision sup-
port (fuzzy logic incorporating the Dempster-Shafer approach) respectively for safety
management systems (Sii et al., 2002; Ren et al., 2005; Mokhtari et al., 2011, 2012).
Utility Theory (UT)
Theories of decision making under uncertainty in particular, sometime relies on the sub-
jects behaviours or appetite towards risk. Psychological research presented that Decision
Makers (DMs) hold domain-specific risk attitudes that often vary between individuals.
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One approach for analysing probabilistic choice outcome under uncertainty to aid a De-
cision Maker (DM) is to use a risk-based Utility Theory. The term Utility is defined
as the measure of satisfaction of a choice or result (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). In order
words, Utility assessment is the psychology of assessing and judging risk. Utility Theory
can be used to support decision-making process by providing quantitative backing to
gut feeling in real-time decision support system. Farquhar (1984) presented a compar-
ative study of the process involved for utility assessment in decision analysis as well as
methods for assessing expected utility function. Van Bossuyt et al. (2012) used Utility
Theory and the Engineering Domain Specific Risk Taking (E-DOSPERT) risk appetite
research to determine the true value of risk decision using utility function. Finnell et al.
(2012) compared the influences of standard gamble and time trade-off utility assessment
based on Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1979) to determine the value of health care
measurement for parents risk attitude. Huang et al. (2013) proposed a multi-attribute
Utility Theory for assessing and ranking alternatives in a decision group.
A DMs risk attitude can be classified into a risk tolerant, risk-averse and risk-neutral,
depending on how skewed the intrinsic value for the risk decision is, based on the utility
function. Pratt (1964) provided a classical definition of utility functions as a function
that specifies the utility of a DM for all the combinations made qualitatively or quan-
titatively (Miyamoto, 2003; Van Bossuyt et al., 2012). Thus, a risk-tolerant decision
makers utility function outcome is skewed more heavily towards a higher intrinsic value
for riskier decisions. A risk-averse decision makers utility function will shift towards
a lower-value outcome while a risk-neutral decision makers utility distribution is not
skewed towards either direction along the utility axis.
There are different methods used for utility assessment (Farquhar, 1984), but a more
robust assessment technique to tackle uncertainty is the hybrid assessment method. To
design and produce a hybrid assessment method, other methods are required to be
merged, methods such as the Certainty Equivalent (CE), preference comparison and the
probability equivalence. In order to find the equivalent value of a specific risk, Certainty
Equivalent Value (CEV) based on Utility Theory gamble comparison is developed and
found in conjunction with the probability of an outcome. The interpretation of the CE
is given, by assessing the context in which judgement are made. For example, the status
quo of four situation is used to regulate the context of choice comparison, and the CE
depends upon the context given as the status quo. Farquhar (1984) presented a good
example of how to assess the CE among two alternative choices (s + c, 0) (s, p), which
he is indifferent between. The certainty effect in the utility assessment specifies that
the utility of an outcome seems greater when it is certain than when it is not certain.
Preference comparison is used to investigate the risk attitude for a preliminary analysis,
and probability equivalence specifies an indifference probability for which two alternative
choices are in-between (Hauser and Urban, 1979; Novick et al., 1980; Farquhar, 1984;
Miyamoto, 2003).
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The psychology on risk decision making describes how decision analysts may un-
avoidably (1) formulate the decision problem, the alternatives, the measurement scales,
and other structural features; and (2) control the response mode and perspectives of
the DM. In as much as there are many possible sources of bias in making preference
judgements, evaluating and analysing individual risk attitude as well as other factors
affecting individuals preferences provides a reasonable basis for making a decisive as-
sessment among alternative choices for investigating risk.
Swiss Cheese Model (SChM)
Reasons Swiss Cheese Model is classified among the dominant paradigms for analysing
the occurrence of system failures in different fields. The model is frequently referred
to and widely accepted by safety professionals in process industries, maritime domain,
transportation systems, high reliability organisations, management and health service
research (Reason, 2000, 2004; Sklet, 2004; Perneger, 2005; Broadribb et al., 2009; Wu
et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2013; Underwood and Waterson, 2014). The SChM is a heuristic
explanatory device for communicating the interactions and sequences that occur when
a complex secured system undergoes a catastrophic breakdown. The SChM involves an
unlikely and often unforeseeable conjunction of several contributing factors arising from
different levels of the system. It also acts as a framework for accident investigation.
The SChM is used for three different purposes (1) as a heuristic explanatory device
(communication) (2) as a framework for accident investigation (analysis) and (3) as a
basis for measurement (Reason, 2000; Ren et al., 2008; Sheridan, 2008; Broadribb et al.,
2009; Xue et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2013). As pointed out earlier, SChM has been used as
the basis for analysis by promoting the view of accidents, as a combination of specific
events and the failure of barriers. Weaknesses on the barriers may exist when events
in the sequence are described as near-misses, incidents or failures, and this occurs at
different operational levels, going from senior management to unsafe acts. Thus, failures
caused by either human or technical factors are not sufficient to cause an accident. The
SChM uses broad practical experience towards system functions but it is often associated
with the occurrence of incidents and accidents when safety defences or barrier(s) fails.
Fig 2.10 and Fig 2.11 shows the SChM and a safety defence barrier function.
Risk 
factors
Possible risk 
or risks
Kick Kick Kick Kick
Figure 2.10: Reasons Swiss Cheese Model
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Figure 2.11: Classification of safety barriers (Sklet, 2006)
In an ideal world, the safety barriers are intact, designed to serve a specific purpose
within the system. In reality, they are full of holes that represent weakness/failures.
When the holes in a systems defence align, an accident trajectory cuts through the
defence layers and thus result to a hazard, causing harm to people, assets and the
environment. According to Reason (2004), there are two major reasons for barrier
failure in the SChM, namely:
• Active failure: these are errors or unsafe act from those in direct contact with the
system. This creates gaps or absence in or among the safety defence barriers, and
the more sequences of gaps created on the defence barriers build up to cause a
major disruption.
• Latent conditions: these are weakness created as a result of decisions made during
system designs, wrong decision taken by managements, regulators, managers or
the person on duty. This weakness occurs in most complex hazardous system as
such due to the complexity within the system, decision makers hardly foresee all
the possible accident scenarios. The effects of latent conditions are such that they
are long-lasting weakness and are present within the system prior to an unsafe
event occurrence. They are the primary source of safety barrier failure but can be
detected and repaired before they can cause a major disruption.
The failures of safety defence barriers in most complex hazardous system can be
detected proactively or reactively using ETA/FTA (Sheridan, 2008; Xue et al., 2013).
Undoubtedly, the SChM remains a viable model that provides a system thinking ap-
proach and a deeper understanding of how event sequences within complex dynamic
system results in an accident.
The SChM has been severally criticised by quite a number of researchers. Dekker
(2006) described the SChM as a model which oversimplifies accident causes by not
taking into context the complex interaction of a system components. Others criticised
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its application, focusing on the lack of specificity of the aligned holes and their effects
as well as its prescriptive attributes; suggesting that its application could be misleading
or entirely incorrect (Hollnagel, 2012; Shappell and Wiegmann, 2012; Le Coze, 2013;
Underwood and Waterson, 2014).
2.5.5 Risk Evaluation
Risk evaluation is a process where results from risk analysis are considered against
judgements, standards or criteria. Criteria are useful for defining parameters used for
decision making (Mokhtari et al., 2012). It defines the metric and the level of risks
that are acceptable, as well as the level of investment in the reduction of risk that are
considered to be non-negligible. An evaluation process study the level of risk/hazard
factors within a platform and a risk criteria will be formulated as a maximum level of risk
that should not be exceeded (Mokhtari et al., 2011). As Low As Reasonable Practicable
(ALARP) is widely used to determine criteria for acceptable risks principle (Wang, 2002).
The risk evaluation process can use any combination of the basic, detailed, comparative
or absolute assessments and this can be repeated severally, provided that the analysts
believe that such combination of techniques will support a conclusion (Skjong et al.,
2005).
ABS (2003) expressed that in the past, managers experiences were a basic factor for
risk evaluation. The manager evaluating the possible options for dealing with issue on
risk factors needs to consider the following:
• Is the risk assessment good enough to be relied upon?
• What criteria are used in the risk ranking of each option to model uncertainties?
• What are the benefits associated with each risk management option?
• Are residual risks aligned with a chosen risk management option?
• How effective will it be to execute the risk management option?
To answer the above questions, Mokhtari et al. (2012) proposed a generic risk
evaluation model, considered to be a key part in the RM framework. The proposed
model was used to provide continued risk control assurance within ports, terminals
and management. Yuhua and Datao (2005) evaluated the risk factors for the failure
of oil and gas transmission pipelines under uncertainty. Ren et al. (2005) proposed
a risk evaluation method for the operation of tandem (off) loading between floating
production, storage and oﬄoading unit (FPSO) and a shuttle tanker. Shang and Tseng
(2010) evaluated the risk factors of stevedoring operation in Kaohsiung harbour container
terminal using risk matrix chart. Evaluation metrics could have qualitative and/or
quantitative parameters which have a characteristic to evaluate a proposed design or
operation in terms of its level of safety (Wang, 2002; Shang and Tseng, 2010; Mokhtari
et al., 2011, 2012; Groso et al., 2012).The qualitative risk evaluation techniques include
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FMEA, risk matrix chart, cause-consequences analysis (CCA) whereas the quantitative
evaluation techniques used mostly under uncertainty includes FFTA, FETA, and FST.
Mokhtari et al (2012) proposed a risk evaluation process methodology for ports and
terminals operations and management (PTOM). In the most generic case, the major
activities in an evaluation process are as follows:
• Define the objectives of the evaluation,
• Conduct a basic risk assessment (comparative or absolute).
Bayesian Network (BN)
A Bayesian network (BN) have been established as a suitable tool for modelling and
reasoning under uncertainty (Ren et al., 2008; Trucco et al., 2008; Clark and Besterfield-
Sacre, 2009; Ren et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2011; Ferna`ndez-Garcia et al., 2012; Li et al.,
2014; Alyami et al., 2014). A BN is a versatile modelling framework, which provide a
systematic and localised method for structuring probabilistic information of a situation
into a coherent whole, such as graphically representing the relationships among a set of
variables, and for dealing with uncertainties in such variables (Ren et al., 2009), sup-
ported by a suite of inference algorithms. BN has been used in many different domains;
many applications can be reduced to a BN inference, allowing one to capitalise on BN
algorithms instead of having to invent specialised algorithms for each new application. A
BN has two components; a structure called a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) (Kjaerulff
and Madsen, 2008; Verma and Pearl, 2013) and a set of computed conditional probabil-
ity table(s) (CPT)(Fenton et al., 2007; Trucco et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2008; Ren et al.,
2009; Li et al., 2012; Alyami et al., 2014; Salleh et al., 2014; John et al., 2016)
A BN consists of qualitative and quantitative parts (Cai et al., 2013). The qualitative
part of a BN are graphical directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) as shown in Fig 2.12, where
the nodes represent prepositional variables of interest (Pearl, 2011). The arcs in a BN
specify direct causal relationships between the linked nodes. The quantitative part of a
BN is the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) and they are assigned to the nodes.
Nodes could be a parent node or a child node. The former is called root node and the
later are called a leaf node. Root nodes have prior probability distribution while leaf
nodes have conditional probability distributions (CPD). Based on the assumption of
conditional independence, the conditional probability distribution for a random variable
associated to a node, is specified by considering the probability of each of its state,
conditioned on the combination of the states of its parent nodes (Zhou et al., 2011). A
BN must include a CPT for each variable; this quantifies the relationship between a child
node and its parent node. The nodes of a structure correspond to the variables of interest,
and the edges have a formal interpretation in terms of probabilistic independence.
A BN is often used for causal representation of the phenomena involved in a complex
system or process, where information is based on expert knowledge. BN has numerous
advantages because of its distinct features in maritime safety, but also has some inherent
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Figure 2.12: A graphical representation of BN
limitations (Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006; Ren et al., 2008; Trucco et al., 2008; Eleye-Datubo
et al., 2008; Ren et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014; Dabrowski and De Villiers, 2015). Prior to
the occurrences of certain events, it is possible to investigate other factors influencing
or being influenced by an event in the overall risk analysis, and this requires too much
data in the form of prior probabilities, such that these data are often difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain in the risk assessment (Yang et al., 2008). A simple understanding
of a BN is to imagine how to model a situation where causality play a role but our un-
derstanding of what is actually going on as incomplete, thus requiring to describe things
probabilistically. A BN has been extensively used in risk analysis based on probabilistic
and uncertain knowledge (Nordg˚ard and Sand, 2010; Gran et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2013). A representation of a typical BN is shown in Fig 2.13.
CS
Vessel type
Cost
Age Size
Accident
Flag
Ship condition Loss
Acyclic graph
Figure 2.13: An example of a vessel accident model using BN (Li et al. 2014)
Comprehensive Review of Bayesian Network
The BN has been applied in different domains for diagnostics (Heckerman 1990), fault
diagnosis in complex nuclear power systems (Kang and Golay, 1999), prediction and
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machine learning, e.g. finance, robotics, forecasting, google, medicine, control and mod-
elling for human understanding, ecological risk assessment (Hayes, 1998), map learning
and story understanding. BNs are often known by other names and different authors
often mean slightly different things when they use these terms. Lauritzen (1995), Cheng
et al. (1997), Darwiche (2002), Jensen et al. (1990b), Heckerman (2007) and Shachter
(1986a) represent BN as recursive graphical models, Bayesian belief networks, belief net-
works, causal probabilistic networks, causal networks, influence diagrams respectively
(Daly et al., 2011). Van der Gaag (1996) in his work presented a review of the histori-
cal development of BNs and extended further by introducing their formalism and use.
Jensen (2001) introduced BNs and their decision support extensions.
The Bayesian approach requires information in the form of prior probabilities (Li
et al., 2014). This offers a compact representation of the interactions in a system
(stochastic or deterministic) by visualising system variables and their dependencies
(Nordg˚ard and Sand, 2010). The BN corresponds to nodes which in turn correspond
to events (random variables), and these nodes are linked by arcs, which suggests that
the child of an arc is influenced by its parent; in a deterministic and probabilistic way.
As such, a BN is a complex representation of distribution over a large joint probability
distribution of random variables. Once the BN is specified, it tends to observe variables
and compute probabilities of the parent nodes. A node (variable) may be of various
types. It may represent a continuous variable, or a discrete states. The discrete states
may be in the form of Boolean, interval based, numbered or labelled states (Heckerman
and Wellman, 1995; Gran et al., 2012). According to the d-separation concept from
Pearl (1988) based on the conditional independence, certain independence assumptions
holds for all CPTs (Charniak, 1991). A BN represent the joint probability distribution
of variables P (R) where R = Ai . . . , An, included in the network as:
P (R) =
n∏
i=1
P (Ai|Pa(Ai) (2.1)
Where Pa(Ai) is the parent set of Ai (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007)
A BN also takes advantage of Bayes theorem to update failure probability of events
(propagation) given new information, called evidence E, thus yielding the posterior prob-
ability. This new information usually becomes available during operation processes,
where there is an occurrence/non-occurrence of primary event(s)/accident(s):
P (R|E) = P (E|R).P (R)
P (E)
=
P (E|R).P (R)∑
U P (E|R)
(2.2)
The evidence E ranges from subjective judgements through to more objective data,
and in some situations, an extensive historical data could be used.
Other approaches based on logical algorithms such as FST have been integrated to
further improve the scope and ubiquity of a BN (Yang et al., 2008). A key factor of
Chapter 2. Literature Review 41
a BN is it compactness which leads to a representation that scales significantly better
to large network, than becoming the trail approach which goes to all combination of
various variables. Recently, Weber et al. (2010) compared a BN with other methods, as
well as reviewed BN application in dependability, maintenance and risk analysis; making
it a well-suited technique for dynamic risk and safety analysis.
In an uncertain environment where there is little or no data, making a decision
based on gut feel and having to justify it could lead to a disaster in the event of subse-
quent safety incidents. BN provides a useful framework for modelling complex systems,
identifying gaps associated with uncertainties in an explicit manner for decision makers.
The advances of BNs in the 21st Century
Over the last few years, a method of reasoning using probabilities, variously called
belief networks, Bayesian networks, knowledge maps, probabilistic causal networks etc.,
has become popular within the artificial intelligence (AI) probability and uncertainty
community. Probabilistic models based on DAGs began in the early 19th century with
the geneticist Sewall Wright in 1921. The long and rich tradition of DAGs modifications
has appeared within cognitive and artificial intelligence (AI), and such models are BN.
Initial modifications of BN in the late 1970s were motivated by the need to model the top-
down (semantic) and bottom- up (perceptual) combination of evidence reading (Pearl,
2011). According to Pearl (1998), Shafer and Pearl (1990), Heckerman et al. (1995)
and Jensen (1996), the rapid emergence of BNs as a method of choice for uncertainty
reasoning was dependant on the proficiency for bidirectional inferences, combined with
rigorous probabilistic foundation. The BN replaces the earlier ad-hoc rule-based schemes
in AI and expert systems (Pearl, 2011).
Subsequent algorithm have been developed, that first builds an undirected graph
from a BN (Howard and Matheson,1979, 1981; Olmsted, 1983, 1984; Pearl,1986; Lau-
ritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shachter, 1986a, 1986b, 1988; Smith,1989; D Ambrosio,
1991) as cited in (Heckerman and Wellman, 1995). Ramamurthi and Agogino (1988),
Jensen and Anderson (1990), Shachter, Andersen and Poh, (1990), Suermondt, H.J and
Cooper (1991), and Heckerman (1993) suggested that a typical BN is constructed using
notions of cause and effect, thereby drawing arcs from cause variables to their immediate
effects. Researchers are developing customized techniques, tailored for a particular net-
work topologies or inference queries, for impracticable inference methods applications
(Smith, 1989; Heckerman and Wellman, 1995).
A BN that incorporates decision nodes (nodes indicating actions that can be per-
formed) and value nodes (nodes indicating the values of various outcomes) is called an
influence diagram, a concept invented by Howard and Matheson ( 1979,1981). According
to Oliver (1986), Barlow et al., (1986) and Smith (1988), influence diagrams are also a
very natural representation of useful Bayesian models (Smith, 1989; Eleye-Datubo et al.,
2006; Zhou et al., 2013). They make the graphs somewhat more helpful for exploring the
consequences of a DM stated beliefs in the form of dependency knowledge (Howard and
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Matheson, 1981; Pearl, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988; Shachter, 1985, 1988; Smith, 1987; Pearl
and Venna, 1987). The validity of graphical manipulations such as arc reversal and node
removal can now be affirmed on solid theoretical foundations. A stratified protocol of a
dependency knowledge model is well explained in (Verma and Pearl, 2013).
The use of Bayesian networks and decision theory has proven to be better than the
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief (Shafer 1976). A BN offer a convenient way to compute
multitude of problem so as to arrive at a conclusion that is not warranted logically but
probabilistically. Furthermore, a BN allow the computation of these problems without
the traditional hurdles of specifying a set of numbers that grows exponentially with
the complexity of the model. The major drawback a BN is the time of evaluation
(exponential time for the general case). However, because a large number of people are
now using BN, there is a great deal of research on efficient exact solution methods as
well as a variety of approximation schemes (Daly et al., 2011).
Owing to various risk factors of uncertainty in CMOs, a BN support causal inference
in situations where data for analysis has a high level of uncertainty. A BN has the
capacity of integrating prior knowledge and sample data, capable of replicating the
essential features of plausible reasoning in a consistent, efficient and mathematically
sound way under a dynamic environments. In recent years, relatively few researchers
have adopted a BN approach for risk management in large engineering projects (Ordonez,
2007). The emergence of new algorithms for BN have attracted increasing attention
(Eleye-Datubo et al,. 2006; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Zhang et al., 2004),
making it more effective and essential guarantee in the plausibility for application (Zhang
et al., 2013). BN has several advantages:
• It has the ability to incorporate new observations in the network and to predict the
influence of possible future observations onto the results obtained (Heckerman and
Breese, 1996).
• It can let users observe the relationships among variables easily and also give an
understandable semantic interpretation to all the parameters in a BN (Myllymaki,
2005). This allows users to construct a BN directly using domain expert knowledge.
• It has both causal and probabilistic semantics, and thus it provides an ideal represen-
tation scheme for combining prior knowledge (which often comes in causal form)
and data.
• It can handle missing and/or incomplete data. This is because the model has the
ability to learn the relationships among its nodes and encodes dependencies among
all variables (Heckerman, 1997).
• It can conduct inference inversely.
• According to Bobbio et al. (2001), it can perform a forward or predictive investigative
analysis as well as backward or diagnostic analysis of factors being influenced, given
a certain event in an overall risk analysis (Cai et al., 2013)
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Maritime accidents in offshore oil industries can lead to devastating consequences,
and this can be analysed using a BN to identify the most important indicators, and to
determine the relationships among these indicators (Li et al., 2014). The application
of a BN for offshore risk assessment have its difficulties (Ren et al., 2008) e.g. how to
deal with incomplete and vague information that largely exists both at the early system
design stage and during normal operations. However, this weakness can be overcome
by the quantitative calculation with a BN where the hierarchy of nodes and states are
defined (Wang, 2002; Sii et al., 2002; Ren et al., 2005, 2008; Wang et al., 2013).
More recent studies have focused on the integration of BNs with other proven risk
assessment techniques. It has proven to be a powerful formalism to express complex
dependencies among random variables and has been applied to a variety of real-world
problems. A BN has been combined with Reasons Swiss cheese Model, ET and FT,
Bow-ties (BT), Logistic regression, Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS), FST, Dynamic Event Tree (DET), pseudo-fault tree (Uusitalo, 2007; Eleye-
Datubo et al., 2008; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008; Ren et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011;
Gran et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2014). The combination of a BN and other
risk assessment techniques has provided a dynamic systems and a promising technique
in knowledge fusion, but yet remains a challenging research topic. Kuikka et al. (1999),
Bobbio et al. (2001), Vinnem et al. (2006, 2012), Montani et al. (2008), Badreddine
and Ben Amor. (2010), Wang et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2011), Gran et al. (2012),
and Khakzad et al. (2013) demonstrated the effectiveness of combining a BN with
other techniques. According to Feng et al. (2014), an effective method for combining
BNs should meet three important criteria; (a) avoiding cycles (b) preserving conditional
independences and (c) preserving the characteristics of the individual BN parameters
(Feng et al., 2014).
A BN is also a good tool for expert elicitation (Uusitalo, 2007). Unlike the tradi-
tional rule based approach to expert systems, expert knowledge can be combined with
the unique intuitive visual representation of BN to replicate the essential features of
reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. This provides a consistent, efficient, and
mathematical basis in Bayesian probability. Expert elicitation combined with uncer-
tain knowledge can add substantial insight to many real-life problems, communicating
theories and results to decision makers (Uusitalo, 2007). While the development of BN
methodology is still ongoing, not all algorithm that has been proposed is likely to estab-
lish a standard method for analysing problems dominated by uncertainty (Gran et al.,
2012).
The reason for focusing on operational resilience is, the trends of hazards on existing
operational installations in the oil industries, in the last few years has been constantly
increasing. Thus a robust initiative is needed to upturn these trends. Perhaps the great-
est testament of a simple BN provides new developments in computational probability
and decision theory. A good reference work for the computational method underlying
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the implementation are described in Jensen et al. (1994), Kadie et al. (2001), and Net-
ica, (2002) perceived to address BN shortcomings. Building models forces us to think
clearly about the subject, and articulate that thinking in the form of the model. Since
most real-life problems involve inherently uncertain relationships, BN is a technology
with huge potential and applicable for building resilient models for marine and offshore
operations.
Bayesian Inference Mechanism
Bayesian inference provides the basic tool for both Bayesian belief updating and for
treating probability as logic i.e. the concept of conditional independence, d-separation
and the pattern of inference (Wellman and Henrion, 1993; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter,
1988; Pearl, 1988) . It is a process where an observable real-world situations are used to
update the random uncertainty about one or more variables and thus defines the manner
in which uncertainties ought to change in light of newly made observations. Bayesian
inference depends on the use of Bayess theorem (Bayes, 1763) as its rule of inference.
Bayes Theorem also referred to as Bayes rule is the fundamental rule of probability
computations (Zhou et al., 2011). According to Zhou et al. (2011), computation using
Bayes rule can be achieved using Eq (2.3)
P (R|E) = P (E|R).P (R)
P (B)
(2.3)
Where:
P (R) = is the prior probability of (A)
P (B) = is the prior or marginal (total)probability of B
P (R|E) = is the posterior probability of A, given B, and
P (E|R) = is likelihood function for A, for a specific value of B
The Eq (2.3) can be paraphrased as:
Posterior =
likelihood× prior
evidence
→ P (R|E) (2.4)
The process of Bayess theorem develops into a recurrent concept when an additional
information or events become available. Therefore, the posterior probability of R for
an event E with states {e1, . . . , em} in the same universe, can be computed from the
Bayess rule as;
P (R|e1, . . . , em) = P (e1, . . . , em).P (R)
P (e1, . . . , em)
(2.5)
According to Lindley (1970) ”today’s posterior probability is tomorrow’s prior”.
Thus, an increase in the number of evidence result to a prior decrease on the origi-
nal estimated dependence of the posterior probability (Eleye-Datubo et al., 2006).
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Flow of Information in Causal Networks: Serial Connections, Diverging Con-
nections and Converging Connections
A causal network, intuitively speaking is a BN with the added property that the parents
of each node are its direct causes. A BN represent causal information, with the arcs
representing direct causal influences. According to recent work put forward on the
generalisations of BNs by Richardson and Spirtes (2002) and Zhang (2008), it is worth
noting that, a BNs is seen by many as the best way to represent uncertain causal
knowledge (Pearl, 2011). For example, fire → smoke is a causal network whereas smoke
→ fire is not, even though both variables are equally capable of representing any joint
distribution on the two variables.
There has been much debate over the use of causal networks and their application
(Druzdzel and Simon, 1993). Many studies such as Acid and de Campos (1995) and
Acid et al. (2001) have assumed wrongly that BNs and causal Bayesian networks are
equivalent. Literature review on learning causal networks has focused on constraint-
based algorithms, building on work from Glymour et al. (1986), Spirtes et al. (1989,
1990), Geiger et al. (1990), Pearl and Verma (1991), Spirtes and Glymour (1990a,
1991) and Verma and Pearl (1991, 1992). Heckerman (1995a, 2007) however focused
on learning causal structures from a score and search perspective, particularly within
a Bayesian framework. The two most relevant studies on learning causal networks are
probably those by Spirtes et al. (2000) and Pearl (2000) who expound their views on the
possibilities of BNs having the ability to capture causal information. There are three
different kinds of causal networks in a DAG, as shown in 2.14;
Serial Connections: Information may flow through a serial connection (X→ Y→
Z) with or without hard evidence on the middle variable (Y). Evidence may be trans-
mitted through a serial connection if we do not know the state of Y for sure, but when
there is a hard evidence on Y, the flow of information between X and Z are independent.
Soft evidence (unreliable information) on the middle variable is not enough to block the
flow of information over a serial connection.
Diverging Connections: Information may flow through a diverging connection (X
← Y → Z) when the state of the middle variable (Y) is known or unknown. For the
later, provided that the information about X will influence our belief about Y, then Y
is a possible explanation for X. The updated belief about the state of Y will make us
update our belief about Z. For the former, provided that the state of Y is known for
sure, the information about the state of either X or Z is not going to change our belief
about the state of Y.
Converging Connections: Information may flow through a converging connection
X → Y ← Z if evidence about the middle variable (Y) and one of its descendants is
available. Information will not be transmitted via a converging connection if there is no
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YY
Converging Connections Diverging Connections
X XZ Z
YYX XZ Z
Serial Connections
X XZ ZY Y
Y YX XZ Z
Figure 2.14: A diagram explaining the concepts of D-separation
evidence available for Y (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008).
Inter-causal Inference (Explaining Away): Explaining away is a property of
a converging connections, where the information about the state of X or Z provides
an explanation for an observed effect on Y, and hence confirms or dismisses X and Z
(Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008).
Constructing a BN for Risk Analysis: Application and Challenges
The objective of using a BN is to make the right decision depending on the corresponding
marginal probabilities. In the context of risk assessment, logical reasoning of marginal
probabilities could either be for risk prediction or diagnosis. For diagnosis, prior prob-
abilities must be appropriately distributed, and the task of analysing the constructed
network to obtain the marginal probabilities of the interested nodes will be calculated.
For prediction, a risk variable in the same universe at random can present itself as a
query or a piece of evidence, thereby permitting forward inferences. The query variable
posterior probabilities provide the estimates of the casual effects of the evidence. The
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dissemination of the whole process yields a pre-posterior analysis (marginal distribu-
tion). The state of variable for a risk evidence is assumed to be known with certainty
and is called an instantiation of the variable (Yang, 2006). According to Zaili (2006),
in risk assessment, information variables are usually defined as risk causes. An effective
way to identify these risk causes is to simulate an operational chain in the domain devel-
oped. Additionally, techniques such as HAZID, HAZOP, FMECA etc., also have great
potential in addressing this kind of requirement. A BN has designated that random
risk variables or nodes representing an uncertain quantity necessitate a finite number of
possible states. The most popular states used to define the corresponding risk variables
are developed based on the rate of event occurrence. Under the BN formalism and in
order for them to be admissible, the variable states must satisfy the two criteria (1) the
completeness of states, and (2) the mutually exclusivity of such states (Yang, 2006).
States can be assigned to various variables according to their individual characteristics.
A proposed BN for the assessment of hazards variables for OTOs can be described using
safety degrees to facilitate the simplification and application of OTOs risk assessment.
Consequently, two exclusive states, ”Yes” and ”No” uniformly define a risk-based nodes
in a hazard-related BN . ”No denotes the probability of being safe and Yes” represents
the probability of being unsafe. A criterion for computing the states of variables is
by using the basic concept in Bayesian computation under uncertainty, the conditional
probability distributions. The number of probability distribution required to populate a
CPT in a BN grows exponentially with the number of parent nodes associated with the
table. Some well-known methods on approaches to populate a CPT have been based
on available data/information or using subjective expert judgements(Das et al., 2002;
Wellman 1999; Druzdzel and Gaag, 1995; Takikawa and DAmbrosio, 1999; Pearl, 1988;
Diez, 1993; Lemmer and Gossink, 2000; Riahi et al., 2012; Salleh et al., 2014). Nor-
mally to compute a CPT using a simple averaging scheme, some inconsistencies can arise
when attempt to do so especially when its states consist of many sub-parameters which
increases exponentially with the number of variables, and tends to make the results
computationally intensive.
However, according to Heckerman (1995) and Kontkanen et al. (1997a), Dong and
Agogino, (1997), Kahn et al. (1997) and Garbolino and Taroni (2002), the emergence
of some software products from artificial intelligence research have been developed and
applied to deal with the computational problems. A BN software provide a natural way
to handle missing data. They syndicate data with domain knowledge, enable learning
on causal relationships amongst variables, and provide a method to evade overfitting of
data. According to Andersen et al. (1990) software’s such as Hugin (Jensen, 1993),
Netica, SamIam, B-Course , Bayesian network toolkit by Microsoft, Ergo and GeNIe
can perform these computations.
The Netica (Netica, 2002) software is a widely used BN software package that
provides an applicable programmer’s interface (API) (Riahi et al., 2012, 2014; Salleh
et al., 2014). The user has to define the model structure but the software provides
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Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm to support the execution of probability cal-
culations (CPT). Heckerman (1995) and Wooldridge and Done (2004) further reveal the
advantages of the EM algorithms. Netica software calculates the maximum likelihood
estimates for all variables given the data and the model structure when inference is
drawn. The general strategy of using Netica software for a BN model must be obeyed
and can be given as follows:
• Initially, the nodes of BNs must be mapped out (enter evidence for some variables),
• Secondly, the states of the nodes must be defined (observe the effect of the evidence
on other variables), and
• Thirdly, the probabilities of each state must be determined (explain the new proba-
bilities).
According to Neil and Cabaliero (2007), the challenges in the use of BN are in three
fundamental criteria; the discretisation of continuous variables (Uusitalo, 2007), collect-
ing and structuring expert knowledge (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Keith, 1996; Neil and
Cabaliero, 2007), and having no support for feedback loops. Moreso, uncertainty and
a superficial knowledge about a methodology may also lead to distrust towards a BNs,
which easily leads to a reluctance for providing an estimate when structuring expert
knowledge in large BNs.”Estimating probabilities may also result in a biased outcomes”
(Morgan and Henrion, 1990, pp. 130-131 as cited in (Uusitalo, 2007)).
Although BN has challenges as any other technique, the advantages of BNs cannot
be ignored. In more realistic cases, the networks would consist of hundreds or thousands
of nodes, and they might be evaluated many times as new information comes in, thus,
changing the conditional probability of the nodes given the changing evidence. The com-
plete distribution is specified by 2n−1 joint probabilities, showing built-in independence
assumption which relates to the causal interpretation of arcs (Uusitalo, 2007; Kjaerulff
and Madsen, 2008).
A BN Modelling Concept and Hypothesis
The use of a BN model tailored for the resilience improvement of OTOs presents a
more advanced technique to evaluate complex operational hazards or risk. This in turn
optimises stochastic behaviours of subsequent operations on oil terminals, even after a
major disruption.
The BN established for the purpose of resilience improvement is based on a presented
modelling approach. It is composed of critical variables, categorised into four different
groups by their function: (a) Decision nodes (b) Starting nodes (c) Intermediate nodes
and (d) Target/goal nodes (Bayraktar and Hastak, 2009; Riahi et al., 2014). Decision
nodes are nodes without parents. They are nodes that define the problem under con-
sideration, and are dependent on the other nodes in the network. Meanwhile, starting
nodes are input nodes; they are nodes with no parents and cannot be easily modified
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when modelling, although they are reflected in the child nodes through conditional prob-
abilities. The intermediate nodes are the nodes that convey conditional probabilities,
from the starting nodes to the target nodes. They have both parent and child nodes.
Finally, the target nodes represent performance indicators, and they have parents and
child nodes.
In the proposed BN, the developed hypotheses will ease computational complexities
as well as create flexibility in the modelling process.
BN Processes
To assess the influence of each critical variable on accidents scenarios in OTOs under
high uncertainty for resiliency, the use of BN as a model is proposed. The processes
involved in the development of the BN model for decision support consist of two major
steps; identification of critical variables and their causal network, and the quantification
of the significant interrelationship among critical variables.
Section 4.3 highlighted preliminary questions and problems on how a holistic ap-
proach can be used to enhance the ability to process large volumes of data in real-time
situations. The dependency of critical variables were not considered in the hierarchical
relationship as referred to Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. To overcome this difficulty,
Bayesian Network Sensitivity Analysis Method (+BN − SAM) is presented using a
bayesian reasoning mechanism to conduct the analysis. Transforming experts’ opinions
into subjective conditional probabilities in the BN model remains the prerequisite of this
approach.
When considering a group of variables for evaluation, judgements on the relative im-
portance of these variables should be considered to permit a quantitative interpretation
among them. Based on this compromise, the methodology follows four major steps:
• Establish potential hazards of relative importance,
• Establish the BN model,
• Analyse the model,
• Model Validation.
Step 1: The formulation of the problem to capture what can go wrong and why this
is a potential hazard with relative importance to OTOs and their potential con-
sequences will provide inputs to what should be investigated and included in the
model. A mapping process was adopted; transforming data from UtiSch+ to es-
tablish the graphical representation of the BN.
Mapping algorithm : Bobbio et al. (2001), presented a method to map FT
to BN and also show how inference can be later used to obtain the probability
of the top event. Toledano et al. (2003) presented a method to map Reliability
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Block Diagrams (RBD) to BNs such as Bobbio et al. (2001) method. Riahi et
al. (2012) presented a novel approach to monitor the performance of seafarers; a
mapping process was adopted in the evaluation of seafarers reliability. Zhou et al.
(2011) provided a method to map a dynamic event tree to BN by utilising various
exact and approximate inference algorithms. Mapping processes have provided
a powerful formalism to express causal relationships among random variables in
BNs, and have been applied to a variety of real-world problems as above mentioned.
Step 2: A directed acyclic graph comprising of nodes and arcs is established based
on the identified hazard factors. In the presence of evidence, a conditional inde-
pendence for a random variable associated to a node is specified but may not be
complete and well represented. The representation of Joint Probability Distribu-
tion (JPD) of child node combination to its parent nodes will also be established.
Ren et al. (2008) presented a functional component focusing on exploring and
establishing a BN model on offshore safety assessment. Li et al. (2012) focused
on establishing a BN model for maritime risk analysis where influence diagram
was augmented with decision and utility nodes. Nordgard and Sands (2010) ap-
proach was in the engineering domain, where their focus was on risk analysis of
MV air-insulated switch operation for electricity distribution companies. Alyami
et al. (2014) prioritised establishing a BN model for container port risk evaluation.
John et al. (2016) established a BN model for resilience improvement of a seaport
systems.
Step 3: The Joint Probability Distribution (JPD) will be calculated in the CPT, it
comprises of a conditional and unconditional probabilities. Calculating JPD is
necessary in a BN because it is used to estimate and analyse how the probability
of each node are affected by both prior and posterior knowledge. Different re-
searchers have presented diverse techniques in analysing JPD over a set of random
variable, which are uniquely defined by the product of the individual distributions
of each random variable. Pearl (1988) and Diez (1993) established the Noisy-OR
and Noisy-MAX model for JPD analysis. Ren et al. (2009) approach used a do-
main experts-dependant, where judgement was based on fuzzy probabilities and
then refined by fuzzy membership function on offshore risk assessment. Riahi et al.
(2012) synthesised the weight assigned to each parent node using Analytical Hier-
archical process (AHP) with the symmetric model for seafarers reliability. Salleh
et al. (2014) further justified this method when assessing operational reliability
for linear shipping operator but then measured the unconditional probability us-
ing the if-then rule. Yang et al. (2008) presented the if-then rule-base Bayesian
reasoning, which was used to estimate the conditional probabilities of failures in
FMEA. Alyami et al. (2014) combined the if-then rule with expert judgement for
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JPD analysis for container port safety evaluation. Li et al. (2012) used the binary
logistic regression method to determine the JPD for maritime risk analysis. Fenton
et al. (2007) used ranked variables (nodes) as mirror image for prior probabili-
ties. John et al. (2016) combined the symmetric model and rule-base assessment
based on linguistic terms to determine the JPD for seaport system resilience im-
provement. Each approach is either an expert opinion distributed by likelihood or
relative importance of each parent nodes associated with their aligned child nodes.
Step 4: Sensitivity Analysis (SA) as a means of partial model validation provides a
reasonable level of confidence on the result obtained. It allows changes in input
variation of uncertainty updates in order to provide tested logical output of the
model. Sensitivity on the other hand refers to the sensitive nature a model’s per-
formance on minor changes of input parameters. In the maritime domain, SA has
been used for model validation to ensure consistency in tackling inaccuracies or
incompleteness of parameters. Ren et al. (2008, 2009) used SA to validate safety
assessment and FBN output result on offshore platforms. Salleh et al. (2014) used
SA to calculate liner shipping operators reliability. Wang et al. (2011) demon-
strated how a minor change on the BN output of Human and Organisational
Factors (HOFs) could behave. Li et al. (2012) developed a SA for the BN result of
maritime risk analysis with quantitative input. Cai et al. (2013) used SA for DBN
modelling to provide a reasonable representation of an actual system for offshore
blowout. Yang et al. (2008) established a SA of failure priority values between a
shuttle tanker and a Floating, Production, Storage and Oﬄoading (FPSO) system.
Ugurlu et al. (2015) carried out a SA to minimise margin of error in the possibility
values of event sets prominent in collision and grounding accidents of oil tankers.
Alyami et al. (2014) analysed the reliability of the developed container port safety
evaluation model using SA. Riahi et al. (2014) used SA to test the degree of belief
associated with the reliability value of a seafarer. John et al. (2014a, 2014b, 2016)
conducted a SA study of seaport operations, resilience strategies for seaport oper-
ations and BN approach to improve the resilience of seaport system, by increasing
the weight of each criterion for the results.
2.5.6 Risk mitigation
After performing a risk assessment, it is required to reduce the risks associated with
significant hazards that deserve attention (Wang, 2001; Wang and Foinikis, 2001; Wang,
2002). Risk mitigation or risk reduction can be defined as the systematic reduction
on the extent of exposure to a risk and/or the likelihood of its occurrence. It involves
a range of methods, e.g. Prospect Theory (PT), which may be used to reduce high-
probability, high-impact type risks or both (Wang and Foinikis, 2001). To reduce risks
to an ALARP level, risk control measures (RCMs) are evaluated (Wang, 2001). The
hierarchical structures of RCMs according to Wang (2002) are:
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• Elimination and minimization of hazards using safer design,
• Prevention,
• Detection,
• Control,
• Mitigation of consequences.
Reduction strategies are used for any level of risk where the remaining risk has high
probability of impact and the strategies for risk reduction are (a) management (b) en-
gineering and (c) operational. Managerial solutions involve development of a safety
culture, while the key factor for their success is elective communication. Engineering
solutions involve the design and/or construction to address hazards in the early stages of
PHA (e.g. introduction of double hull in oil carriers). Operational solutions involve the
development and introduction of appropriate procedures for carrying out ‘risk-critical
tasks, by establishing safety procedures, safe working practices, contingency plans and
safety drills. This addresses human error risk factors and ensuring the existence of uni-
formity of the adopted safety standards (Wang and Foinikis, 2001). The lack of historical
data on designs and the inability to carry-out a full-scale experimentation/replacement
of a system/equipment during an operation poses the only limitation of an engineering
solution.
Prospect Theory (PT); A Multiple Attribute Decision Making perspective
for risk mitigation
Over the past few years, numerous studies attempting to handle multiple attribute
assessment problems under uncertainty have been conducted to a considerable effect.
Following the growing need to develop sound method and tools in this line of research,
different approaches with rational, repeatable, reliable, and transparent characteristics
have been developed. Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) involves to structure
and solve decision problems based on multiple criteria. Typically, solving these prob-
lems can be interpreted in different ways; it could correspond to the most preferred
alternative of a decision maker involving different attributes (MADM) or choosing the
best alternative from a set of conflicting gaols with the use of advanced computational
techniques with objective functions (MODM)(Lai et al., 1994). Furthermore, Multiple
Attribute Decision Making (MADM) techniques as a tool evaluate and select the pre-
ferred alternative from a predetermined number of alternatives, characterised by multiple
attributes.
A survey on MCDM was conducted to identify its approaches and application. The
survey suggested which MCDM techniques are most robustly and effectively usable to
identify the best alternative (Aruldoss et al., 2013). The application of various decision
making techniques to solve MCDM problems have been published in professional and
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academic journals of diversified discipline; including economics, airline performance eval-
uation, behavioural decision theory and software development and information systems
(Jiang et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2011; Behzadian et al., 2012; Aruldoss et al., 2013).
To determining the best optimal solution for a decision making problem, an appro-
priate MADM method among numerous MADM/MCDM methods developed to solve
real-world decision problems have to be considered. Each of the MADM has it unique-
ness in determining a unique optimal alternative which clearly lead to more informed and
better decisions. TOPSIS, VIKOR, AHP, ANP, ELECTRE, Grey theory, SMART, ER,
DEA, AIRM and DAMATEL have all been employed to solve various decision problems
based on the problem uniqueness (Belton, 1986; Watson and Bued, 1987; Saaty, 1987,
1990; Lai et al., 1994; Yoon and Hwang, 1995; Edward and Barron, 1994; Barron and
Barrett, 1996; Triantaphyllou, 2000; Bolton and Stewart, 2002; Goodwin and Wright,
2004 as cited in (Yang and Xu, 2002; Chen and Chen, 2010; Yang et al., 2011; Behzadian
et al., 2012; Bu¨yu¨ko¨zkan and C¸ifc¸i, 2012; Aruldoss et al., 2013; John et al., 2014b; Tadic´
et al., 2014). Although these methods have their pros and cons, each method has partial
or full involvement of the decision maker. Other MCDM techniques have been combined
to tackle decision problems in different domain such as HSE, safety and risk manage-
ment, energy management, resilience improvements, berth allocation, vessel selection,
engineering design selection, operational planning and business/marketing management.
The distribution by combined methods span across journals, year of publication, coun-
try and authors nationality. Recent trend of papers have moved towards applying a
combined MCDM techniques rather than a stand-alone method. These tends to give
a more representative and workable platform when dealing with real life and theoreti-
cal problems. According to Behzadian et al 2012, TOPSIS have been the most widely
combined MCDM/MADM tool in recent time. The common techniques used to extend:
• TOPSIS technique are AHP, FST, ANP and Delphi methods,
• VIKOR method are AHP, ANP and ELECTRE,
• ER method are AHP, FST, ANP and DAMATEL and ,
• Grey theory is ELECTRE.
The combination of different MCDM/MADM tool also known as a hybrid approach
assumes that problems with imprecise information can be handled more effectively. The
identity of the hybrid approach clearly tackles the weaknesses in judgements taken away
from the DM and MCDM/MADM methods.
Prospect Theory (PT)
Prospect theory is one of the famous element of behavioural economic, it was invented
by two psychologist, Kahneman and Tversky (1979). PT describes how people form
decisions about a prospect and a prospect is a gamble; people decision under uncertainty.
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The theory states that people make decisions based on the potential value of losses and
gains rather than the perspective of outcome, thus people evaluate these losses and gains
using certain heuristics. Ongoing research by scholars have begun to focus on risks and
uncertainties decision-making methods under a conditions in which the rational choice
model is a standardised model (i.e. to solve a problem when management face the risk
of selecting what decision is to be implemented), and applied it in a more convenient
way. MADM method based on PT to solve decision making problem is becoming an
aspiring idea in the maritime domain.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) developed a wealth Expected Utility Theory
(EUT). The theory provided a mathematical axioms, however it encountered a lot of
problems. The theory could not explain many of its visions and also, have a few basic
axioms contrary to the experimental data. The resulting questions to the problems
stimulated a number of other attempts to explain the risks under uncertain individual
behavioural theories of development. PT was among the more outstanding one. Where
a DM no longer consider decision-making issues from the perspective of final assets, but
from a view point of winning or losing, caring much about gains and losses.
PT was based on the combination of a large number of empirical research in psychol-
ogy, demonstrating a person’s decision-making behaviour complexity to urgent needs,
thereby analysing and guiding people behavioural decision. Peoples risk preference and
decisions under risk and uncertainty are task independent, thus they present that PT
is an alternative descriptive theory for DMs actual decision behaviour in making deci-
sions under risk. They viewed decision making under risk as a choice between prospects
or gambles. A prospect (x1, p1; . . . , ;xn, pn) is a pact that yields an outcome xi with
probability pi( where p1 + p2 + . . . , pn = 1) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; Kusev et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2013; Levy and Wiener, 2013).
The application of prospect theory, particularly in applied research is still insufficient,
yet the values are very large, and has a wide range of applications. PT has been ap-
plied in financial markets, insurance, industrial organisations, endowment effect and
consumption-saving decision (Barberis, 2013) but the application scope is yet to be ex-
panded. When people make decisions, they tend not to measure the true value of an
item but to some it is relatively easy to evaluate clues to judge. However, there is some
reason to believe that peoples choices about monetary gambles may not correspond with
their preponderance for risk i.e. in situations where decisions regarding other kind of
risks are considered.
Empirical evidence have shown that DMs treat probabilities non-linearly. Specifi-
cally, when DMs is making a risky decision, they tend to overweight small probabilities
and underweight large probabilities (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Kusev et al., 2009). This
results in risk seeking and risk aversion for both low probability gains and losses respec-
tively, and however show a contrasting risk aversion for high probability gains and risk
seeking for high probability losses. Given that there may be differences in DMs decision
behaviour as a function of the type of risk they may be contemplating, there is a need to
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be sensitive to the different possible psychological types of risky decisions (Kusev et al.,
2009).
Components of PT
To set the stage for the present development, four basic conclusions must be met for
PT to provide a unified treatment of both risk and uncertainty (Gurevich et al., 2009;
Barberis, 2013). A number of experiments have confirmed these findings (Kusev et al.,
2009). In the face of risk and uncertainty, adopting PT for decision making needs to
reflect the following components: 1) Reference dependence, 2) Loss aversion, 3) Dimin-
ishing sensitivity and, 4) Probability weighting.
1. Reference dependence: risk analysts derive outcomes from either gains or losses,
measured relative to a reference point. In other words, rather than representing
the status quo point from absolute wealth levels for gains and losses, risk analysts
are more attuned to changes in current wealth from a reference point. Thus, it
serves as an argument for the value function (VF) and, as such, is divided into two
parts: the gain and loss domains, based on the reference point.
2. Loss aversion: refers to the tendency that risk analyst are much more sensitive
to small losses than to gains of corresponding value when moving away from the
reference point. Hence, the value function is steeper in the region of loss than
in the gain domain. Some studies suggest that losses are as much as twice as
psychologically powerful as gains.
3. Diminishing sensitivity : risk analysts have deferent psychological mirrors for gains
and losses. They exhibit a risk-averse tendency over moderate probability gains
and a risk-seeking tendency over losses. This element of PT is in accordance with
diminishing sensitivity, where the value function is concave down in the region
of gain and concave up (convex) in the loss domain. The impact of diminishing
sensitivity creates a decrease in size of the marginal value for both gains and losses
with changes in the reference point.
4. Probability weighting : risk analysts do not weight outcomes by their objective
probabilities, but rather by transformed probabilities or decision weights. The
decision weight are computed with the help of a weighting function, they are actual
weight deemed fit for either gain or loss. Thus ”Probability weighting function”
(PWF) has an inverse-S-shaped: concave up for low probability and concave down
for high probability. The principle of diminishing sensitivity also applies to PWF
as well. It entails that the impact of a given change in probability diminishes
with its distance from the boundary; two natural boundaries 1) certainty and
2) impossibility and this correspond to the endpoints of the certainty scale. For
example, an increase of 0.1 in the probability of a positive prospect has more
impact when it changes the probability of gain from 0.9 to 1.0 or 0 to 0.1, than to
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when it changes in probability from 0.2 to 0.3 or 0.6 to 0.7. Therefore, diminishing
sensitivity gives rise to a weighting function that is concave near 0 and convex
near 1. Thus, this principle yields sub-additivity for very unlikely events and
super-additivity near certainty for prospects under uncertainties.
The meaning of the first three components can be described by an asymmetric S-
shaped PT value function as shown in Fig 2.15(a). For the purpose of understanding
PWF proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Fig 2.15(b) shows a graph for gain or
loss which corresponds to risk analyst transformed decision weight. Weighting function
overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Fig 2.15 shows the
graphical representation Of the VF and PWF.
Features of PT
Framing effect : according to Kahneman and Tversky (1992), it is a rational theory
of choice such that a risk analyst can give the same prospect to decision makers,
but worded in different ways. That suggest a different reference point option,
which often yield to systematically different preferences thus, eventually changes
the DMs behaviour.
Reflection Effect : Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found in the reflection effect that,
when a promising positive prospects for the same absolute value is reversed to be
replaced by a negative, the selection between the positive prospects is a mirror
relationship of the preference between negative prospects.
Isolation Effect : when risk analysts choose to simplify the choice between prospects,
they tend to ignore all the common parts the prospects share, and focus on the
components that distinguish them. This behavioural approach to choice problems
may yield inconsistent preferences, because a pair of prospect can be interpreted in
more than one way, and the different decomposition (i.e. common and distinctive
components) sometimes leads to different preferences.
Prospect theory editing Heuristics: according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) it con-
sists of the preliminary analysis of the offered prospects. The function of editing
is to organise and reformulate prospect options, which often produces a simpler
representation of prospects, for subsequent evaluation and choice. The several
operations applied to transform the outcomes and probabilities associated with
the offered prospects are described as follows: (1) Coding: to identify outcomes
as gains and losses depends on the reference point, however the location of the
reference point can be affected by the originated offered prospects and the expec-
tation of the risk analyst, (2) Combination: combining probabilities associated
with identical outcomes, e.g. Prospect = (100,0.2;100,0.1;0,0.7) will be reduced to
Prospect=(100,0.3;0,0.7), (3) Segregation: some prospects contain a riskless and
risky components. Thus, separating out guaranteed outcome components, e.g.
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Figure 2.15: Fig A represent the reference point curve of a prospect value and Fig B
shows the probability weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
Prospect = (100,0.2;200,0.8) will be reduced to a guaranteed gain of 100 and a
risky prospect of (100, 0.8) or Prospect = 100 + (0,0.2;100,0.8), (4) Cancellation:
discarding of components that are shared by the offered prospect. Thus, ignor-
ing the common constituents to of both options and focusing on the difference,
e.g. the choice between prospects (100,0.2; 50,0.5; 25,0.3) and (100,0.2; 40,0.4;
30,0.4) can be reduced by cancellation to prospects (50,0.5; 25,0.3) and (40,0.4;
30,0.4), (5) Simplification: discarding extremely unlikely outcomes by rounding
the probabilities or outcomes, e.g. the prospect (100,0.49999; 201,0.2) is likely to
be recorded as (100,0.5; 200,0.2), which can also be interpreted differently by risk
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analysts, and (6) Determination of dominance: to detect the dominated alterna-
tives of the offered prospect, and then rejecting the dominated options with no
further evaluation, e.g. between prospects (100,0.6; 50,0.4) and (60,0.6; 20,0.4),
the final prospect will be (100,0.6; 50,0.4) with no further evaluation of the dom-
inant prospect. Furthermore, there is no specific way of applying these editing
heuristics, no insight on what order it has been applied. It depend on a scenario
as long as it gets into the framing effects and the steps seems in line with what
decision makers actually do.
Loss Effect : losses looms larger than gains (loss aversion) under both risk and un-
certainty, thus risk-seeking choice often prefer a small probability of gains over
the expected value of that prospect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). The observed asymmetry between gains and losses can be es-
tablished when a risk analyst must make a choice between a prospect of a sure loss
and a significant probability of a larger loss. It is far too extreme to be explained
by certainty effects or by decreasing risk aversion.
Application of prospect theory
According to Barberis (2013), PT as a model for decision making under risk and uncer-
tainty has been successfully applied in the areas of economics, decision making under
risk, accident analysis and prevention, banking and finance, and transport research. Fi-
nance and insurance are the most areas where prospect theory has been actively applied
in economics. In the field of finance, three main context are considered (1) a cross sec-
tion of financial assets average returns, (2) aggregate stock market, and (3) trading of
financial assets over time. Whereas in insurance, it has been most extensively applied
on (1) property and casualty insurance, (2) morality insurance with the main product
in life and annuities, and (3) health insurance.
In transportation research, a pricing model was proposed and PT was adopted for
the determination of travellers reference point, to capture travellers response to pricing
signals under risk (Xu et al., 2011). Zhou et al. (2014) applied PT to describe routes
choice behaviour based on the travel time distribution of alternative routes and route
choice shown on variable message signs (VMS). Gao et al. (2010) presented a model
based on the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to tackle travellers strategic behaviours
when adapting to revealed traffic conditions en-route in a stochastic network, viewed as
a choice problem under risk. Gurevich et al. (2009) presented a research to test CPT
in the financial market; focusing on investors preferences using the conventional option
analysis from US stock option data. Fan et al. (2013) proposed a method based on
PT to solve MADM problem by calculating the three format attribute aspirations, to
obtain overall prospect values in order to determine ranking of alternatives. Kusev et al.
(2009) compared risks taken for precautionary decisions with those taken for equivalent
monetary gambles using PT in five experiments.
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The applications of CPT/PT discussed above are based on decision-making under
risk, however, the insight of PT can be used in a more predictive way to nudge decision
makers towards making choices that are viewed as more desirable. CPT/PT provide
a quantitative meaning to DMs observed behaviours. The fundamental difficulty in
applying PT for decision making is that, even if we accept that the carriers of utility are
gains and losses, it is often unclear what a gain or loss represents in any given situation.
Thus, this challenge provided a hypothesis (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). Additionally,
further testing of the hypothesis is necessary for to the fact that it was based on finance
rather than the gains and losses in risky decisions under high uncertainties. Otherwise
it is unlikely to be completely true.
Critique of PT
The key difference between PT and CPT is where the subject decision weight are assigned
to cumulative probabilities rather than the raw probabilities, otherwise CPT upholds
the core values of PT. CPT was developed to improve on the lapses within PT, and
it applies to both risky and uncertain prospect. Assuming that the PT value function
is an S-shaped function with a convex segment steeper than its concave counterpart;
provided a prospect does not violate first degree stochastic dominance (FSD) such that
if prospect A dominates B by FSD, such dominance will be found also in the CPT
framework. Thus, PT and CPT are not differentiated, we simply refer to PT as long
as the transformation of initial probability to cumulative probability does not violate
FSD. Wakker (2010) in his book ”Prospect theory: for risk and ambiguity” pointed out
a feature of PT largely discredited through its inbuilt violation of dominance, although
clearly stated that this deficiency was rectified by CPT in Tversky and Kahneman in
1992 (Hey, 2011).
According to Nwogugu (2006), PT/CPT models are inaccurate and were derived
from improper methodology and calculation. PT/CPT do not incorporate the many
psychological, legal, biological, knowledge and situational price-dynamic factors inherent
in decision making. Furthermore, prior work by Nwogugu (Nwogugu, 2005a,b) suggested
that PT/CPT and Expected Utility Theory (EUT) are similar in concept, both based on
probability-weighted or factor-weighted summations of possible outcomes. Thus, show-
ing inherent flaws and invalidity due to weak theory, incorrectness in real-life conception
and perception and/or being derived from a questionable method. For this reasons,
PT/CPT and EUT do not explain many aspect of decision making and risk (Nwogugu,
2006).
First of all, as a somewhat popular and a descriptive model, PT/CPT has its advan-
tages and disadvantage. It can deal with decision making under both risk and uncer-
tainty, it has a scientific basis for several major effects in decision making and choice as
well as allows for rank-dependant probability distortion to rely on prospective gains or
losses. The major disadvantage is how does PT/CPT tackles a prospect choice where
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in a realistic case both positive and negative outcomes are possible. Second, the appli-
cation of prospect theory, particularly in applied research is still insufficient, therefore
PT and its value is very large, with a wide range of applications. So the application
scope has yet to be expanded. Lastly, even after more than 30 years of its existence as
a decision model for both risk and uncertainty, PT is still widely considered as the best
available description of how subjects evaluate risk. The authors Kahneman and Tversky
(1979, 1992) have contributed immensely, and this decisively awarded their efforts with
a Nobel Prize in economic science (2002).
2.5.7 Existing Hazards in oil terminals and OTOs
In the past decades, researches has been undertaken in the maritime industry ranging
from dry dock, sea ports and offshore terminals, maritime transportation, oil and gas
pipelines, maritime critical infrastructures, ship safety assessment, ship navigation, tank
farms, exclusive container terminal, onshore platforms, maritime security etc. but there
is a common threat which has been a stigma in such different research areas. This stigma
termed ”hazard” has cut across all aspect of the maritime industry, and researchers are
still examining the RM model that will best reduce risk to ALARP for specific critical
systems.
A literature review on oil terminals and OTOs has been conducted and some major
hazards in such terminals and operations were discussed. A generic oil terminal and
OTOs hazards can be categorised into (a) Man related hazard (b) Machine related
hazard (c) Communication and Correspondence related hazards (d) Management related
hazards and (e) Nature related hazards. Fig 2.16 represents a generic environment of
operators in an oil terminal.
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Figure 2.16: A generic environment for OTOs
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Man-related Hazards
Human error contributed to the causal chain of accidents in the maritime domain. It
may be of various origins and part of larger organisational processes that encourage
unsafe acts, which ultimately produce system failures (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011).
The combination of demand characteristics in the maritime industry such as fatigue,
stress, work pressure, communication, environmental factors, and long periods of time
away from home, are potential contributors to human errors (Hetherington et al., 2006).
Rothblum (2000) stated in his research that human induced activities caused economic
loss and harm to people (Ren et al., 2008). Data from New Zealand, Taiwan, USCG
report and Dutch Shipping Council cited human factors as a cause of shipping accident
as shown in Fig 2.17. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB, 2000)
stated that human error is one factor that still dominates the majority of maritime
accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006). Furthermore in the maritime domain for the past
two decades, 16% of all the accidents that occurred in port cited human factor as the
main cause as listed in the Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) (Darbra and
Casal, 2004). Amongst the vast consequences related to human error at offshore/onshore
platforms includes, fire and explosions, collisions, groundings, and tankers accidents (Ren
et al., 2008). ’Human factor’ and ’human error’ are used interchangeably (Skogdalen and
Vinnem, 2011), but they are all underlying causes of accidents. While human factors are
the interaction between man and his workstation (e.g. machine, infrastructures etc.),
human error on the other hand is the failure of planned operations due to unforeseeable
events. In seaport and terminals, pilots, ship’s officers and crew and shore personnel’s
errors were mentioned as the main categories of human errors contributing to major
marine loss (Mokhtari et al., 2012) as shown in Fig 2.18. Database has considered
seven different categories to designate the place or activity in which accident occurred,
this includes (1) process plants (2) storage (3) transport (4) loading/oﬄoading and (5)
domestic/commercial and warehouse waste (Darbra and Casal, 2004).
Figure 2.17: Human factors contribution to accidents in the marine domain as cited
in (Darbra and Casal, 2004; Hetherington et al., 2006)
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Figure 2.18: Cited human errors leading to accidents in the marine domain as cited
in (Mokhtari et al., 2012; Lu and Shang, 2005)
Machine-related Hazards
Due to the complexity of operating equipment, operators cannot overlook highly dan-
gerous processes (Shang and Tseng, 2010). As a part of the marine services, dredging
and maintenance of port infrastructures, navigational aids, IT and equipment are among
the main ”technical factors” and lack of maintenance could contribute towards opera-
tional risk (Mokhtari et al., 2012). MHIDAS database records that 14% of accidents
occurred in hoses during (un)loading operations at oil terminals and this was purely due
to mechanical failure (Darbra and Casal, 2004). The inappropriate use of machine also
contributes to technical risk factor resulting to total system failure. Accident due to over
reliance of technology as resulted to incident causing 1000 reported injuries and costing
the company $7 million (Hetherington et al., 2006). More so, technical risk factor was
responsible for a collision risk between Floating, Production, Storage, and Oﬄoading
(FPSO) and a shuttle tanker during tandem oﬄoading operation (Yang et al., 2008).
Oil release, pool fire, spills, rupture and jet fire radiation could be the consequences of
such risk factor during OTOs. According to Alderton (2008), absence of preventive and
running maintenance, lack of qualified maintenance personnel, lack of adequate stocks of
spare parts and insufficient standardisation of equipment types are reasons for the high
proportion of equipment being out of service. The aforementioned risk factors have been
identified in previous literatures using the HAZID processes within the risk management
framework (Mokhtari et al., 2012).
Coordination and Correspondence-related Hazards
The consequent increase in the transportation of hazardous products is directly related
to the increase in port activities thus the frequency of accidents in port is increasing.
The ability of an individual to possess mental model to use information from the envi-
ronment to predict possible future states and events, in order to reduce surprise reflects
an adaptation to a potentially critical situation. Between 1987 -2000, 71% of all human
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error types on maritime accidents were due to communication problem during maritime
operations from eight countries (Grech et al., 2002). Lack of communication was re-
sponsible for 42% of the 273 incidents reported by the Canadian Transportation and
Safety Board (CTSB) while carrying out a mooring operation and navigation. Het-
herington et al. (2006) suggested that language problems was the main factor due to
misunderstanding and as such communication issues can often result in error leading to
accidents. Research on safety operations for ECT at Kaohsiung port in Taiwan identified
that the leading factor influencing risk frequency is ”communication misunderstanding”
(Ding and Tseng, 2012). Mearns et al. (2003) conducted a safety climate surveys on
oil and gas installations and communication about health and safety was part of her
survey, she argued that addressing the adequacy of communication between two subsets
e.g. operator and ship interface on shared activities establishes key accountabilities and
responsibilities for preliminary hazard identification.
Management-related Hazards
Research effort has been aimed to reveal, isolate and measure/predict human and orga-
nizational factors and their influence on risk (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011) and during
the past decade, industries and organizations have long measured safety and organiza-
tional performance in safety-critical systems, tracking accidents, near misses, lost time,
resources, and personnel. Organizational factors are characterized by the division of
tasks, design of job positions and selection, training and cultural indoctrination, and
coordination to accomplish the activities. Organizational safety factors such as hiring
quality personnel, safety orientation, promotion of safety, formal learning system, re-
warding safety, and multicultural operations, were all identified by domain experts as
having a significant link to safety performance (Grabowski et al., 2010). Organisational
error has resulted to a sub-sea gas blow-out i.e. the Snorre Alpha in the Norwegian sector
of the North sea in 2004 and what contributed to the accident were failure to follow steer-
ing documentation, lack of appreciation and execution of risk assessments, inadequate
management involvement and requirements for well barriers not fulfilled (Brattbakk
et al., 2004). According to Rothblum (2000), about 75 -96% of marine losses are partly
or fully caused by organisational and human error (Ren et al., 2008). Previous reviews
have demonstrated that these factors are seen as a cause of major accidents, therefore
the need to analyse organizational factors in a more structured way is necessary in safety
critical systems.
Nature-related Hazards
Limited research has been carried out on the above risk factor but the majority of
research refer to it as ”Environmental or safety” risk categories (Ronza et al., 2006;
Mokhtari et al., 2012; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). Environmental risk categories
attributes 4% to causes of accidents at sea (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000) with extreme
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weather, winds exceeding port criteria, strong currents, visibility, earthquake, rain/s-
now and wind direction as specific hazards on operations (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000;
Merrick and Van Dorp, 2006; Ronza et al., 2006; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). The
Bunga Alpinia disaster (2012) caused severe explosion after apparently being struck
by lightning, three deaths were recorded. The New York harbour oil terminal disas-
ter (2012) which damaged infrastructures and the environment due to hurricane Sandy,
caused loss of life with high consequences. Mansouri et al. (2010) provides basic natural
risk factors, they include hydrologic, geologic, seismic, and atmospheric hazards. They
influence a system on a random basis and only little information is known about their
occurrence.
The consequences of such risk factors led to economic loss to the operators of such
terminals and as such, the challenges of these risks are so enormous that it requires flex-
ible yet robust risk analysis methods in order to tackle their unpredictable outcomes.
The key questions in this line of research can be summarized as (1) what are the signifi-
cant factors that affect risk in OTOs? (2) How do these factors influence risk in OTOs?
(3) How much do they contribute to risk in OTOs?
2.6 A Resilience Engineering (RE) Literature Review Rel-
evant to OTOs
There are different definitions of resilience in a resilience engineering context (Madni
and Jackson, 2009; Mansouri et al., 2010; Steen and Aven, 2011; Dinh et al., 2012).
Most researchers capture more or less the same ideas but a generalised definition of
resilience by Wreathall (2006) comes into context in this research; s/he defines resilience
as managements ability to recognise, adapt or recover a system rapidly to a stable
condition, enabling it to continue its activities during and after a major accident rather
than prevent incidents from occurring. In the context of a Port Infrastructure System
(PIS), resilience can be defined as a function of systems vulnerability against potential
disruption with adaptive capacity of recovering from the face of major shocks within a
reasonable timeframe after a major accident (Mansouri et al., 2010). Therefore, resilience
as an additional safety measure is needed in complex operational designs (Dinh et al.,
2012). In response to any disruptions of various levels of intensity, resilience alongside
robustness, flexibility, adaptability, and agility is amongst the strategies that might
be adopted and utilised by maritime complex systems. Fig 2.19 shows the nature of
resilience modelled in an operational environment.
Adaptability: is the ability to adjust through reconfiguration to cope with unfore-
seen situation in a dynamic and unpredictable environment. Complex dynamic oper-
ational systems need to be tolerant of uncertainty. To achieve adaptability, modelling
dynamic operations with adequate safety margins to account for uncertainty and exper-
imenting with alternative operational design to understand the operational impact of
various alternative (Madni and Jackson, 2009; Neches and Madni, 2013). Adaptation
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Figure 2.19: Many faces of resilience and its system vision, as adapted in Madni and
Jackson (2009)
to uncertainty is one of the vital tests of a resilient system (Abech et al., 2006),thus
a resilient oil terminal operations should have the capability to adapt and withstand
external or internal disruption of unknown magnitude.
Avoidance: is a quality exhibited by a resilient system to anticipate failure without
having to wait for serious accidents to occur. Avoidance goes beyond traditional safety
system in that it is enabled by predictive capabilities or the ability to preview outcomes
and take proactive action on occurrence or consequences of disrupting events (Madni
and Jackson, 2009).
Survival: survivability arises from the combination of robustness and adaptability. It is
the ability of a critical dynamic system to resist destruction or incapacitation during and
after disruptive events. For a critical dynamic system to survive, shock absorbers for ex-
ample, resource buffers capable of responsiveness within which the system is developed,
designed, deployed, operated and maintained (Abech et al., 2006; Madni and Jackson,
2009; Neches and Madni, 2013). Models with representational richness, learning about
operational context and uncertainty could help reimburse the survival of critical dynamic
operational systems.
Recovery: is the ability of a critical dynamic systems pre-disruption to be restored
to as closely as possible to cope with current condition (Madni and Jackson, 2009).
Recovery is also the ability of operators to create a new plan or retract and switch
to the correct plan at the early stage of responses to disruption (Kontogiannis, 2011).
Hence, to advance safety within already ultra-safe system, it is important to focus on
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strengthening models to provide a good basis for detecting and repairing systems, and
its operation to be responsive to the constraints of uncertainty.
Different research reviews have stated that, for a system or an organisation to be
resilient enough, it must have the following qualities: the ability to:
• Respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet flexible manner,
• Monitor what is going on, including its own performance,
• Anticipate risks (risk events) and opportunities, and
• Learn from experience.
In the past, operational systems were primarily designed to be effective, but now
they also need to be resilient. Due to the current economic competition mechanisms,
resilience seems to be a strategic concept dealing with the improvement of safety in
complex dynamic systems, since it could reconcile the notions of performance and safety
rather than systematically oppose them (Morel et al., 2009).
Resilience Engineering (RE) is about increasing the ability of organisation to make
proper adjustment to the current system of operations in such a way that they anticipate
adverse events and act in a proactive manner. RE explores ways that enhance organisa-
tions ability to be robust and flexible to cope for the unexpected (Hansson et al., 2009).
Conventional risk assessment ordinarily treats a small number of possible scenario taken
into account as a moment in time, but in the past few years, new ideas such as RE
have been suggested to improve and keep safety, have started a revolution in the safety
of complex systems (Shirali et al., 2012). Although many efforts have been focused on
finding solutions to prevent incidents in major hazardous operations, incidents still oc-
cur because of various technical, human factors and random natural events. It seems
the unexpected hazards, not being absorbed by the system are leading to catastrophes
and this hazards are unavoidable even under good risk management; this seems to be
true especially with the more complex systems (Dinh et al., 2012). It has become quite
evident that complex systems development invariably demands both high productivity
and ultra-high safety levels. It is this recognition that has stimulated the noticeable rise
in interest in RE (Madni and Jackson, 2009). According to Hollnagel (2007), RE rep-
resents an alternative to conventional risk management approaches which are based on
hindsight knowledge, failure reporting and risk assessments, calculating historical data-
based probabilities. Furthermore RE consider conventional risk assessment methods to
be inadequate for the present day systems (Steen and Aven, 2011; Dinh et al., 2012).
Amongst the different diversities of RE objectives is the ability to anticipate incident
that have not yet happen. RE views ”failure” as inability of critical dynamic systems
to be resilience, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. Thus a key component of RE
is robustness in decision aiding system and operating procedures. It helps operators to
adapt to work methods as well as limiting the spread of risk factors under extreme natural
and man-made hazards (Kontogiannis, 2011). Robustness is a key operational property
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in RE, that is related to operation failure resistance. The robustness of an operation
is influenced by the combination of two factors: (1) structural redundancy and, (2)
integrity. These two factors must be quantified to express robustness in a meaningful and
measurable manner. The assessment of operational robustness requires a realistic and
efficient simulation of operational behaviour under various local failure scenarios, using
advanced and experimentally validated modelling methodologies to examine operational
system performance.
Flexibility is the ability of a plan to cope with variations and to allow adjustments
to the lay-out of the plan (Taneja et al., 2012). Flexibility is a strategy for dealing
with uncertainties, thus an operation is flexible if output variation can operate and
stay within the desired range under unexpected disruption. Flexibility is considered
amongst the attributes of resilience (Dinh et al., 2012). It is required that the design of
complex dynamic system, is operated in such a manner that it can exhibit robustness;
to respond to less powerful operational and financial fluctuations to show resilience in
the face of major shocks and substantial disturbances, that can pause its operating
processes either temporarily or for a long period of time (Mansouri et al., 2010; Taneja
et al., 2012). Tanja et al. (2012) suggested the following strategies in order to cope
with uncertainties: (1) spacious marine layout: terminal areas with sufficient depth
and length, (2) long quays to improve the flexibility of operations and vessel berthing;
flexibility with regard to allocating terminal concessions and the possibility to extend
quays and terminals when necessary without serious constraints created by the need for
disproportionately expensive construction, and (3) infrastructures designed in such a
way that it can cope with technical changes of the superstructure, equipment etc.
2.7 Approaches on How to Measure Resilience
Performance criteria and metrics for evaluating resilience will enable the development of
decision tools for planners and stakeholders to enhance the performance of operations
during and after extreme events, thus reducing loss of life, injuries, and economic losses.
The following are ways to measure resilience:
1) Vulnerability assessment using performance metrics for evaluating resilience (Mc-
Manus et al., 2008): it contributes to increased situation awareness, promotes the
development of adaptive capacity and gives the organisation something to work on
such as using preparedness and criticality information for both response and recovery
phase of a crisis.
2) Design and retrofit strategies for resilience: A resilience heuristics plan which rely on
experience, judgement and intuition for which results can infrequently be quantified
or verified (Madni and Jackson, 2009).
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3) Risk-based assessment and decision methods for achieving resilience that are sup-
ported by a cost/benefit analysis and performance-based methods for codes, stan-
dards, and practices (Wang, 2002; Berle et al., 2011).
2.7.1 Performance Metrics for Vulnerability Assessment
The term vulnerability in the maritime domain is defined as the properties of a critical
dynamic system that limits its ability to cope, handle and survive threats and disruptive
events which may occur within and outside the system boundaries (Berle et al., 2011).
Vulnerability is related to an ’internal weakness’ in a system (England et al., 2008).
There is considerable confusion over the use of the term vulnerability assessment and the
modelling of vulnerability in the real world (McManus et al., 2008), but more emphases
should be considered on critical dynamic systems with potentials to have significant
negative impact in a crisis situation.
Vulnerability assessment requires investigation or quantification of hazards, focusing
on all relevant failure modes. A performance metrics for vulnerability has been used by
researchers to measure the effectiveness of resilience. McManus et al. (2008) developed
vulnerability matrices for the assessment of vulnerability at an all hazards level to im-
proving organisational resilience. Furthermore they also used susceptibility information
to develop a context specific matrix and this was due to the fact that vulnerability should
not be assessed across scales because processes causing system vulnerability are different
among each scale. Ozyurt and Ergin (2010) developed a coastal vulnerability matrix,
using the concept of Thierler and Hammer-klose (2000) and a coastal vulnerability index
for the assessment of coastal vulnerability for decision making. The two researchers used
parameters with the corresponding range values from very low vulnerability to very high
vulnerability. Vulnerability matrix is similar in structure to traditional risk matrix. The
challenge of measuring resilience for OTOs in real-world application is to determine the
indicators and metrics that allow real-time monitoring of unforeseen events within crit-
ical dynamic systems, thereby allowing a continuous view of how vulnarable the system
may be.
2.7.2 Resilience Heuristics
Heuristics are typically a function of the type of disruption, systems being monitored,
and the resilience needed (Madni and Jackson, 2009). Developing a representative re-
silience heuristics needs experience, judgement and intuition, to enhance systems re-
silience to unforeseen events. Resilience heuristics should be verified or quantified by
experts before being implemented. Resilience heuristics are more of a holistic method
to measure resilience and could be done at the initial stage, for verification or quantifi-
cation of a resilient system. Examples of parameters used in representative resilience
heuristics design are; systems functional redundancy, human backup, predictability, re-
organisation, neutral state, drift correction, intent awareness, etc.
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2.8 Conclusion
Operational risk within a risk management system has been linked to the complexity
and the dynamic performance of the system. Practically this can be described as ”organ-
isational acceptance” due to the fact that risk related factors may lead to the disruption
of the systems. However, applying a holistic risk analysis to offshore installations could
have some hurdles particularly in dealing with OTOs; where different hazardous ma-
terials such as petrol, kerosene and diesel are being transported. Important research
questions to be asked are:
• What measures can be used to form a proper assessment framework and how are these
measures inter-related to each other?
• What method will be used to collect empirical data from oil terminals? There is
often inadequate data or imprecise information available when carrying out OTOs
analysis. Although several maritime accident databases have been built up, the
data contained in them are only marginal.
• How to develop a framework to support the developed model for OTOs RM. This
is because offshore risk assessment must take all major risk related factors into
account. When these factors are involve in OTOs, modelling becomes very com-
plicated (e.g. exploring the relationships among OTOs needs a deep understanding
of oil terminal safety issues, and may involve domain experts personal experiences
that are difficult to be treated in a comprehensive way).
The benefits derived from the implementation of resilience in complex systems op-
erations are: the ability to prepare for the unforeseen in such uncertain environment;
ability of a system to avoid, adapt and recover in the face of adverse operational scenar-
ios in order to maintain its functionality and to increase focus on proactivity. Finally,
many of the cited papers in this literature review lack outcome measures that could
assess the influence of risk related factors on OTOs, thus there is a gap to be filled on
the assessment of these identified hazards/risks. Ronza et al. (2006) analysed tanker
navigation through port waters using the QRA technique for the handling of hazardous
materials in oil terminal such as petrol, kerosene, diesel oil, and fuel oil. The lack of
literature on oil terminal operation has underscored the need for a new approach (a
resilience model) for RM on OTOs.

Chapter 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Summary
This chapter describes the research methodologies and methods that are fundamental
to the study. It identifies the research assumptions that directed the decisions about the
research approach adopted. The aim of this study is to investigate the uncertainties in
oil terminal operations in order to monitor, control or mitigate risk. Thus, a concep-
tual framework to enhance operations on ship/terminal interface for OTOs is essential.
The development of a generic conceptual framework requires relevant knowledge to be
extracted from experts with experience in the related field. After introducing the generic
conceptual framework, this chapter will discuss the different research strategies, defini-
tion of key terms, types of research methodology and the choice of the most appropriate
methodologies to be applied in this thesis.
3.1 Introduction
Research is an organised, systematic, data-based, critical, objective and scientific inquiry
into a specific problem undertaken with the aim of finding answers to the research
questions or solutions to the problem. In carrying out a piece of research, a choice
has to be made between three alternative research methods, which are: qualitative,
quantitative or both. The world is essentially knowable; it consists of knowledgeable
facts, and, if we ask the right question in the right way, use the right research method
and carry out the right kind of processes, we will discover the facts of truth. The role
of a piece of research is to test theories and provide materials for the development of
laws; thus, this chapter will concentrate on explaining how the research was conducted
in order to achieve the research aim and objectives.
The researcher is an observer of common reality. In a similar vein, research method-
ology is an outline for the researcher’s activity which specifies how the researcher intends
to carry out the research plan in a methodical way. On the other hand, research meth-
ods are processes of data collection, data analysis and interpretation that a researcher
performs during research work. A research method is connected to different types of
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research design/strategy. The data collection method applied in this thesis is mainly
expert judgements, and is discussed briefly here and at length in the following chapters.
3.2 Description and Ideas Linked to Research Design
3.2.1 Research Methodology
The research methodology is a strategy, design and plan of action that shapes the choice
and the use of specific methods to collect and analyse data as part of the research
process (Glassman and Pinelli, 1985; Creswell, 2013). It is an activity blue print for
the researcher, which specifies how the researcher intends to carryout research from
the beginning to the end. The knowledge of the various methods and the procedures
involved in each is important in establishing the justification of such techniques to both
the researcher and those who consume the research (Soni and Kodali, 2012).
3.2.2 Research Techniques
Research varies in type but are common in the following categories: historical, descriptive
and experimental depending on the advancement of knowledge about the research topic.
As such, different techniques are required as tools to collect data and information and
identify what is unknown, in a systematic and orderly approach. A technique expresses
the reason behind using a method. Research techniques is a process that can be followed
to gather data and analyse them to find a result (Tijjani, 2013).
3.2.3 Research Design
A research design can be described as the method formulated to seek and respond to
research problems. The research design of this study uses multiple methods to generate
and analyse different kinds of data. The distinctive research strategy was to select and
synergistically integrate the best techniques from qualitative and quantitative methods
to comprehensively solve the various aspects of the research problem. The research
design proposes a ’concurrent transformative design’ based on the ideology of concep-
tual framework, specific theoretical perspective, and is guided primarily by qualitative
and quantitative data. Questionnaires and surveys, expert opinion and empirical study
were used for data collection and research justification. This was based on the belief
that ”no specific method is straightforward to solve a problem, because each method re-
veals different aspect of empirical realism” (Denzin, 1978, p.28 cited in Abubakar, 2013).
Therefore, using multiple theories, combining and collecting data qualitatively and quan-
titatively in a single research design counterbalances the weakness of one method with
the strength of another (Tijjani, 2013).
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3.3 Sampling Frame, Data Collection and Analysis
3.3.1 Sampling Frame
The oil industry is considered to be among the largest companies by gross revenue in
oil-producing countries. Its primary business activities differ between regions and can
include oil exploration, refining, commercial transportation and storage. Within the oil
industry, there are differently-sized companies carrying out various activities ranging
between small, medium and large scale. The activities on onshore/offshore oil terminal
platforms are of importance to this research and respondents for this study were drawn
from terminal operators and management.
Selecting a sample representation from all elements in the population allows the
researcher to limit the amount of data he/she wishes to collect. Thus, sample selection
is limited to certain criteria, depending on the type of research process (Soni and Kodali,
2012). The selection of respondents for data collection was based on specific crude oil-
producing countries, where a large amounts of crude oil are being consumed/transported
thereby leading to large import/export of these refined products, constitute the target
population.
A simple random sampling of professionals and specialists with relative or vast expe-
rience on onshore/offshore oil terminal platform operation and management were iden-
tified and chosen as respondents. Consequently, the experts in this randomly chosen
sample population are aware of the significance of the hazard factors with which they
are involved. Their expertise within oil terminal platforms makes them the most suitable
participants in this research. A simple random sampling was adopted in order to control
bias (Tijjani, 2013). The research used publicly available directories (Lloyds register,
CHIRP maritime), LinkedIn and recommended oil terminal professionals in selecting
respondents from the appraised companies. Information such as respondent company
name, e-mail address, telephone numbers, job position, postal address, and the product
and/or services produced by the company were important.
The best way of obtaining basic information quickly and efficiently (Gonza´lvez-
Gallego et al., 2015)was to consult senior management officers, ship captains, HSE
consultants, and academicians with industry experience on oil terminals and vessels.
The convenience sampling method was used in this thesis. The sample size was five
experts from various countries, as described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Hammitt and
Zhang (2013) considered that a sample size of N expert (i)( where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N)
was necessary if the well-calibrated experts are of equal or unequal quality and their
judgements are independent, positively or negatively dependent. The aim of having a
wider generalisation of representatives as participants is of importance to this research.
3.3.2 Data Collection
The choice of data collection method should be based on the uncertainty of the data in
line with the research question. The two prominent data collection methods are: primary
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data collection, which involves collecting fresh data, and secondary data collection, which
entails concentrating on historical data. This thesis adopted primary data collection as
the only method used to gather data and this method can be further categorised into
qualitative and quantitative research methods.
Qualitative research is carried out when a researcher want to understand meaning,
interpretations, ideas, beliefs and values, as well as describe and understand experience.
It is a set of multiple practices where words in methodological and philosophical vocab-
ularies attain different meanings in their use. This type of research aims to discover
meanings for a problem or issue for an individual or group. As a result, the qualita-
tive research method can be associated with personal experience with people, interview,
observations, life history, interaction and visual text in the research setting. The data
collection strategies when using this method involve the collection of evidence through
document studies, interview studies, literature reviews, descriptive studies, case studies,
experts’ judgements, naturalistic inquiry and field group (Creswell, 2013; Qrunfleh and
Tarafdar, 2014).
On the other hand, quantitative research methods are also referred to as empiri-
cal studies and/or statistical studies. Quantitative research is characterised by collec-
tion of numerical data, demonstrating the relationship between theory and research.
Quantitative research strategies for data collection include: experimental studies, pre-
test and post-test design, self-administered questionnaire, structured interview schedules
and quasi-experimental studies. The subjects included when carrying out quantitative
study are selected at random; this is to reduce error and to cancel bias. The qualitative
method has its limitations, such that it is less systematic, it has a limited generalisation
to broader groups of people, it results in barely replicable findings and it minimises the
possibility of inferences beyond the data. The combination of qualitative and quantita-
tive methods helps acquire credibility in the research field and provides a fairly regular
basis as a distinctive research strategy (Tijjani, 2013).
An empirical approach with surveys, followed by a resilience improvement model
and a structured case study was adopted. The purpose of empirical research is to verify
already existing or newly proposed collected evidence about a piece of research on the
basis of empirical data. More so, on the basis of these empirical data, one can postulate
a newly proposed model (Singhal et al., 2011; Soni and Kodali, 2012). Empirical studies
have both the qualitative and quantitative method. In this thesis, both methods were
used to establish the relationship amongst hazard factors and this helps to refine the
level of understanding of hazards that could lead to major disruption. Empirical study
was conducted separately for Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
As discussed in Chapter 2, hazard factors associated with OTOs in the form of
qualitative data were identified through HAZID, i.e. literature review. Saunders et
al. (2007) emphasised the advantages of a literature review; it saves time since the
information has already been collected, and it is less expensive than other methods.
The data can be used in tandem with the data collected through expert elicitation. In
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Chapter 4, the questionnaire is designed to draw out the DM’s attitude towards risk
by means of the utility elicitation. Ethical approval was obtained to further validate
questionnaire contents and participant consent. The questionnaire adopted a seven-point
Likert-type scale to evaluate HFs. The content and language used in the questionnaire
was revised by two scholars after its initial design, to facilitate understanding. A pilot
study was conducted to eliminate inconsistency and vagueness of questions, and also to
determine the level of understanding about the identified HFs. The questionnaire was
web-based and a link was e-mailed to targeted experts. A total of five experts were
chosen at random.
In Chapter 5, significant HFs with the most relative weights are further evaluated
quantitatively using a BN. First, a draft version of the developed questionnaire was ex-
amined by two academicians and a specialist to comment on the appropriateness of the
questions and whether any were confusing. The questionnaire was then reworded for the
pilot study. Six different judges were drawn at random to pre-asses the questionnaire.
These judges were assembled from the maritime domain and oil terminal focus group,
and ranged from an industrialist, academics and experts with experience in both fields.
The ratio of judges correct agreement was considered good and the discriminant valid-
ity feedback from the pilot study was eliminated. Seven-point Likert-type scale type
questions were adopted. The questionnaire was web-based and a link was e-mailed to
targeted expert participants as well as a follow-up process. Data were collected through
the same web-link as soon as the respondent completed the questions. Measures were
considered to eliminate bias.
In Chapter 6, owing to the need to scrutinise identified strategic decisions based
on the results, an empirical approach is utilised in order to ensure that the assembled
strategies are reliable and consistent. Additional in-depth study was also carried out in
each technical chapter (4, 5, and 6) in the thesis, a Case Study or Sensitivity Analysis
(SA) (see the detailed processes in relevant chapters).
3.4 Research Structure
The research structure (see Section 1.8) provides a platform upon which the research
methods will be combined for the research design/strategy during the research work.
The knowledge of the various methods in a research structure involves studying, under-
standing and presenting a purposeful yet robust procedure to facilitate in defining the
research problems.
3.4.1 A Novel Resilience Framework
Fig 3.1 provides an illustrative view of a novel resilience framework proposed for the
purpose of this research upon which the research methodology will be directed. The
research recognises that there is weak knowledge about the uncertainty that has been
Chapter 3. Research Methodology 76
highlighted in the UK Offshore Operators Association’s (UKOOA) framework for risk-
related decision support. Many of the cited papers on offshore/onshore installations
and ships presented that the oil industries have constantly adopted new approaches,
technology and hazardous cargoes, and each element brings with it a new hazard in one
form or another; therefore, there is a lack of reliable safety data and lack of confidence
in risk assessment in complex marine operations (CMOs). Thus, the lack of outcome
measures that could assess the influence of hazard-related factors (section 2.5.7) has un-
derscored the need for a resilience-modelling framework for risk management for OTOs.
The selection of the appropriate conceptual framework that involves all operations is a
complex task in order to fill the gap identified for system resilience, and thus needing
an intensive evaluation process.
The ideas that have been used for the framework are from an extensive review of
resilience engineering papers, experts’ opinions and current practice on oil terminal
operational platforms. The philosophy behind this novel framework is that of the inter-
pretation of the content and context of the satisfaction of observed DMs choices, which
are based on behavioural research. This can be influential in improving system resilience
under high uncertainty; therefore, it will take the burden off the oil terminal platform
management team. In addition, adopting the resilience concept can help improve aware-
ness of dependencies via deep thought regarding its practical and realistic applications
to sustain operation even after a major mishap. Finally, it is important to investigate
the uncertainties on OTOs with a view to identifying relative hazards, obtaining suc-
cessful results relating to their impacts on oil terminal platforms and hence understand
and proffer strategic decision support to CMOs. Therefore, the novel framework of this
research will investigate vulnerability, optimise adaptability and survivability and aid
system recovery against unexpected mishap.
Hazard Identification Phase
The framework encompasses investigated hazards from critical appraisal of relevant lit-
erature (see Chapter 2) on the current practices on CMOs, and existing hazard factors.
A brainstorming session with assembled experienced and knowledgeable participants on
OTOs was carried out in meetings to obtain a thorough examination of identified haz-
ards. The outputs from this session and subsequent literature combine the participants’
judgements and human knowledge on the identified hazards to propose a reliable hier-
archical structure. A dynamic hierarchical structure was developed via a cluster process
involving grouping observations of mutual distances together into manageable numbers
of subsets that resemble each other (see Chapter 4).
Risk Assessment Phase
The identified hazards to the system’s attributes and disruption will be assessed and
assigned relative weights in this phase, and will then be prioritised and ranked using a
model designed to determine the resilience level for OTOs, the, UtiSch+ model, which
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Figure 3.1: A Novel Resilience Framework for OTOs
is based on the Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese concepts, as will be fully explained in
Chapter 4.
The second phase of assessment is discussed in Chapter 5. The HFs from the UtiSch+
model with the most relative weights were further justified by a subjective expert’s
opinion. The HFs are thus then established as potential hazards that could lead to an
accident scenario on OTOs. The most significant hazard factors previously prioritised
in Chapter 4 will be analysed in depth using the BN approach. The flexibility, simplic-
ity and dynamism of the BN technique in addition allows further investigation of the
significant hazard factors and their feasible consequences. As a result, the Netica soft-
ware will compute and obtain crisp numbers for individual hazard factors and this will
provide in-depth understanding for DMs, decision analysts and accident investigators
to issue comments about lessons to be learnt and to suggest/recommend strategies for
decision-making purposes. It is noteworthy to mention that the BN allows new input to
be assessed with existing nodes (see Chapter 5).
Risk Mitigation Phase
In Chapter 6, in order to monitor, control and mitigate operational hazard factors in
oil terminal platforms, alternatives will be proposed for each attribute that describe
each alternative from the set of proposed alternatives. This will be attained with the
use of a decision-making tool AHP and PT, motivated by behavioural psychology and
uncertainties for decision presentation. The proposed alternatives will be evaluated and
Chapter 3. Research Methodology 78
the desirable alternative(s) will be selected using experts’ elicitation to establish which
alternative(s) has more resilience strategic importance.
Testing the Novel Resilience Framework
An empirical study will be used to test the resilience framework in order to explore if it
provides a high degree of methodological support to improve system resilience. A real
case study will be used in order to validate if the framework can solve or contribute
significantly to the enhancement of OTOs even after a major disruption. This thesis
aims to provide a resilience concept for industries to set up planning and application
philosophies for OTOs under high uncertainties. Where the analysis and the result ’in
view’ centres towards gains, then the novel resilience framework will have significantly
contributed to the web of knowledge.
3.4.2 Analysis of the Existing work and Methodologies for CMOs
OTOs are among the core activities in complex marine operations (CMOs). Oil ter-
minal platforms are structures in which these operations are performed and, as such,
there is a high degree of uncertainty while these operations are being carried out. In
Chapter 2, a critical review of corresponding studies on oil terminals was carried out.
Journal articles, accident reports, historical data, conference papers, workshop papers
and relevant seminar on maritime critical infrastructures and transportation formed the
primary part of the review; seaports, offshore and onshore platforms became the main
sources of secondary appraisal.
3.4.3 Integrated Risk Assessment for Resilience Improvement Method-
ology
Chapter 4 demonstrates the labile nature of preference judgements towards hazard by
means of behavioural research for OTOs using the UtiSch+ model. In situations where
there is lack of data, quantifying experts’ judgement qualitatively allows for a step-
by-step analysis of possible hazards with the potential to cause major disruptions to
operations. The methodology strategised to investigate the uncertainties on oil ter-
minal operations is as follows: firstly, hazard factors (HFs) were identified through a
relevant literature review of journal articles, proceedings and conference papers. Other
sources included accident reports, seminars and brainstorming sessions. The information
obtained was then categorised by developing a dynamic hierarchical structure using a
clustering process. Secondly, an empirical study (section 4.5) was conducted to provide
a set of values and consistency for the identified hazard factors to simulate the proposed
model. This study was executed in three phases: (1) questionnaire formulation and pi-
lot study, (2) choosing the right experts and (3) survey data collection and description.
Fig 3.2 shows the questionnaires forms for the pilot study, see Appendix 4E for final
questionnaire and expert elicitation feedback.
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Finally, the SChM in tandem with the behavioural utility approach was designed
to communicate, analyse and provide weighted measurements of the DMs preference
judgements on the HF whose outcome will pose a major catastrophic. A real case
study will be used to steward the process of achieving resilience by applying an holistic
risk analysis model to integrate the entire hazardous events into a multi-level model to
produce an overall picture to identify failures. This can be inter-related to form a proper
assessment framework in the following two (2) steps:
• The utility context of the comparisons
• The Swiss cheese Model (SChM)
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2: Fig (a) and (b) are pilot study questionnaire forms for Utility Swiss
Cheese Model
3.4.4 Priority assessment for OTOs hazards methodology
Chapter 5 investigates the top 10 hazard variables (identified in Chapter 4) whose rela-
tive weights are most significant in causing unexpected events on oil terminal platforms.
The use of a BN model tailored for the resilience improvement of OTOs presents a more
advanced technique to evaluate complex operational hazards. The development of a BN
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model for decision support consists of two major steps: identification of critical vari-
ables and their causal network, and the quantification of the significant interrelationship
among critical variables. The BN methodology follows four major steps:
• Establish potential hazards of relative importance
• Establish the BN model
• Analyse the model
• Model Validation
An empirical study was conducted (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3) in four phases: (1)
questionnaire formulation and pilot study, (2) choosing the right experts, (3) survey
data collection and description and (4) BN model application and results. The BN
model was then performed using the Netica (Netica, 2002) software. For further detailed
information, see Chapters 2 and 5. Fig 3.3 shows the questionnaire form used for the
pilot study and see Appendix 5C for the final questionnaire.
Figure 3.3: A pilot study questionnaire form for BN
3.4.5 Strategic Decision Support Methodology
Chapter 6 outlines the selection of an appropriate alternative for decision making. The
PT framework provides a menu of the different ways through attribute aspirations ex-
pressed in multiple formats by DMs, but formally in the following ways: (1) ”would
better not be over an nth term”, (2) ”would better be over an nth term” and (3) ”would
better be between kth and nth term”. These are mental heuristics or how they perceive
prospects based on gains and losses to come up with a unifying theory for decision mak-
ing under risk. Based on the assessment of OTOs in Chapters 4 and 5, the methodology
for solving an MADM problem with multiple formats of attribute is given as follows:
Chapter 3. Research Methodology 81
• Determine the decision weight of attributes by aggregation, according to experts’
preference judgements.
• Determine reference points according to DM’s attribute aspirations
• Construct gainloss matrix
• Construct prospect value matrix
• Construct normalized matrix
• Calculate the overall prospect value of each alternative
• Determine the ranking of alternatives according to the obtained overall prospect val-
ues.
As discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, an empirical study was conducted to facili-
tate general understanding and knowledge on the significance of the developed resilience
strategic decision. This study was attained in three phases: (1) questionnaire formu-
lation and pilot study, (2) choosing the right experts, (3) survey data collection and
description and (4) test case study. Fig 3.4 shows the questionnaire forms to determine
experts’ aspiration level and alternatives’ importance to OTOs. See Appendix 6C for
the final questionnaire.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has briefly outlined the research methods adopted in this thesis as well as
laying down the foundation for the research viewpoints via the novel framework. The
chapter has also clearly stated the research methodology and the novel framework of
this research; the utility and Swiss cheese (UtiSch+) model, Bayesian Network (BN)
and Analytical Hierarchical Process-Prospect Theory (AHP-PT), as well as the research
structure. The rationales for using only a questionnaire were also stated, followed by
the method used in the questionnaire dissemination. The number of experts used in this
research and the justification for using them were also presented. The next chapter will
move forward the justification of the research framework, where behavioural research
based on DMs’ psychology demonstrates the labile nature of preference judgements.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4: Pilot study questionnaire forms for Prospect Theory
Chapter 4
AN INTEGRATED RISK
ASSESSMENT FOR
RESILIENCE IMPROVEMENT
OF OTOS USING UTILITY
THEORY AND SWISS CHEESE
MODEL UNDER HIGH
UNCERTAINTY
Summary
This chapter presents an innovative approach towards integrating Utility Theory and
Swiss Cheese Model into oil terminal risk assessment. The combined Utility Theory and
Swiss Cheese Model (UtiSch+) considers the behaviours based on experts estimation and
possible active failures under uncertainty. This approach has been developed and applied
to a case study of an oil terminal platform. The simplicity and efficiency of this model
will benefit oil terminals in tackling uncertainties their operation to minimise vulnerabil-
ity and maximise resilience. The Utility Theory and the Swiss Cheese Model (UtiSch+)
model was used to determine the relative weights of the identified hazard factors. The
model will facilitate the decision-making process for complex decision problems and thus
improve resilience.
4.1 Introduction
In the early phases of conceptual design, it is more useful to aspire to create something
new than to use the same decision patterns as used in the past. Behavioural research
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on decision making approach demonstrates the labile nature of preference judgements.
Many decision problems involve considerable uncertainty about the outcomes of alter-
native decisions. Often it is important not only to evaluate the possible outcomes in
a decision problem but also to judge the riskiness of various alternatives. Seemingly
subtle changes in problem structure, question format, response mode, individual per-
spective or other aspects of the assessment process can sometimes dramatically change
the preference responses of an individual decision maker (DM) (Farquhar, 1984).
A single failure or error seldom causes an accident, but the consequences of a series
of failures or errors do (Wu et al., 2009). However, applying a holistic risk analysis to
integrate the whole hazardous event into a multi-level model produces an overall picture
by which to identify failures, and this can be inter-related to form a proper assessment
framework. Several tools have been developed by researchers to support risk analysis.
Experts in different domains may use different categories to classify failures, with each
category having different sorts of errors. Thus, this requires risk or decision analysts
to develop novel methods that are capable of finding the right balance in dealing with
overall risk assessment and domain-specific analysis (Ren et al., 2008).
The DMs attitude, as defined by their decision criteria, denotes the relevance of
the decision, supported by the method and model. Hazelrigg (1998) stated that there
are no right or wrong decision criteria; instead, there are criteria that are more or less
important to the DM (Van Bossuyt et al., 2012). The emphasis is on probing the steps
in the utility assessment process (Farquhar, 1984), and, in particular, reviewing various
methods of comparing person approach focusing on unsafe acts using other approaches
in tandem (Wu et al., 2009). Thus, the methodology presented has a wider application
than decision problems involving only one attribute.
By methodically substantiating assessment procedures and contextual elements in
behavioural research, it has been possible to examine some of their effects on preference
judgements (Farquhar, 1984; Reason, 2000; Xue et al., 2013). This information can be
helpful in choosing appropriate utility assessment procedures when combined with other
approaches for a particular decision situation by decision analysts.
4.2 Appraisal on Resilience Approach for Complex Marine
Operations (CMOs)
In response to any unexpected events with various levels of disruption, resilience along-
side robustness is amongst the strategies that might be adopted and utilised by the
maritime domain. Resilience is an additional safety measure needed in CMOs such as
OTO platforms. Zhang (2007) highlighted the lack of distinction between the available
definitions of resilience and robustness, and he and a colleague further gave a distinctive
definition in the context of operations (Zhang and Lin, 2010). The available conventional
risk assessment frameworks for oil terminal platforms ordinarily treat a small number of
possible scenarios, taken into account as a moment in time, though of high significance
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(Ronza et al., 2006, 2007; Elsayed, 2009; Wang et al., 2009; Mokhtari et al., 2011; Tang
et al., 2011; John et al., 2014a). As such, a limited number of studies have been carried
out on the resilience of port infrastructures.
Abech et al. (2006) analysed the opportunities and challenges for improving resilience
of fuel oil distribution in the downstream sector situated in the southernmost state of
Brazil, identifying how the system is resilient in some ways and brittle in others. Hansson
et al. (2009) demonstrated how the resilience concept model proposed by Hollnagel et
al. (2006) was adapted for reducing occupational injuries in the oil and gas industry.
Dinh et al. (2012) proposed the principle and factors that contribute to the resilience of
complex organisations that handle hazardous technical/process operations. Mansouri et
al. (2010) developed a Risk Management-based Decision Analysis (RMDA) framework
that adopted resilience investment plans and strategies for port infrastructure systems
(PIS) oil terminal platforms are such infrastructures. John et al. (2014b) further
proposed a collaborative modelling approach for the selection of appropriate resilience
investment strategies for decision makers for seaport operations. John and colleagues
also developed a modelling approach (John et al., 2016) to improve the resilience of a
seaport system.
The various researchers adopted methodologies that were suitable for obtaining pri-
mary/secondary data on different factors relevant to their individual research, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. While John et al. (2014, 2016) presented five and six
steps respectively for quantitative data collection, Mansouri et al. (2010) adopted three
steps, and port infrastructure authorities were involved in quantitative data collection
techniques. Abech et al. (2006), on the other hand, adopted a qualitative data collection
technique, observing how latent factors combined to form hazardous situations as well
as remaining alert to other incidents occurring within the platform. Moreover, Hansson
et al. (2009) adopted a qualitative data collection method based on explanatory and
descriptive analysis.
These authors have demonstrated that their work has followed logical steps. Relevant
case studies have been used, and the main ideas are represented in tables and figures,
and are supported by reliable evidence. The conclusion of each article reflects the issues
raised by the study and some suggested recommendations are proposed to tackle the
issues based on the results obtained from the qualitative and quantitative analysis.
However, the research areas, scopes and types of goods and services being handled
differ between seaports and terminal platforms. As such, risks/hazards differ, especially
in ports whose activities are based on handling hazardous materials. With the limited
amount of conference papers, journals and articles available on OTOs and a resilience
strategy for OTOs optimisation, a further investigation is relevant to improve operations
and identify hazards from unforeseen events. The results from such an investigation
should be tested and validated. Furthermore, none of the available studies on oil terminal
platforms considered uncertainty.
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An assured system safety does not mean tighter monitoring, control of disruption, or
reducing counting of failures (because systems are already safe), but rather a constant
calibration of unexpected hazards. When we see things go right after a disruption, some
of which may even fall outside of what the system has been designed to do, it means the
system has gone way beyond its traditional safety discipline.
4.3 Risk Assessment Methods for Complex Marine Oper-
ations (CMOs)
Rodriguez and Souza (2011) developed a risk-based analysis method aimed at defining
the risk profile associated with the risk scenario of a shuttle tanker main engine fail-
ure at an offshore oﬄoading operation in Campos Basin, Brazil. Accident Modelling,
Failure probability assessment with Bayesian techniques, Evaluation of consequences,
and Markovian process to aid decision making were the four basic steps applied (Ro-
driguez et al., 2011). Other researchers such as John et al. (2016) presented a modelling
approach that utilised the Bayesian belief networks, and Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy
process (FAHP) was used to evaluate the relative influence of a number of risk factors.
Mokhtari et al. (2011) proposed the integration of the Bow-tie approach into the risk as-
sessment phase for risk management of offshore terminals. Ronza et al. (2006) processed
data using Event Trees (ETs) to determine the probability of the various events that
initiated accidents for liquefied and crude oil products; due to the proliferation of loading
arm failures and tank rupture, the operations they considered were: bunkering opera-
tions, tanker navigating through the port, tanker (off)loading bulk hydrocarbons and
tanker manoeuvring in the proximity of berths (Ronza et al., 2003). Abech et al. (2006)
presented a more qualitative technique based on explanatory and descriptive analysis
for an oil distribution plant, whereas Hansson and Herrera (2009) adopted an empirical
study technique for reducing occupational injuries on an oil and gas installation.
4.3.1 A Categorisation of Uncertainties by developing a Dynamic Hi-
erarchical Structure
Given that there are several possible failure modes that can affect OTOs, uncertainty
in CMOs cannot be completely eliminated. CMOs are often associated with a high
level of uncertainty due to the ever-changing environment leading to a range of possible
accidents. Assessing uncertainty in OTOs requires the use of a method that combines
experts judgement and human knowledge to propose a reliable dynamic hierarchical
structure.
HFs for OTOs has been identified through a literature review of relevant journals
articles, proceedings and conference papers (see Section 2.5.7). Others include accident
reports (MARSH, 2011, 2013) seminars and brainstorming sessions for HAZID proce-
dure. A pilot study was conducted with specialist and academicians to determine the
consistency of the identified unexpected events for further experts judgement. There are
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five major categories of hazards identified to cause an accident scenario on OTOs under
high uncertainty; they are described as follows: Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Table 4.1: Description of Man-related hazards for OTOs
Level 3 risk factors Attributes Descriptions
Sabotage Unauthorised
interference from
third party,
Internal Crisis
External or internal source of secu-
rity breach. In 2005, oil fields were
taken over by armed Libyans groups
or shutdown due to security con-
cerns, according to officials at the
Libyan National Oil Co. Resultant
loss of crude was from 900,000 b/d
to 325,000 b/d.
Cargo transfer failure Platform struck
by Stad Sea,
Overfill
A multi-purpose support vessel hits
a platform riser during a transfer op-
eration. Problems during transfer
from an overfilled internal floating
crude oil tank led to fire and explo-
sion.
Accident Vessel loss power,
control or steer-
age
A well intervention vessel collided
with an unmanned platform caus-
ing heavy damage to the vessel and
the platform, 2009. Resultant loss
worth USD 1.3 billion.
Release from loading arm High-pressurised
oil,
Pump leak,
Gasket failure
California, USA (1992, 1999): a
vapour cloud was formed followed
by a large fire from the release of
escaping hydrocarbon due to high
pressure (10psi. An explosion as a
result of a ruptured pipeline, releas-
ing hydrocarbon-hydrogen mixture
to the atmosphere. Resultant loss
worth USD 340 million.
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Poor training system Quality of worker Educating the operational work-
force on hazard identification per-
taining to loading/oﬄoading opera-
tion and to be able to identify mea-
suring tools that can convince them
that ”operations are safe” at a ter-
minal..
Operators error SOPs not fol-
lowed,
Accidentally
performed action
In 2004, in Illinois, USA there were
wilful safety violations from inade-
quate inspection of equipment and
failing to maintain fire protection
equipment. Poor worker training
led to the destruction of about 75%
of terminal facilities. Resultant loss
worth USD 200 million, serious in-
juries and five deaths..
Vessel personnel error Human careless-
ness
Vessel not securely and safely
moored; mooring lines out of posi-
tion and layout (not applied in the
correct angle).
Terminal personnel error Human omission Terminal personnels not allocating
sufficient staffing levels to deal with
emergencies during ship stay in ter-
minal.
Mode awareness Lack of awareness
of the mode of op-
eration
lack of awareness and constant vig-
ilance on the part of all workers, to
establish safety operations are safe.
Personal issues Stress,
Fatigue
Health and wellbeing.
Under-staffing Workload Consequences to operation.
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Negligence Carelessness,
Cowardice
In Zimbabwe, 2003, while an of-
floading operation was ongoing be-
tween two petrol tankers, one of
the drivers was alleged to have been
smoking. One of the tanker caught
fire and exploded. Resultant loss
worth USD 230 million.
Violation Quality of worker Carelessness, cowardice.
Misapplication of good rule Quality of worker Competence.
Non-intentional behaviour Quality of worker False alarm.
Inattention Quality of worker Distraction.
Application of bad rule Quality of worker Carelessness, cowardice.
Table 4.2: Description of Machine-related hazards for OTOs
Level 3 risk factors Attributes Descriptions
Maintenance error Workmanship
shortcut,
Non-explosive
proof tools used
An offshore platform in the South
China Sea, 2006 suffered hydrostatic
collapse as a result of installation of
undersized ring stiffeners; ring stiff-
eners were fabricated using incor-
rect construction drawing. Resul-
tant loss USD 150 million.
Maintenance omission Poor grounding of
equipment
Mechanical friction generated
sparks that ignited flammable
vapours. A seal ignited during
a cleaning operation. Incorrect
manual setting of transfer system.
Lack of dredging and
Navaid maintenance
Workmanship
Shortcut
Navaid breakdown.
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Residual maintenance
problems
Poor fabrication,
Pump leak,
Circuit Shortcut
Electric sparks generated by electric
motor, pump leak.
Equipment failure Accidental dam-
age to equipment,
Pump/Hose fail-
ure
Loading arm fail-
ure
Microbial sulphate-reducing bacte-
ria, low temp oxidation. An FPSO
alarm was triggered as a result of a
leak emanating from one of the load-
ing arms in Norway, 2006. Upon
further investigation, five other ris-
ers failed. Resultant loss worth USD
230 million.
Utility failure Poor Mainte-
nance
Loss of platform utilities due to
a chain reaction of other failure.
In 1998, an onshore platform in
Louisiana, USA lost all utilities due
to vapour cloud explosion. The ef-
fect greatly limited firefighting ef-
forts for several hours. Resultant
loss worth USD 600 million.
Hardware failure Failure of IT Tech Lack of flexible IT infrastructure.
Well-bore error Competency In Egypt, 2004, a production plat-
form suffered significant damage
and collapse following a well control
incident caused by a drilling opera-
tion. Resultant loss worth USD 2.5
million.
Formation error Competency Poor documentation.
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Table 4.3: Description of Communication- and Correspondence-related hazards for
OTOs
Level 3 risk factors Attributes Descriptions
Communication misun-
derstanding
Proficiency in
language,
Ignorance,
Drawing up fault-
less dynamic
route
Loss of communication between
subsea centre and its platform re-
sulting to damage of offshore as-
sets in Angola, 2009. Resultant loss
worth USD 180 million.
Ill-advised dynamic route of the op-
eration areas.
Implicit signals/ wrong
signal
Interface issue,
Illumination,
Hidden signage
Ignoring signage
Personnel not appreciating the ne-
cessity of signal discipline while
communicating applicable signals.
Signage equipment and facilities in
close proximity to hazardous equip-
ment and tankers accessing the ter-
minal; other operating areas are
considered faulty and do not meet
the requirements of local regula-
tions.
Lack of Situation
Awareness
Lack of awareness
of crisis situations
between multiple
parties, and how
teams relate to
each other.
Awareness and constant vigilance
on the part of all terminal workers,
to establish safety as a permanent
and natural feature for on-the-spot
decision-making.
Rare events displaced
by more urgent issues
Communication
failure
Not following up as discussed.
Lack of leadership Not influential,
Pump/Hose fail-
ure
Poor leadership
qualities
Establishment of safety, general
wariness and fear of arrest. Conver-
sation abnormality.
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Information not dis-
tributed around teams
Poor leadership
qualities
No one has the overview. This is a
particular problem as staff rotate/-
move on.
Inadequate review of
technical team record
Neglect Review of internal email.
Breakdown of relations
with third party
Communication
failure
Organisation response where most
are informal.
Continuity of knowl-
edge
Communication
failure
Large volume of command such as
ship/shore, within department and
during handover.
Table 4.4: Description of Management-related hazards for OTOs
Level 3 risk factors Attributes Descriptions
Decision making error Little information
known about the
occurrence
A quick visual check, without refer-
ring to the radar, was insufficient to
fully assess the danger.
Inadequate planning
procedure
Redundancy Lack of accessed revenue and allo-
cated capital to construct ready-to-
use platforms for unexpected opera-
tion prior to disruption.
Poor staff selection Competency Facilitate critical safety information
to act upon unsafe activities.
Organisational changes Management of change.
Guiding safety princi-
ples
Negligence Non-compliance with applicable in-
ternational national and local regu-
lations.
Information not dis-
tributed around teams
Poor leadership quali-
ties
No one has the overview. A particu-
lar problem as staff rotate/move on.
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Inadequate inspection
and testing
Quality of Worker,
Competency
Procedural error; in Ryazan, Rus-
sia 1994 a worker did not meet nor-
mal terminal practices and thus cre-
ates weaknesses on the safety bar-
riers in place. Resultant loss was
worth USD 100 million.
Inadequate safety cul-
ture and hazard aware-
ness
Lack of integrated secu-
rity and safety design
Recognised industry codes of prac-
tice, able to demonstrate and docu-
ment proof of compliance with new
regulatory requirements.
Inadequate safety pro-
cedures
Lack of integrated
safety management
Safety culture.
Inadequate reporting
procedures
Lack of integrated
safety management
Lack of safety awareness and train-
ing.
Poor tracking system Reliable tracking tech-
nologies
Design and implement a security
system that monitors the vast terri-
tories within the entire operational
environment at oil terminal.
Implementation of
safety audit
Poor documentation A survey of the state of installation
and operator’s performance.
Design error Workmanship Significant equipment and struc-
tural deformation of installation due
to design and lack of modification
control. Resultant Loss was worth
USD 270 million.
Not updating regula-
tory changes
Negligence,
Frauds
Lack of precision. The possibility
that the circumstances in effect ini-
tially on regulation may change at a
later date.
Professional negligence Neglect Improper sampling procedures.
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Company policy Bureaucracy Inadequate decisions on safety poli-
cies and the ability to promote a
good safety culture throughout op-
eration.
Financial issues Access to revenue and
allocated capital,
Frauds,
Bureaucracy
Helicopter operations, competition
factor among terminals, customer
change in terms of demand for more
products (uncertainty in ship size)
and services, terminal change factor
i.e. potential for global substitution
and consolidation among terminals.
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Table 4.5: Description of Nature-related hazards for OTOs
Level 3 risk factors Attributes Descriptions
Lightning Direct strike during opera-
tions,
Bound charge, electromag-
netic/ electrostatic pulse
and earth current
A severe thunderstorm passed over a termi-
nal in Labuan, Malaysia, 2005. A tanker
was apparently struck by lightning while
it was loading resulting in the death of a
number of crewmembers. Resultant loss
worth USD 150 million.
Flood Increased water volume due
to heavy rain, water released
from dams and global warm-
ing
In 2011, 638 workers were evacuated when
water entered the pontoon of an offshore
platform on the Gulf of Mexico, USA and
capsized. Resultant loss worth USD 160
million.
Snow Extremely low temperature Slippery terminal platforms and poor visi-
bility causing slip and trips hazards.
Storms Bad weather Heavy rain and thunderstorm.
Earthquake/tsunami Earth movement,
ocean floor slides
A 9.0Mw earthquake at Tohoku in Japan
and an 8.8Mw earthquake off the coast of
Chile in 2011 and 2010 respectively. These
events triggered a tsunami that travelled
up to 10km, causing large-scale structural
damage and loss of life. Resultant loss
worth USD 22.3 billion.
Hurricane/cyclone Atmospheric hazards Hurricanes Andrew, Ike, Rita, and Ka-
trina in 1992, 2005, 2005 and 2008 re-
spectively made landfall, causing flooding
and widespread destruction to onshore/off-
shore facilities resulting to shutdowns. Re-
sultant combined loss worth USD 24.3 bil-
lion.
Tornadoes Atmospheric hazards Triggers the release of hazmat from
onshore/offshore terminals and facilities
causing disruption to operations.
Ice-berg Navaid failure Collision of large floating ice feature with
massive offshore structure.
Epidemic Diseases External or internal breach of human well-
being using viruses/bacteria e.g. bird flu /
Ebola outbreak, resulting in closure of oil
terminal and borders if not contained.
4.3.2 Clustering Process for Developing a Sub-hierarchical Structure
A hierarchical cluster process involves grouping observations of mutual distances to-
gether into related subsets. It could group the universe of possible uncertainties into
a manageable number of subsets so that all the elements are present. Xin and Huang
(2013) constructed a scenario cluster as a process for building fire risk analysis (Hall Jr
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Table 4.6: Description of Man-related hazards after a cluster process
Hazard Category HFs undergoing cluster-
ing process
Group name
Cargo transfer failure
Accident
Release from loading arm
R1: Major Accident Hazards(MAHs)
Operators error
Poor training system
Vessel personnel error
Terminal personnel error
R2: Duty Holders Error (DHE)
Man-related hazards Mode awareness
Personnel issues
R3: Personal Issues (PI)
Sabotage R4: Sabotage (S)
Under-staffing
Negligence
Violation
Misapplication of good rule
Non-intentional behaviour
Inattention
Application of bad rule
R5: Indirect Contributing Factors (ICF)
Table 4.7: Description of Machine related hazards after a cluster process
Hazard Category HFs undergoing cluster-
ing process
Group name
Maintenance error
Maintenance omission
Lack of dredging and Navaid
maintenance
Residual maintenance prob-
lems
R11: Maintenance Event Hazards (MEHs)
Machine-related hazards Equipment failure
Utility failure
Hardware failure
R12: Equipment Failure (EF)
Well-bore error
Formation error
R13: Well Control System Failure (WCSF)
and Sekizawa, 2010; Xin and Huang, 2013). A cluster process was proposed to form a
working group (Lu and Shang, 2005).
The clustering process involves three major steps, namely: (a) identification of ele-
ments of a similar kind in the hierarchical structure, (b) grouping of observable elements
together into a smaller group on the basis of self-similarities, and (c) developing the sub-
hierarchical structure. Fig 4.1 shows a hierarchical structure for OTOs while Tables 4.6,
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 describe the clustering process for the HFs in related subsets.
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Table 4.8: Description of Communication and Correspondence related hazards after
a cluster process
Hazard Category HFs undergoing cluster-
ing process
Group name
Communication Misunder-
standing
Implicit signals/ wrong sig-
nal
R21: Platform Communication Misinter-
pretation (PCM)
Communication and
Correspondence-related
hazards
Lack of Situation Awareness
Rare events displaced by
more urgent issues
R22: Situation Awareness (SA)
Lack of leadership
Information not distributed
around teams
Inadequate review of techni-
cal team record
Breakdown of relations with
third party
Continuity of knowledge
R23: Lack of Proper Crew Interaction
(PCI)
Table 4.9: Description of Management related hazards after a cluster process
Hazard Category HFs undergoing cluster-
ing process
Group name
Decision making error
Inadequate planning proce-
dure
Poor staff selection
Organisational changes
R31: Human Resources Error (HRE)
Management-related
hazard
Guiding safety principles
Inadequate inspection and
testing
Inadequate safety culture
and hazard awareness
Inadequate safety proce-
dures
Inadequate reporting proce-
dures
Poor tracking system
Implementation of safety
audit
R32: Latent Error (LE)
Not updating regulatory
changes
Professional negligence
R33: Job Safety Rules and Regulation
(JSRR)
Design error R34: Design error (DE)
Company policy
Financial issues
R35: Business Risk (BR)
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Accident 
scenario on 
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Man related
Hazards
Machine related 
Hazards
 Coordination 
and 
correspondence 
related Hazards
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Management 
related Hazards
Nature related 
Hazards
Major Accident Hazards (MAHs)
Duty Holder Error (DHE)
Personnel Issues (PI)
Sabotage (S)
Indirect Contributing Factors (ICF)
Maintenance Event Hazards (MEHs)
Equipment Failure (EF)
Well Control System Failure (WCSF)
Platform Communication Misinterpretation (PCM)
Situation Awareness (SA)
Lack of Proper Crew Interaction (PCI) 
Human Resources Error (HRE)
Job Safety Rules and Regulation (JSRR)
Latent Error (LE)
Design Error (DE)
Business Risk (BR)
Hydrologic (HH)
Seismic (SH)
Atmospheric (AH)
Epidemic (EH)
Figure 4.1: A Dynamic Hierarchical Structure for Resilience Improvement for OTOs
using Clustering Process
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Table 4.10: Description of Nature related hazards after a cluster process
Hazard Category HFs undergoing cluster-
ing process
Group name
Lightning
Flood
Snow
Storm
R41: Hydrologic Hazards (HH)
Nature-related hazard Earthquake/ tsunami
Ice-berg
R42: Seismic Hazards (SH)
Hurricane/cyclone
Tornadoes
R43: Atmospheric Hazards (AH)
Epidemic R44: Epidemic Hazards (EH)
4.4 The Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese Model
In psychology, Pratt (1964) provided a classical definition of risk as the parameter that
differentiates different individuals utility functions. A function that specifies the utility
(measure of satisfaction of a preference) of a DM for all the combinations made qual-
itatively or quantitatively is termed utility function. Psychology extends this to treat
perceived risk as a variable that differentiates individuals based upon content and con-
text interpretations. Keeney and Raiffa (1993, 1996 cited in Van Bossuyt et al. 2012)
elaborated how the utility function of individuals is generally expressed as well as elu-
cidated that Utility Theory presents an axiomatic approach that can assess the DMs
behaviour with regard to risk (Brito et al., 2010; Van Bossuyt et al., 2012).
Riskiness refers to the riskiness of an option, which is equated to its variance. It
can arise from normal behaviours or the normal variability of established work practice.
Psychology perceived risk as a variable that differentiates individuals based upon con-
tent and context interpretations. Therefore, the suitability of a decision is based on the
DM appetite towards risk as defined by the DMs decision criteria. Saatys (1980) pair-
wise comparisons were primarily used to estimate relative weight of attribute in several
approaches including the eigenvector method, its matrices have also been used to assess
alternatives with respect to a particular attribute such as in AHP/FAHP (Yang, 2001).
The method presented below adopts an innovative approach based on Utility Theory
and Swiss Cheese Model (SChM).
4.4.1 The Utility Context of the Comparisons
Since the context of an assessment can have significant effects on the derivation and
interpretation of a utility function, the discussion below analyses the effects of the four
different context for comparing DM choice on the likelihood of the risk indicator p with
equivalence methods. Also, it distinguishes between the DMs individual preference,
Chapter 4: An Integrated Risk Assessment For Resilience Improvement Of OTOs
Using Utility Theory And Swiss Cheese Model Under High Uncertainty 100
experience, recurrent and response modes. For the purpose of discussion, suppose the
attribute of interest is the consequence X. Let S denote one’s initial level of risk tolerance,
and let p be the likelihood of the risk indicator under consideration. One’s status is thus
represented by (x,t), where x is the current risk tolerance and t indicates whether or not
the DM makes the right decision (denoted by p or 0,respectively).
A common question in evaluating the risk indicator p is to ask the decision maker to
specify a certainty equivalent c for which s/he is indifferent between the following two
alternative choices:
(s+ c, 0) ∼ (s, p) (4.1)
Although each context is distinguished by a different status quo position, one is
always asked to find c such that Eq (4.1) holds. The interpretation of the certainty
equivalent c depends upon the context given by the status quo position. In the individual
preference context, c is the minimum preference given to p that the DM possesses. In
the response mode context, p is the mode in which the DM is indifferent, between either
c or p. In the recurrent context, one is forced to give up either the amount c or (p or 0 ;
c is the indifferent point between these two choices. In the experience context, the DM
begins with c; the DM is asked to specify p with c for which s/he is indifferent between
alternative choices (Farquhar, 1984).
Experience
(s + c,0)
RecurrentIndividual Perspective
Response mood
(s, 0)
(s + c, p)(s, p)
Consequence is certain
(c)No consequences 
More likely
(p)
Likely
(0)
Figure 4.2: Status Quo positions for Four Situations in Assessing DM’S Certainty
Equivalent as adapted in (Farquhar, 1984)
According to Farquhar (1984) it is important to note that the minimum preference for
p is occasionally difficult to elicit from a DM who has two or more choices. The following
scenario helps to overcome this inertial effect (Hershey et al. 1982). The decision analyst
derives a threshold on the DM preference, k. Once k is set, the DM preference of k
becomes the more likely. With a weak restrictions on the probability distribution of
k as well as the decision maker utility function, Toda and MacCrimmon (1972) prove
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that k which maximizes expected utility is indeed the DM’s minimum preference. This
technique is analogous to a ”proper scoring rule” for motivating an individual to report
his/her true value on probability assessment (Hogarth, 1975; Lichtenstein et al., 1982;
Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975; Wallsten and Budescu, 1983; Winkler and Murphy
1968). For example, in the individual preference and experience contexts, the status
quo position is one of the two alternative choices in Eq (4.1). Assessments in either case
can suffer from inertial effects that can distort one’s judgement (Hershey et al. 1982).
On the other hand, the status quo position is bound to change in either the response
mode or recurrent context, because the initial position is not among the alternative
choices in Eq (4.1). Thus the response mode and recurrent contexts are not subject to
inertial effects.
For other possible combinations e.g. the experience context, which begin with a
status quo of (s, 0), the DM is asked to specify the maximum years (b) for (p) to lead
to a failure, such that (s, 0) − (s − b, p) hold. Raiffa (1968, pp. 89-91) noted that c is
not constant across contexts, instead useful qualitative properties of a utility function
can be determined by establishing relationships between certainty equivalent assessed
in different contexts. For example, if the minimum years (bi) equal the maximum DMs
preference (ci) for all p ∈ P and s ∈ X, then the underlying utility function must
either be linear or exponential (Pfanzagl, 1959; Pratt, 1964). Other examples can also
be considered. According to Fishburn (1968), Green (1963), Schlaifer (1959, 1969) and
Swalm (1966) the regulations of gamble comparison also involve ways at which outcomes
are shown to decision makers; for many years, the accepted practice in utility analysis
was to consider p over the final assets in X (Farquhar, 1984). With additional research,
perhaps questions about the choice of an appropriate context for behavioural utility
assessment comparisons or an appropriate representation for the outcomes can be better
resolved.
Preference Comparison
Friedman and Savage (1952), Davidson et al. (1957), Suppes and Walsh (1959), DeGroot
(1963), Meyer and Pratt (1968), Bradley and Frey (1975), and Novick et al. (1981) noted
that in a preference comparison between the risk [x, α, y] and the certain outcome w, an
individual specifies the relation R (either >,<, or ∼) such that the expression [x, α, y] R
w holds. It involves a sequence of such comparisons, [xi, αi, yi]Riwi for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n,
where the probabilities, values, and standards are chosen in a particular way. More so,
the preference comparison method often uses only even-chance on risk, αi ≡ βi ≡ 12 ,
and this can be used to construct an ordered metric scale for utilities. As such, it offers
an advantage for elicitation simplicity and reduce bias. There are two common uses of
preference comparison methods in utility assessment;
• Investigating risk attitudes in a preliminary analysis and checking the consistency of
an assessed utility function, and
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• In converging on an indifference point where [xn,αn,yn] ∼ wn. Such convergence
techniques iteratively adjust either the probabilities, values, or standards until
indifference occurs.
Preference comparison provides a linear constraint that the utility function must
satisfy. However, other researchers have applied linear programming procedures to the
constraints generated by the preference comparisons such as [xi,αi,yi]Ri[wi,βi,zi] to esti-
mate a utility function. With a sufficiently large set of constraints, the decision analyst
can develop fairly tight bounds on either admissible utility functions or consistent future
responses (Farquhar, 1984). Fig 4.3 is an example for x and y risk:
x
y
(Tree)
Figure 4.3: An example of preference comparison analysis
Probability Equivalence
Researchers such as von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Mosteller and Nogee (1951),
Luce and Raiffa (1957), Myers and Sadler (1960), Myers and Katz (1962), Fishburn
(1964,1967), Officer and Halter (1968), Schlaifer (1969), Hull et al. (1973), Ronen (1973),
Kneppreth et al. (1974), Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Hogarth (1975), Keeney and
Raiffa (1976), Johnson and Huber (1977), Moore (1977). LaValle (1978), Karmarkar
(1978), Fischhoff et.al. (1980), Hogarth (1980), Novick et al. (1981), Zagorski (1981),
Hershey et al. (1982), and Kahneman et al. (1982) have each contributed to the emer-
gence of probability equivalence. Probability equivalence methods require that an indi-
vidual specifies an indifference probability for which [x, α, y] ∼ w where w is between x
and y. These methods apply to either discrete or continuous attributes, X. We begin by
selecting two reference points, x0 and xn+1 in X, where x0 < xn+1. These points may
either be catastrophic or a no-risk outcome in X, or some other convenient benchmarks.
The task is to assess the utilities of the points x0 < x1, . . . , < xn+1 using the adjacent
risk method (Farquhar, 1984).
Extreme risk: [xn+1, αi, x0] ∼ xi. This method uses the reference points of the risk
attribute X as the extremes in every risk. If u(x0) ≡ 0 and u(xn+1) ≡ 1, then obviously
u(xi) = αi. Thus, the elicited indifference probabilities themselves are the utilities of
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the xi values. If x0 and xn+1 are not the endpoints of X and it is necessary to find the
utilities of points above xn+1 or below x0, additional questions can ask [y, α, x0] ∼ xn+1
for y > xn+1 or [xn+1, α, y] ∼ x0 for y < x0 Although using the extreme risk method
could be quite easy, there are susceptibilities to serial dependence in the responses and
to biases from range effects if x0 and x(n + 1) are too extreme. A decision analyst
might try to alleviate these potential problems by permitting the sequence 1, 2, . . . , n of
comparisons and taking other precautions to de-bias the responses. The possibilities for
the probability equivalence methods using paired-gamble comparisons for extreme risk
are estimated as follows:
[xn+1, αi, x0] ∼ [xi+1, xi−1] (4.2)
Let: x1 ≡ x0, and xn+2 ≡ xn+1 for this method.
Adjacent risks: [xn+1, αi, xi−1] ∼ xi. Instead of using risk over extreme values
(best and worst outcomes) this method uses risk over the ”locally best and worst”
values for each xi. Each of the DM’s n responses generates an equation of the form
u(xi) = αiu(xi+1)+(1−αi)u(xi−1). With u(x0) ≡ 0, u(xn+1) ≡ 1, f0 ≡ 1, and fi ≡ 1−αiαi ,
Novick and Lindley (1979) solve the resulting system of n equations in n unknowns to
get:
u(xi) =
i=1∑
k
fk(xi).exp(λix) (4.3)
u(xi) = αiu(xi+1) + (1− αi)u(xi−1) (4.4)
u(xi) =
j=0∑
i=1
k=0∐
j
fk/
j=0∑
n
k=0∐
j
fk for i = 1, . . . , n. (4.5)
A key advantage of the adjacent risks method over extreme risk is ”provided we do
not ask the subject to assess probabilities near zero or one (numerically large log-odds),
the utilities will be relatively insensitive to a lack of precision in probability assessments
(Novick and Lindley 1979, p. 308)” as cited in (Farquhar, 1984). Points outside the
range are easily determined by additional comparisons of the form [y, α, xn] ∼ xn+1 if
y > xn+1 or [xi, α, y] ∼ x0 if y < x0. The possibilities for the probability equivalence
methods using paired-gamble comparisons for adjacent risk are as follows:
[xi+2, αi, xi−2] ∼ [xi+1, xi−1] (4.6)
Let: x1 ≡ x0, and xn+2 ≡ xn+1 for this method.
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Probability equivalence methods offer several advantages over preference comparison
of utility assessment. One is that chaining of responses (i.e. the use of earlier responses
in subsequent risk comparisons) does not occur; serial dependence between comparisons
can be sharply reduced with permuted sequences. Secondly they are less susceptible to
risk distortions, path dependence, and some other cognitive biases. Although individuals
may find it difficult to make probability judgements, training procedures and aids are
available. The adjacent risk method is fairly robust for probabilities not close to zero or
one, so probability judgements need not be precise in that case (Farquhar, 1984).
4.4.2 The Swiss Cheese Model (SChM)
Over the past few years, the oil industry has continued to develop and strengthen control
barriers to prevent potential catastrophic consequences to people or the environment re-
sulting from accidental releases of oil cargo. The SChM has been used for three different
purposes: (1) as a heuristic explanatory device (communication),(2) as a framework for
accident investigation (analysis) and (3) as a basis for measurements (measurements).
The SChM uses broad practical experience for risk investigation in the UtiSch+. In the
UtiSch+ approach, the cheese slices are categorised into avoid, prevent, control, mitigate
and active failure barriers respectively. The slices (barriers) have holes representing the
opportunities for a risk indicator to cause an incident (barrier penetration). When the
slices are stacked such that holes are aligned, there is an opportunity for all the barriers
to be penetrated; thus, the barriers’ weaknesses combine and grow into large failures,
with the potential to cause an accident. Systematically, the combination of an active
risk and a latent risk results in a major accident or catastrophe. Fig 4.4 elaborates more
on the Swiss Cheese Model in the UtiSch+.
Possible risk 
or risks
Kick Kick Kick Kick
ControlAvoid Prevent Mitigate Active failure
(0.50)
(0.00) (1.00)
Figure 4.4: The concept of SChM in the UtiSch+ model
Weighted measurements of the DMs preference judgements on all the risks whose
outcomes will pose a major catastrophe can be ascertained using the probabilities not
close to zero or one. Thus, an expression u(x0) ≡ 0 and u(x(n+ 1)) ≡ 1. Fig 4.5 shows
Chapter 4: An Integrated Risk Assessment For Resilience Improvement Of OTOs
Using Utility Theory And Swiss Cheese Model Under High Uncertainty 105
how the analysis in the SChM for hazard factor(s) would be performed, using the ETA
techniques for each barrier for a generic accident scenario for OTOs.
Successful    
irrelevant
Successful
Successful    irrelevant
Failed
Successful    irrelevant
Failed
Successful
Failed
Failed
Successful    irrelevant
Failed
Successful
Failed
Successful
Failed
Failed
Successful    irrelevant
Failed
Successful
Failed
Risk factor(s)
Successful
Failed
Figure 4.5: Example of SChM analysis as adapted in (Xue et al., 2013)
Specification of quantitative restrictions on the decision maker’s preference is accom-
plished by comparing various risk attitudes over the attribute under consideration.
4.5 The Utility Swiss Cheese (UtiSch+) Model
The SChM can be developed along with a consideration of approaches used in risk
management for dynamic sociotechnical systems (Wu et al., 2009). SChM in tandem
with Utility Theory approach is design to communicate, analyse and provide weighted
measurements of the DM’s preference judgements on the risk whose outcome will pose
a major catastrophic. Section 4.4 elaborated the innovative approach behind the inte-
gration of the Utility Theory and the Swiss Cheese Model; While the Utility Theory
assess the behavioural variables that differentiate the DM appetite towards risk, the
Swiss Cheese Model was used as a basis for measurement for accident analysis in the
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(UtiSch+) Model context. The novelty of this method will steward the process of achiev-
ing a resilient decision-making approach, with a basis for making a decisive assessment
among alternative choices on operational risk. Fig 4.6 shows a novelty model for ranking
risk.
Response mode
(S,O)
Experience
(S+C,O)
Individual Perspective 
(S,P) Recurrent (S+C,P)
Consequence is certain 
(C)
No Consequence
Likely 
(O)
More Likely 
(p)
Hazard
Consequences
Or 
Accident
Figure 4.6: The Utility and Swiss Cheese Model (UtiSch+)
A certainty equivalent value (CE (V)), based upon the Utility Theory, is developed
and found in conjunction with the probability of an outcome in order to find the equiv-
alent value of a specific risk.
A safety barrier is implemented to protect people, the environment and assets from
hazards or dangers. Though different terms with similar meanings (safety element,
defence, protection layer, etc.) have been used in various industries, sectors and countries
(Xue et al., 2013), the specific strengths of the barriers are to avoid, prevent, control
and mitigate risk; when a barrier is bridged, it results in an active failure (Broadribb
et al., 2009).
The proposed theory and model of the decision making under risk provide as much
robust information as possible about the risky prospect (He and Huang, 2008). There
are two(2) steps in assessing paired method expected utility functions; these are:
• The utility context of the comparisons
◦ Preference comparison and probability equivalence (hybrid method)
• Other approach
◦ The Swiss Cheese Model (SChM)
The risk-return framework shows that a DMs perception of risk affects the choices
s/he or makes (Van Bossuyt et al., 2012).
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4.6 UtiSch+ Process
In a situation where there is lack of data, quantifying of expert’s (DMs) judgement
qualitatively allows for a step-by-step analysis of the possible risks that might pose
a major hazard with the potential to cause disruption to operations with long-term
consequences. This study uses a questionnaire design to address the DMs attitude
towards risk by means of the utility elicitation. The selection of experts will be based
on expertise in and experience of OTOs, and three experts on loading and unloading
operations as well as two executive directors will be chosen. The content and language
used in the questionnaire will be revised by two scholars after initial design to facilitate
understanding (Shang and Tseng, 2010). The questionnaire adopts a seven-point Likert-
type scale to evaluate risks. Estimating risk mostly emphasises damage frequency and
severity. Damage frequency means the average rate of risk accidents and damage severity
means the consequences of the damage of risk accidents. Fig 4.7 represents the goal of
UtiSch+.
Utility Context of the Comparisons 
Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)
Expert Judgment (DMs)
 Consistency checks on the 
assessed utilities
 Sub-hierarchical 
structure 
 Questionnaire 
design 
 Initial design 
questionnaire 
revised by scholars
 Preference comparison
 Probability equivalence
 Obtaining risk 
weights
 Ranking probable 
risks
 Empirical Analysis 
Data collection UtSch+ Model Result and Validation
No
Yes
Are results logical Case study
Figure 4.7: Method for the proposed UtiSch+ for ranking probable risk
4.7 An Empirical Study on the Uncertainties of OTOs
To investigate the uncertainties for oil terminal operational hazards, firstly, OTOs haz-
ards have to be determined. Empirical study provides a set of values and consistency
to simulate the proposed model. More so, it is an investigative platform where there
is no extent research on significant hazards causing unexpected events on CMOs. This
study was executed in three phases: (1) questionnaire formulation and pilot study, (2)
choosing the right experts and (3) survey data collection and description. We discuss
each of the phases below:
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4.7.1 Procedure for questionnaire design and pilot study
The questionnaire is systematically designed with the help of the sub-hierarchal struc-
ture. Based on this information, data collection and content validity was performed
to improve the clarity of the questionnaire. First, a draft version of the questionnaire
and cover letter was developed. The questionnaire was examined by two academicians
and three specialists to comment on the appropriateness of the questions and whether
any were confusing. Based on their feedback, the questionnaire was reworded for the
pilot study. The pilot study was conducted by asking different judges to pre-asses the
questionnaires effectiveness, accuracy and unambiguous communication with the respon-
dents. The six judges were drawn at random from an assembled maritime domain and
oil terminal focus group comprising an industrialist, academics, and experts with both
types of experience. All items on the questionnaire were measured on a seven-point
Likert-type scale with response options ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely).
The ratio of the judges’ correctness was considered good and the discriminant valid
feedbacks from the pilot study were eliminated. Ethical approval was also obtained
to further validate the questionnaire content and participant consent. The question-
naire (see Appendix 4C) as represented at the end of the pilot study was used for data
collection.
4.7.2 Selection of Experts (DMs) for OTOs
As an exploratory study in this research area, a cross-section of experts or decision
makers (DMs) was considered to participate in the survey. Experts with relative (on-
shore/offshore oil fields) and vast (academic, maritime domain, oil and gas refineries)
experience related to this research were drawn at random. Experts service times and
academic qualifications were used as the selection threshold (John et al., 2014b).Another
factor being considered as a criterion for choosing experts was the region/country; it has
to be a crude oil-producing region or somewhere refined crude oil is consumed in large
amounts, thereby leading to large import of these refined products. Publicly available
directories, LinkedIn and recommendations from safety consultants and senior lecturers
from the department of maritime and mechanical engineering, Liverpool John Moores
University were used to identify these experts.
The questionnaire was web-based and a link was e-mailed to the targeted expert
participants. A cover letter appeared to respondents prior to the main question page
(see Appendix 4C). As an example, five experts with the following background assigned
possible failure outcomes regarding OTOs given their experience:
• A Doctor of maritime technology and marine industry for more than 20 years; having
both academic and onshore/offshore industrial experience in the field of oil terminal
management and marine operations.
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• A senior maritime safety engineer with a PhD who has been involved with Quality,
Health, Safety and, Environment (QHSE), on offshore/onshore oil installation and
port safety for more than 20 years.
• A Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) vessel captain of maritime transportation system
who has been involved with (un)loading operation on offshore/onshore oil terminal
platforms for more than 12 years
• A senior operation manager who has been involved with oil terminal operational ser-
vices for more than 20 years.
• An assistant manager with a Master’s degree in marine operation who has been in-
volved in port management and applicability of modelling tools for OTOs for more
than 20 years.
Similarly, when these five experts made their judgements, they assigned values to
each question. Their evaluation for each question is presented in Table 4.11
4.7.3 Data Collection and Description
After a follow-up process, data were collected through a web-based questionnaire. Six
uncompleted and completed questionnaires were returned. Twenty-five questionnaires
were started, five of which were completed; one incomplete one was also submitted, and
19 were not returned. In all, the five valid responses obtained yield the final response
rate of 20%. This response rate can be compared to other studies conducted in the
literature (Mokhtari et al., 2012; Hammitt and Zhang, 2013; Alyami et al., 2014; John
et al., 2016). Table 4.11 shows the consistency of HFs based on experts responses.
Figure 4.8: A graph showing the Empirical evaluation of HFs
From the questionnaire, the research revealed that 100% of the participants showed a
good awareness and knowledge about the Hazard Factors (HFs), as well as the possible
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Table 4.11: Consistency of HFs based on experts’ responses
Hazards/Failures HFs Arithmetic
mean
Man-related Hazard Major Accident Hazards
Duty Holder Error
Personnel Issues
Sabotage
Indirect Contributing Factors
4.40
4.80
4.40
3.40
3.80.
Machine-related Hazard Maintenance Event Hazards
Equipment Failure
Well Control System Failure
3.80
3.80
4.00.
Coordination and
correspondence-related
Hazard
Platform Communication Misinterpreta-
tion
Situation Awareness
Lack of Proper Crew Interaction
4.80
4.40
4.20.
Management-related Haz-
ard
Human Resources Error
Job Safety Rules and Regulation
Latent Error
Design Error
Business Risk
4.00
3.80
4.00
3.60
3.60.
Nature-related Hazard Hydrologic
Seismic
Atmospheric
Epidemic
3.40
3.40
3.60
3.60.
consequences of these HFs for OTOs. In addition, Fig 4.8 shows the consistency of
participants responses. The participants are all senior employees with experience all over
the world, which also represents around 100% of the whole sample. In order to eliminate
the presence of response bias, participants were chosen from the United Kingdom, Iran,
United Arab Emirates, China and Nigeria. These represent the major oil importing and
exporting countries where OTO activities are being performed at a large scale.
According to participants, the probabilities of these HFs occurring on oil terminal
platforms spans very unlikely (1) to moderately likely (6). The quantitative data col-
lected were to be used for the application of the UtiSch+ model in a case study, as
described below.
4.8 Case Study
Company A is one of the leading suppliers of crude oil and refined petroleum in Kaoh-
siung oil terminal, in south China. The company needs to choose a risk attribute(s)
that will result in accident/catastrophe as a result of the weakness of the safety barriers
at the oil terminal. This enables the forecasting of operational risk factors with high
chances of causing a failure. With the aim of improving the process of achieving re-
silience at Kaohsiung oil terminal, decision-making methods have been used to ascertain
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possible risk attributes, but a major problem is how to rank the risk attributes accord-
ing to their weight. A robust risk ranking method has been proposed, the UtiSch+, to
promote adaptability and safety.
To address this problem, five experts from external organisations were invited to form
a committee. A normative individual response model that included models of individual
perspective, response mode, recurrence and experience was developed. The model led
to managerial actions that were able to improve maritime critical system adaptation to
catastrophe by roughly 50 percent. The committee comprises of:
• A senior operations manager who has been involved with port operational services for
over 20 years.
• A senior marine and safety engineer who has been involved in maritime and port
operational management for over 20 years
• A chief superintendent of maritime transportation systems who has been involved
with maritime operations for over 20 years.
• A scholar from a renowned maritime academy.
• A professor from the department of engineering, technology and maritime operations
at a renowned university.
The committee was tasked with developing a list of possible hazard attributes and
also determining the attributes’ ranking and weights. Each expert was requested by the
committee to participate in a study that would require completion of a questionnaire.
In the utility assessment, four perceptual attributes of the DM were identified,
namely: individual perspective, response mode, recurrence and experience. These were
deduced from previous study and literature. These perceptual attributes were rated on a
seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g. 1 (extremely poor), 2 (very poor) , 3 (poor), 4 (satis-
factory), 5 (good), 6 (very good) , and 7 (excellent)) and for the hazard attributes (very
unlikely (1), moderately unlikely (2), somewhat unlikely (3), not sure (4), somewhat
likely (5), moderately likely(6) and very likely (7)).
After the investigation and survey, 100% of the questions were answered by all five
DMs ( expr1, expr2, . . . , expr5). The committee (DMs) finalised the attributes deduced
from the dynamic hierarchical structure. Some of the attributes considered were as
follows:
• R1: Major Accident Hazards (MAHs),
• R2: Duty Holder Error (DHE),
• R3: Personnel Issues (PI),
• R4: Sabotage (S),
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• R5: Indirect Contributing Factors (ICF).
Table 4.12 represents the five experts’ (DMs) comparisons for R1 − R5 using the
seven-point Likert-type scale questionnaire (see Appendix 4A for R11−R44). The first
expert’s judgements were between ’low importance’, (1 and 2), the second and fifth
experts estimated the comparisons between ’high importance’ (5 and 6), and the third
and fourth experts evaluated the comparisons between ’low’ and of ’high importance’ (2,
3, 5 and 6). Table 4.13 represents experts’ perceptual attributes for utility assessment.
Table 4.12: DMs’ decision on hazard attributes
Experts
HF Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5
MAHs (R1) 2 5 3 6 6
DHE (R2) 2 5 6 5 6
PI (R3) 1 6 5 5 5
S (R4) 1 5 2 5 5
ICF (R5) 1 5 5 3 5
where: (Expr) = expert, and(HF ) = Hazard factor
Table 4.13: DMs’ Utility assessments
Experts
UCC Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5
YOE 20 yrs 20 yrs 12 yrs 20 yrs 21 yrs
RM 7 5 3 6 6
IP 7 5 3 4 6
RO 1 5 1 3 5
where: (UCC) = Utility context of comparison,(Y OE) = years of experience,
(RM) = response mood,(IP ) = individual perspective, and(RO) = recurrence
Where recurrence is correlated with trust, prevention and availability of good docu-
mentation of threats/incidents/hazard/accidents, individual perspective reflected pref-
erence of x,y,z attributes, response mood was not just how the DMs responded but the
DM mood of the day and experience reflected years.
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4.8.1 UtiSch+ Model and Application
A 2 × 2 matrix is constructed and calculated manually to obtain each DM’s certainty
equivalent value (c), for the Utility assessment. Similarly, when the experts made their
judgements for the UCC, they assigned values to each criterion until all the elements in
the matrix were obtained, such as Fig 4.2:
In the individual preference context, c is the minimum preference given to p that
the DM possesses. In the response mode context, c is the mode where the DM is
indifferent, between either c or p. In the recurrent context, one is forced to give up
either the amount c or (p or 0); c is the indifferent point between these two choices. In
the experience context, the DM begins with c; the DM is asked to specify p with c for
which s/he is indifferent between alternative choices. A 2× 2 matrix is constructed for
the UCC as follows:
using the coefficients of ℵβ and AB for the 2×2 matrix for the above linear equation,
the Certainty Equivalent Value (CE(V)) for each expert can be obtained. Table 4.15
represent the certainty equivalent for each expert utility assessment.
Expert 1
nc cc
O 7 20
P 7 1
Let: nc = 2, cc = 7 and O = 2, P = 7
[1ℵ+ 20β = 7] ∼ [1ℵ+ 7A = 7]
[7A+ 7B = 2] ∼ [20β + 7B = 2]
Where: ℵ and β are the coefficients
of RO and YOE, respectively, and A and B are the
coefficients of IP and RM, respectively.
[
1 20 7
7 7 2
]
∼
[
1 7 7
20 7 2
]
1
1
(R1) ·
[
1 20 7
7 7 2
]
=
[
1 20 7
7 7 2
]
∼
[
1 7 7
0 −133 −138
]
= −20(R1) + (R2) ·
[
1 7 7
20 7 2
]
−7(R1) + (R2) ·
[
1 20 7
7 7 2
]
=
[
1 20 7
0 −133 −47
]
∼
[
1 7 7
0 1 1.0376
]
=
− 1
133
(R2) ·
[
1 7 7
0 −133 −138
]
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− 1
133
(R1) ·
[
1 20 7
0 −133 −47
]
=
[
1 20 7
0 1 0.3534
]
∼
[
1 0 −0.2634
0 1 1.0376
]
=
−7(R2) + (R1) ·
[
1 7 7
0 1 1.0376
]
−20(R1) + (R2) ·
[
1 20 7
0 1 0.3534
]
=
[
1 0 −0.068
0 1 0.3534
]
∼
[
1 0 −0.2634
0 1 1.0376
]
therefore ℵ = −0.0680, β = 0.3534 and A = −0.2634, B = 1.0376
In solving group decision-making problem under uncertainty, importance weights
of various criteria and the ratings of qualitative criteria are considered as linguistic
variables. These weights can be obtained by directly assigning grades to evaluate the
importance(Chen, 2000) of a specific criterion with respect to the various criteria. Table
2 represents the probabilities assigned to the seven-point Likert-type scale in Eq (4.4)
for the utility assessment.
Table 4.14: Criteria for assigning probabilities, as adapted from Chen (2000)
Occurrence likelihood Grade Probabilities
Very Low (VL) 1 (0, 0, 0.1)
Low (L) 2 (0, 0.1, 0.3)
Medium Low (ML) 3 (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)
Medium (M) 4 (0.3, 0.5, 0.7)
Medium High (MH) 5 (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
High (H) 6 (0.7, 0.9, 1.0)
Very High (VH) 7 (0.9, 1.0, 1.0)
To calculate the utility function of an expert judgement (expr1, expr2, . . . , expr5)
for each HF, the outcomes can be obtained using Eq (4.17), as follows:
u(xi) = p1u1(xi) + (1− pi)u1(xi) (4.7)
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where:
u(xi) = utility function of (x1, x2, . . . , xn) attributes, and
(x1, p1, x2, 1− p1) = probability in which one has a p chance of an outcome x1 and a
1− p chance of an outcome x2.
The case study demonstrates how the methodology can be implemented to assess
probable hazard factor(s) affecting the smooth operation of OTOs. Behavioural utility
of a DM can have different results when made based upon the information produced by
this method. Based on the generic possible failures identified in the SChM for Kaohsiung
oil terminal, as shown in Fig 4.9 and the available information in the Tables C.14, A.2,
a decision analyst can identify key systems elements, and areas that require a great deal
of attention to ensure a resilient system.
4.8.2 Results Analysis
The introduction in the questionnaire defines the scope of the generic OTOs to help the
experts understand what is required in answering the questions. The lottery questions
were asked to assess risk aversion and check for utility independence. The questionnaire
was used to assess attribute importance and check for preferential independence. The
responses plus one combined lottery and trade-off question supplied enough data to man-
ually calculate each respondent’s multiplicative utility function over the four attributes
for utility assessments.
Based on the utility parameters, predictions were made for the first choice among
all attributes given to experts in the written questionnaire. The ratings of preference,
response mode, recurrence and experience for each concept were used as independent
variables and the concept with the highest utility was designated as the first choice.
A pre-test of the lottery questions indicated that a constantly risk-averse function
was a reasonable approximation for the experts, thus concentrating on a parameter
estimation with testing of utility and preferential independence of the HFs.
Useful qualitative properties of the utility function can be determined by establishing
relationships between certainty equivalents assessed in different contexts. The under-
lying utility function must be either linear or exponential and preference comparison
provides a linear constraint that the utility function must satisfy. A common ques-
tion in evaluating the risk indicator p is how to investigate attitudes in a preliminary
analysis to specify a certainty equivalent c for which the DM is indifferent between the
following two alternative choices (”locally best and worst” outcomes), and checking the
consistency of an assessed utility function. Although each context is distinguished by a
different status quo position, one is always asked to find c such that (1) holds.
The decision analyst further derived a threshold for the DM preference, k. Once k
is set, the DM preference above k becomes the more likely. With very weak restrictions
on the probability distribution on k and the decision maker’s utility function, Toda
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Failures and consequences
Figure 4.9: Failures of barriers in the proposed model
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Table 4.15: Certainty equivalent for each Expert’s utility assessment
Certainty Likelihood
Experts ℵ β A B C ≥ or ≤ L Probability(P)
expr 1 −0.0680 0.3534 −0.2634 1.0376 nC ≤ L 0.0 ≥ 0.1 ≤ 0.3
expr 2 0.0668 0.3333 −0.3333 1.7333 nC ≤ L 0.0 ≥ 0.1 ≤ 0.3
expr 3 0.0909 0.5758 −0.4545 2.4545 nC ≤ L 0.0 ≥ 0.1 ≤ 0.3
expr 4 −0.0323 0.3548 −0.5484 2.1613 nC ≤ L 0.0 ≥ 0.1 ≤ 0.3
expr 5 0 0.3333 −0.3125 1.4271 nC ≤ L 0.0 ≥ 0.1 ≤ 0.3
and MacCrimmon (1972) prove that k which maximises expected utility is indeed the
DM’s minimum preference. This technique is analogous to a ”proper scoring rule” for
motivating an individual to report his/her true values in probability assessment. For
many years, the accepted practice in utility analysis has been to consider p over the final
assets in dealing with x such that:
u(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = p1u1(c1, c2, . . . , cn) + (1− p1)u1(c1, c2, . . . , cn) (4.8)
Assume that the assumptions of utility independence and constant risk aversion
for a sequence of risk factors as well as the preferential independence for each pair of
attributes has been verified; in practice, these would be checked by pre-tests and/or
repeated measures. Mainly based on Farquhar (1984), the multiplicative function is
given by:
u(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) =
p1u1(c1)+p2u2(c2)+p3u3(c3)+p4u4(c4)+p5u5(c5)+xp1p2p3p4u1(c1)u2(c2)u3(c3)u4(c4)
+ xp1p2p3p5u1(c1)u2(c2)u3(c3)u5(c5) + xp1p2p4p5u1(c1)u2(c2)u4(c4)u5(c5)
+ xp1p3p4p5u1(c1)u3(c3)u4(c4)u5(c5) + xp2p3p4p5u2(c2)u3(c3)u4(c4)u5(c5)
+ xp1p2p3p4p5u1(c1)u2(c2)u3(c3)u4(c4)u5(c5) (4.9)
where: u1(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 = max) = 1 and u1(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 = min) = 0.
Then substituting Equation 6 in Eq (4.17), and cancelling terms for u5(c5) yields:
u(c1) = p1u1(c1 = max) + (1− p1)u1(c1 = min) (4.10)
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The only options required for utility assessment are simple outcomes (riskless out-
comes) and binary lotteries (lotteries with two outcomes). The basic claim of Expected
Utility assumption is that the preference ordering among lotteries is the same as the
ordering of the lotteries by their expected utilities. This claim can be stated in terms of
binary lotteries as follows:
(c1, p1; c2, 1− p1) > (x1, q1;x2, 1− q1)
iff
p1u1(c1max) + (1− p1)u1(c1min) > q1u1(x1max) + (1− q1)u1(x1min) (4.11)
(c1, p1; c2, 1− p1) ∼ (x1, q1;x2, 1− q1)
iff
p1u1(c1max) + (1− p1)u1(c1min) = q1u1(x1max) + (1− q1)u1(x1min) (4.12)
One special case of condition (10) is especially useful in utility assessments, namely
the case where one observes an equivalence between a certain outcome W and a gamble
(c1, p1; c2, 1− p1) . From Eq (4.11), we may infer that:
W ∼ (c1, p1; c2, 1− p1)iffU(W ) = p1u1(c1max) + (1− p1)u1(c1min) (4.13)
As an alternative to the piecewise linear utility function, one could fit a parametric
utility function like a power or exponential utility function to the pairs, [x1, U(x1)], . . . , [xn, U(xn)],
by means of a non-linear regression procedure. Let A designate the best outcome, and
Z designate the worst outcome. As noted above, we are free to assign the utilities
U(A) = 100 and U(Z) = 0. To assess the utility of any other outcome,B, the client is
asked to judge the probability p∗ that satisfies the relation:
B ∼ (A, p∗;Z, 1− p∗)iffU(W ) = p1u1(c1max) + (1− p1)u1(c1min) (4.14)
If p∗ is the probability that creates the equivalence in Eq (4.14), then p∗ will be called
the probability equivalent of B with respect to the endpoints A and Z. By Condition
(11), we infer that:
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U(B) = p∗U(A) + (1− p∗)U(Z) = p∗(100) (4.15)
or
U(B) = p∗U(c1max) + (1− p∗)U(c1min) = p∗(c1max) (4.16)
the scaling also gives:
U(B) = (1− exp[−r1(c1 − c1min]/(1− exp[−r1(c1max − c1min]
therefore, non linear regression
(r1) = (
1
c1min
)ln[p1/(1− p1)
To illustrate this approach (Eq (4.11), let c1, . . . , cn be a list of risk factors, and let
c1min = 0 and c1max = 1 denote the worst and the best outcomes of the risk factors
respectively. Let p∗1, . . . , p∗n denote the probability equivalents of c1, . . . , cn with respect
to the endpoints, c1min and c1max, and let U(c1), . . . , U(cn), be the corresponding utili-
ties inferred by means of the standard gamble method. According to the power QALY
model, U(ci) = k ·Xri for every i. Because utilities were assigned under the specification
U(c1max) = 1 (Eq (4.14) assumption), we must have 1 = U(c1max) = k · cr1max, or k =
1/cr1max. By (Eq (4.11), U(xi) = p
∗
1(1), where p
∗
1 is the i
th probability equivalent; there-
fore, p∗1(1) = U(ci) = (1/c1maxr) · Cr1 , i.e.:
p∗1 = c
r
1/c1max
r = (c1/c1max)
r (4.17)
where:
p∗1 = serves as the dependent variable,
Values of (c1/c1max)
rserve as the predictor variable in a non-linear regression that
solves the value of r,
The constant k is an arbitrary constant chosen so that the utilities range over a
convenient interval of numbers, i.e. k = 10025
r
causes the utilities to range between 0 and 100.
The power QALY model implies that a utility function of an outcome is risk averse
if r < 1, it is risk neutral if r = 1, and it is risk seeking if r > 1. With a sufficient set
of constraints, the decision analyst can develop fairly tight bounds on either admissible
utility functions or consistent future responses.
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Figure 4.10: Schematic of lottery for MAHs
u(c1) = p1u1(c1max) + (1− p1)u1(c1min) Eq. 4.7
u(c1 = 5) = p1u1(c1max = 7) + (1− p1)u1(c1min = 3)
where:
u1(c1 = 7) = 1andu1(c1 = 3) = 0, p1 = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
But p∗ = C
r
1
c1maxr
= (c1/c1max)
r or (57)
0.4236 = 0.8670
U(c1max) = k · c1maxr, or k = 1c1maxr , therefore k = 170.4236 = 0.4385
The constant k is an arbitrary constant chosen so that the utilities range over a
convenient interval of numbers, i.e. causes the utilities to range between 0 and 1.
Under the EU assumption, the power parameter r= 0.4236 Substituting for equation Eq. 4.7
u(c1 = 5) = 0.8670(1) + (1− 0.8670)(0)
U(c1) = 0.8670
Power QALY model
U(b, x) = k ·H(b) · xr.U(c1) = k ·H(b) · xr
U(c1) = 0.4385 · (1) · 50.4236 = 0.8670
Utility Belief Limit for certainty equivalent utility assessment: The criterion
for each certainty equivalent is revealed in the utility belief limit, such that it influences
the probability for obtaining the weight of each hazard factor (HF) in the SChM. The
utility belief limit is considered as the mechanism for the integration in the UtiSch+
model. For example, the belief limit associated with the third condition states that ” the
utility for the nth expert indicate the likelihood L of certainty c for an unexpected event
to occur with no consequences, is at 50% utility function for all combination made”.
Based on the data obtained from all experts, the certainty equivalent and the utility
assessment result as calculated, is then analysed based on the developed utility belief
limits for OTOs.
• The belief limit associated with cC ∼ mL indicates that expert’s certainty equivalent
level is at 100% utility function.
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• The belief limit associated with cC ∼ L and cC ≤ mL indicates that expert’s certainty
equivalent level is at 75% utility function.
• The belief limit associated with nC ≤ L and nC ∼ L indicates that expert’s certainty
equivalent level is at 50% utility function.
• The belief limit associated with indicates that expert’s certainty equivalent level is at
25% utility function
• The belief limit associated with nC ∼ cC and nC ≤ cC indicates that expert’s
certainty equivalent level is at 0% utility function.
By evaluating the certainty equivalent for each DMs utility assessment and the utility
function of each hazard factor, the weight and ranking of the risk can be obtained using
the UtiSch+ model. This was calculated manually to determine the extent of failure
of each hazard factor, represented by different colours in the SChM. The colours used
identifies the path of progression towards active failure barrier. For instance, MAHs (R1)
is represented in a sky blue colour, and the extent of (R1) failure was at the response
barrier failure, measured as 0.75 in the SchM. Fig 4.11 shows the extent of failure for
each HFs (R1 − R5) as embodied in Table 4.16 (see Appendix 4B for R11− R44). The
results of all evaluated HFs of all experts are represented in Table 4.17
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Figure 4.11: Extent of barriers failure for each HFs in the proposed model
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Expr 1(C) Expr 2(B)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R1 0.5882 c1 < 0.75 0.2206 1 0.8671 c1 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R2 0.5882 c2 < 0.75 0.2206 1 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R3 0.4385 c3 < 0.50 0.1096 3 0.9368 c3 < 0.50 0.2342 3
R4 0.4385 c4 < 0.50 0.1096 3 0.7889 c4 < 0.50 0.1973 5
R5 0.4385 c5 < 0.50 0.1096 3 0.8671 c5 < 0.50 0.2168 4
Expr 3(D) Expr 4(Q)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R1 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.2619 2 0.9368 c1 < 0.75 0.3513 1
R2 0.9368 c2 < 0.75 0.3513 1 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 2
R3 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.2168 3 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.2168 3
R4 0.5882 c4 < 0.50 0.1471 5 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.2168 3
R5 0.8671 c5 < 0.50 0.2168 3 0.6984 c5 < 0.50 0.1746 5
Expr 5(W)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R1 0.9368 c1 < 0.75 0.3513 1
R2 0.9368 c2 < 0.75 0.3513 1
R3 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.2168 3
R4 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.2168 3
R5 0.8671 c5 < 0.50 0.2168 3
Table 4.16: Experts assessments using the UtiSch+ model
According to Eq (4.11) and (4.12), the utility function [u(x)] for each expert can be
represented by the following notations if and only if the equations are satisfied. From
the result of the five experts, Fig 4.12 shows how the notations apply.
The weights of each HF was obtained based on the UtiSch+ model for all expert as
shown in Table 4.18. A graphical representation of the weighted values of all HFs are
presented for ranking probable hazards, as shown in Fig4.13.
The ranking of uncertain and imprecise data in a decision-making process requires
the assessment of the importance weight for each expert. Here, a vertex method which
is elective and simple is proposed to rank the risk factors. The standard mean for
R1, R2, . . . , R44 is calculated for all five experts, and the ranking can then be assigned.
Although the proposed method presented in this thesis is illustrated by personal selec-
tion, it can also be applied to many other areas of management decision problems. Table
4.19 shows the highest-ranked hazard factor (R2), which can lead to a disruption, and
also shows the one with the lowest possible effect (R4).
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Table 4.17: Results for all Hazard Factors based on UtiSch+
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Figure 4.12: Co-relation between experts’ judgements based on the utility function
With additional research, perhaps questions about the choice of an appropriate con-
text for behavioural utility assessment comparisons or the representation of the outcomes
can be better resolved.
4.8.3 Discussion
The onus on every decision the DM makes in regard to each hazard is the utility function.
This tends to affect proactive inputs upon identification of the risk for OTOs. The
majority of the events that result in an accident/catastrophe are a result of the weakness
of safety barriers, and as such can provide some predictive correlation to operational
failures. The uncertainties around OTOs require a concise and precision decision analysis
in a manner that considers all internal, personal and external factors that have an effect
on the DM. For OTOs to achieve system resilience in order to anticipate operational
hazard factors under high uncertainty, developed risk assessment techniques based on
innovation, tends to improve the process of achieving resilience.
A seven-point Likert-type scale was proposed, which was used to obtain data for the
utility assessment and hazard attributes (See Appendix 4A). After the investigation,
100% of the questions were answered by all five DMs. Table 4.15 is very important
in the UtiSch+ model, such that the utility assessment for each expert in regard to
utility belief limit for certainty equivalent utility assessment influences the probability
for obtaining the weight of each HFs in the SChM. The certainty equivalent for experts
1-5 is nC ≤ L respectively. The probabilities (p1) were adapted from Chen (2000), but
the actual probability (p∗) was calculated using Eq (4.17). A non-linear regression (r1)
was also considered for the best and worst outcome.
The result in Table 4.19 can be established to forecast possible failures where un-
certain and imprecise data may probably cause disruption. With the aid of the expert
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(a)
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(c)
(d)
(e)
Figure 4.13: Fig (a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) are UtiSch+ graphs for ranking probable
hazards
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Table 4.18: Experts’ weighted values for each hazard factor
HFs Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5
R1 0.2206 0.3250 0.2619 0.3513 0.3513
R2 0.2206 0.3250 0.3513 0.3250 10.3513
R3 0.1096 0.2342 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168
R4 0.1096 0.1973 0.0.1471 0.2168 0.2168
R5 0.1096 0.2168 0.2168 0.1746 0.2168
R11 0.2361 0.3513 0.3250 0.2619 0.2619
R12 0.2361 0.3250 0.2206 0.3250 0.3250
R13 0.2361 0.3250 0.2168 0.3250 0.3250
R21 0.1746 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2342
R22 0.1471 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168
R23 0.1471 0.2342 0.2168 0.2168 0.1746
R31 0.1471 0.2168 0.1746 0.2342 0.1973
R32 0.1096 0.2342 0.1471 0.2168 0.2168
R33 0.1471 0.2342 0.1471 0.2342 0.1973
R34 0.1471 0.2168 0.1471 0.1746 0.2342
R35 0.1471 0.2342 0.1471 0.1471 0.2342
R41 0.2619 0.2958 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250
R42 0.2619 0.2619 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250
R43 0.2619 0.3250 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250
R44 0.8671 0.2168 0.1746 0.1471 0.2168
judgement on the dynamic hierarchical structure, the probabilities of the identified re-
lated hazards caused by the HFs R1, R2, . . . , R44 can be reviewed. The analysed results
show that R2, R1, R13, R11, R12, R43, R41, R42, R22 and R21 need a proactive approach
combined with a robust yet flexible model for the resolutions of the problems in oil
terminals.
The utility assessment for each DM was calculated as well as the utility function (See
Appendix 4A, 4B). The combined utility assessments was analysed using the proposed
UtiSch+ model. Table 4.19 shows the hazard ranking, achieved using the proposed
model. The graph shows the weighted distribution of each expert hazard factor. Al-
though HFs R4, R35R34, R32, R44, R5, R33, R31, R23 and R3 might not pose much threat
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Table 4.19: Ranking of hazard factors (HFs)
HFs Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5 M =
∑
x 1
n
R
R1 0.2206 0.3250 0.2619 0.3513 0.3513 0.3020 2
R2 0.2206 0.3250 0.3513 0.3250 10.3513 0.3146 1
R3 0.1096 0.2342 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.1988 11
R4 0.1096 0.1973 0.0.1471 0.2168 0.2168 0.1775 20
R5 0.1096 0.2168 0.2168 0.1746 0.2168 0.1869 15
R11 0.2361 0.3513 0.3250 0.2619 0.2619 0.2872 4
R12 0.2361 0.3250 0.2206 0.3250 0.3250 0.2863 5
R13 0.2361 0.3250 0.2168 0.3250 0.3250 0.2946 3
R21 0.1746 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2342 0.2118 10
R22 0.1471 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2245 9
R23 0.1471 0.2342 0.2168 0.2168 0.1746 0.1979 12
R31 0.1471 0.2168 0.1746 0.2342 0.1973 0.1940 13
R32 0.1096 0.2342 0.1471 0.2168 0.2168 0.1849 17
R33 0.1471 0.2342 0.1471 0.2342 0.1973 0.1919 14
R34 0.1471 0.2168 0.1471 0.1746 0.2342 0.1839 18
R35 0.1471 0.2342 0.1471 0.1471 0.2342 0.1819 19
R41 0.2619 0.2958 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2730 7
R42 0.2619 0.2619 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2662 8
R43 0.2619 0.3250 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2788 6
R44 0.8671 0.2168 0.1746 0.1471 0.2168 0.1859 16
to operations, they have also weakened the safety barrier, which may lead to a disruption.
It is thus important that OTOs are resilient enough to anticipate such failures.
According to the ranking from the UtiSch+ model, Duty Holder Error (DHE) is
considered the most highly ranked HF as well as Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) from
Man-related hazards. The hazard considered to be very low ranked are Sabotage (S),
Business Risk (BR) and Design Error (DE). The UtiSch+ model is a novel approach for
port practices and can also be suitable for risk management at industrial pots, with the
aim of deciding which HFs could be ranked as most likely to cause a disruption.
Chapter 4: An Integrated Risk Assessment For Resilience Improvement Of OTOs
Using Utility Theory And Swiss Cheese Model Under High Uncertainty 128
4.9 Conclusion
Oil terminal platforms are vital complex marine operations, thereby facilitating global
trade. The assessment of significant events disrupting OTOs tends to suffer from a lack of
data to explain such events, and also from their infrequent occurrence. The risk within
these operational infrastructures requires attention in respect to their identification,
assessment and mitigation with the use of an appropriate RM approach. For OTOs
to remain responsive to strategic needs and future challenges, subjective judgements of
disruptive events were employed to model the imperfection associated with OTOs under
high uncertainty.
This chapter has presented a quantitative approach, a generic risk assessment model
based on the integration of Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese Model to determine the
relative weight of the identified hazard factors. This approach intends to facilitate
the process involved to significantly tackle uncertainties on oil terminal platforms for
resilience improvement. Accident reports and literature review were used to identify
hazard factors. An empirical study was further conducted to provide a set of values and
consistency for the identified hazard factors to simulate the proposed model. Evidently,
for a resilience-based modelling approach, input data can be expressed by an expert’s
(DMs) measure of satisfaction with a preference (utility) with the utility belief limit.
This approach presents a favourable means with flexibility where subjective judgements
and imprecise data can be modelled in a unified manner. The SChM approach employed
provides a procedure for precise data aggregation of the original features where the safety
barriers experienced multiple weakness under high uncertainty.
The usefulness of the UtiSch+ model is demonstrated for resilience-based decision
making. Experts provided a subjective assessment for the investigation of the risk of
disruption in a stochastic manner. This approach provides a reliable, justifiable and
unblemished method for determining the relative weight of the identified hazard factors.
It can therefore be reasonably expected that the application of the novel model will serve
as an impetus for the development of a resilient and enhanced marine environment for
CMOs.
This chapter has explained the measure of satisfaction of a DM observed preference
and presented a novel research technique behind the research methodology for the present
study. Eventually, as revealed in the final result, the developed UtiSch+ model does
provide some level of confidence as a step towards preventing the risk of disruption for
OTOs. However, the UtiSch+ model cannot deal with the dependencies of the criteria;
therefore, a BN approach is developed to complement this shortfall systematically and
can be deduced in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
PRIORITY ASSESSMENT FOR
OTOs HAZARDS USING
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
Summary
This chapter presents a modelling approach that employs Bayesian Networks to evaluate
the probabilities of the HFs with the most relative importance. A symmetrical method
was used to assign prior probability for the variables responsible for OTO disruption
under high uncertainties. The use of Bayesian Networks provided a flexibility to the
model such that, in the event of new evidence, the model can be updated. The vari-
ables in the Bayesian Network are grouped into three categories of target node or goal,
intermediate node and starting nodes. UtiSch+ model is mapped into BNs and the un-
conditional and conditional prior probability are calculated for each starting node. The
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for each intermediate node (child node) was deter-
mined for the associated starting node (parent node) and the marginal prior probability
was calculated based on the strength of their direct dependence. A Bayesian Network
Sensitivity Analysis method (+BN − SAM) was performed accordingly. The evaluation
of the HFs facilitates the process of determining the probability of the target node for
strategic decision making towards OTOs resilience improvement and management.
5.1 Introduction
The operation of offshore/onshore oil terminal platforms is prone to high levels of un-
certainty because such operations usually take place in a dynamic environment where
man, nature and organisational hazards may cause possible accidents. Offshore and
onshore oil terminal platforms need to constantly adopt new approaches and technolo-
gies, and have to transport the latest hazardous materials, etc., each of which brings a
new hazard in one form or another. A typical hazard is fire on an offshore oil terminal
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installation. Though the majority of incidents on oil terminal platforms occur when oil
cargoes are oﬄoaded, other related activities such as organisational influences are also
taken into consideration. Furthermore, the development of models for hazardous ma-
terials’ discharge during oﬄoading using actual data where possible or an exploratory
data modelling approach due to reasons based on uncertainty, shows that the outer influ-
ence of the environmental context is dynamically affected by other factors, both directly
and indirectly. As such, there is a demand to develop a simple yet effective model to
represent these affiliations between variables of each operational subsystem.
Studies have been actively carried out looking at how similar accidents may be
prevented both at the national and international levels. Several methodologies have
been used for the analysis of different accident scenarios, each of which benefits from
different techniques. For example, Ren et al. (2008) developed a methodology capable of
accommodating the modelling of multiple risk factors considered in offshore operations,
which also has the ability to deal with different types of data that may come from
different.
However, it is challenging to find a single yet flexible technique to wholly capture
different phases of an accident from the beginning to the end, and which is also robust
enough to fit a variety of accident types (Khakzad et al., 2013). Information about rare
risk events inherently suffers from a meagreness of accident data. With an increasing
awareness of environmental protection and associated safety issues, research of various
kinds into maritime risk assessment and analysis therefore forms an important research
domain.
The fundamental concepts of probabilistic graphical models or probabilistic networks
have become an increasingly popular paradigm for reasoning under uncertainty. How-
ever, even though probabilistic networks provide an intuitive language for constructing
knowledge-based models for reasoning, one can often benefit from a deeper understand-
ing of the principles underlying these models. Nevertheless, having a basic understand-
ing of the structure of a model and the relation between probabilistic network and the
complexity of inference may prove useful in the model development phase.
A few authors have used Bayesian inference, in which uncertainty handling and belief
updating are inherent characteristics (Khakzad et al., 2013). Despite the remarkable
effort performed at different levels to achieve safety, the occurrence of accidents and
incidents at seaports is still increasing (Ronza et al., 2007). We take a novel approach
to risk analysis of activities relating to onshore and offshore oﬄoading of hazardous
materials performed on oil terminal platforms, using the Utility and Swiss Cheese Model
(UtiSch+) in the risk framework. Bayesian Network (BN) is tailored to fit into the
framework to construct a causal relationship model for OTOs.
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5.2 Bayesian Networks’ (BNs) Applications
A simple Bayesian Network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), in which the nodes
denote variables, arcs signify direct causal relationship between the linked nodes, and
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) assigned to the nodes represent conditional de-
pendencies. BNs are now being used in a variety of applications. Their application has
been used in different domains, e.g. for diagnostics in medicine and complex nuclear
power systems, prediction in complex maritime critical systems, control and modelling
for human understanding, ecological risk assessment and machine learning, e.g. finance,
robotics and Google. A few researchers have adopted the BN method for risk manage-
ment in large engineering projects (Ordonez, 2007), mainly focusing on the application.
Various applications of BNs as a modelling tool in maritime risk analysis have been
widely developed (Ren et al., 2008; Trucco et al., 2008; Ren et al., 2009; Clark and
Besterfield-Sacre, 2009; Lu et al., 2011; Ferna`ndez-Garcia et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014).
However, some difficulties arise when using BNs in offshore safety assessment (Ren et al.,
2008), such as how to deal with incomplete and vague information that largely exists
both at the early system design stage and during normal operations. Eleye-Datubo et
al. (2006) used a BN to examine a typical ship evacuation in an accidental risk sce-
nario. Trucco et al. (2008) developed a Bayesian belief network to model a maritime
transport system, by integrating human and organisational factors into risk analysis.
Ren et al. (2008) assessed offshore safety by combining Reasons Swiss Cheese model
and a BN where prior probabilities were obtained by experts judgements. Ren et al.
(2009) used a Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) to quantify the collision risk between a
Floating Production, Storage and Oﬄoading (FPSO) unit and authorised vessels due
to human error during operation. Anto et al. (2009) developed a model for maritime
accidents by applying Bayesian belief networks, and the maritime accident database of
the Portuguese Maritime Authority was used. Eleye-Datubo et al. (2008) developed
a BN model to examine system safety during the transfer of oil to an oil tanker. Lu
et al. (2011) innovative approach, integrated logistic regression and Bayesian networks
(BNs), was applied to a case study for maritime risk assessment in the maritime indus-
try. Alyami et al. (2014) evaluated the criticality of hazardous events in a container
terminal using Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Network (FRBN). Salleh et al. (2014) used
a Bayesian Belief Network as an assessment model for helping liner shipping operators
to conduct a self-assessment of operational reliability in the container shipping industry.
The application of BNs for maritime risk assessment is more skewed towards proactive
and predictive purposes. John et al. (2014a, 2014b) proposes a novel fuzzy risk assess-
ment approach to facilitating the treatment of uncertainties in seaport operations. Many
criteria need to be considered and modelled under an uncertain environment and the oil
terminal is one such environment. The application of BNs on an oil terminal platform
to optimise the operational efficiency is a gap which needs to be bridged. Selecting dy-
namic model needs to be developed in order to select the appropriate resilience strategy,
and BNs have been proven by various researchers to handle missing and/or incomplete
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data. BNs also have the ability to incorporate new observations into the network and
to predict the influence of possible future observations onto the results obtained (see
Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5 for BN advantages).
5.2.1 Dynamic Risk Analysis of OTOs for Resilience Modelling
The selection of an appropriate resilience investment strategy to optimise the perfor-
mance effectiveness of terminal operation often requires analysts to provide data in a
quantitative or qualitative assessment form for the analysis of complex operational sys-
tems (John et al., 2014b). The use of intelligent dynamic risk analysis techniques has
become a critical part of building resilience in OTOs to enhance the ability to process
large volumes of data in real-time situations. An holistic approach dependent on a step-
by-step analysis to identify all influencing hazards for modelling under high uncertainty
is required (Mostashari et al., 2011). This in turn assists decision makers to have a clear
insight into the operations in order to propose resilience strategies for the improvement
of OTOs.
While early research efforts were devoted to the protection of systems against disrup-
tive events, be they malicious attacks, man-made accidents or natural disasters, recent
attention has been shifted towards the ability of a system to ’bounce back’ from these
disruptive events (resilience) (Pant et al., 2014; John et al., 2016). When critical op-
erational systems such as OTOs cannot substantially recover in the face of disruption
due to a lack of robustness, they present themselves at any point within their oper-
ation as prone to disastrous consequences. Building resilience in maritime operations
entails stakeholders’ involvement in creating proficiencies and maintaining a sustained
engagement in critical operational systems John et al. (2014a).
Critical infrastructure systems provide the essential physical basis for modern soci-
eties, and have a multi-dimensional impact on public safety and economic prosperity at
regional and national levels (Shafieezadeh and Burden, 2014). Intelligent decision tools
with systematic procedures tailored dynamically to handling complex systems such as
OTOs are required to identify all causes of unexpected events with the potential for
disruption to operations within complex critical systems.
Uncertainties in complex critical systems are mainly due to vagueness, randomness,
ignorance and lack of data. Vagueness is mainly caused by ill-defined concepts in obser-
vation or inaccuracy and poor reliability of instruments used to make the observation.
Wang et al. (1995) and Ren et al. (2005) developed a fuzzy reasoning approach to
deal with vagueness of data used in maritime risk assessment. Randomness is due to
unpredictable events, whilst ignorance is due to weak implications, caused by experts
unable to establish a strong correlation between postulation and conclusion.
The literature highlights several reasons why a BN is suitable for use as a resilience
modelling tool for enhancing the resilience of OTOs. They are based on its ability to
model randomness and capture discrete causal relationships in complex critical oper-
ational systems, based on the modeller’s expertise and the capability in adapting the
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system’s behaviour from past experience. Individual probabilities of variables are com-
bined using BNs to calculate the overall probability that a specific hazard is present
(Lane et al., 2010). BNs can provide a powerful risk analysis modelling tool due to their
flexibility and they have been widely used in a range of applications (Wang et al., 2013;
Feng et al., 2014; Garcez and de Almeida, 2014).
However, a common criticism of BNs is that they are limited due to the fact that they
require too much information in the form of prior probabilities, which is usually difficult
to obtain in risk assessment, although research has revealed that a mapping algorithm
can be used to relax these limitations (Zhou et al., 2011; Khakzad et al., 2013).
5.2.2 BNs model for OTOs
The BN is a single technique which completely captures different phases of an accident
starting from accident causes to minor/major mishap. Since complex system operation
involves uncertainty, we consider an approach to model causal relationship networks
among hazard factors which may cause possible accidents in OTOs. The kernel of
incorporating observations in the network to predict the influence of possible future
observations is that it can be adapted or attuned to be used for a specific oil terminal
platform.
Graphical structures are used to represent knowledge about an uncertain domain.
In the structure of a DAG, each node in the graph denotes a random variable and is
drawn as a circle labelled by the variable name, while the edges drawn by arrows between
the nodes represent direct probabilistic dependencies among the corresponding random
variables. The identified hazard factors as discussed in Chapter 4 are used to develop a
dynamic model of possible accidents in OTOs. This represents the visualisation of the
potential variables and forms the basis for the resulting assessment process. Fig 5.1 is
the graphical representation of a sub-criterion from the dynamic BN model structure.
Decision makers should understand and have a clear insight of the whole operational
problem before attempting to solve it. This is especially true when there are many
criteria to be considered. Based on the outcomes of the UtiSch+ model, a sub-dynamic
BN model of OTOs was deduced to form the basis for the resulting assessment process.
A mapping process was conducted to transform the quantified important variables from
the UtiSch+ model into a deterministic weight vector. A symmetric model was used
to determine the conditional probabilities (Riahi et al., 2014; Salleh et al., 2014) and is
also flexible enough to allow variables to be updated in the network either by addition
or removal without impacting on all the information in the same universe. The main
feature of the symmetric model in a BN ensures that expert opinions are distributed by
the relative importance of each parent node to its child nodes in an intelligent manner;
therefore, the strength of dependence of each parent node to its connected child nodes
is determined by the parent’s normalised weight.
The relations between variables and the corresponding states of each variable gives
the quantitative part in the form of a Conditional Probability Table (CPT), whereas
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Figure 5.1: A graphical structure of Man-related hazards and their causal network
the graphical representation of each variable gives the qualitative part in the form of a
structural network. Using a BN model is a unique and strong technique which will com-
pensate or support the weakness of the UtiSch+model. It takes the advantage of Bayes
theorem to update failure probability of events (propagation) given new information.
This new information usually becomes available during the operation process. The BN
helps to understand which possible combination of parent nodes and child nodes will
lead to an accident on oil terminal platforms. Based on the BNs graphical structures, it
is evident that it offers assistance to decision makers in amassing different information
in an uncertain domain reliably and reasonably, accounting for uncertainties inherent
within the operational framework for decision making. A concise representation of BN
analysis can be found in research by Zhou et al. (2011), Riahi et al. (2012), Khakzad
et al. (2013), John et al. (2014) and Salleh et al. (2014). Fig 35 shows a proposed
dynamic OTOs BN model structure.
5.2.3 Identification of Interrelationships between the Critical Hazards
The task of maintaining a balance between safety, resilience of operations and the impact
of disruption due to uncertainties is arguably adjudged to be mitigated by shifting
towards a cognitive-based system. This tends to adapt its behaviour based on past
experience and is able to anticipate, recover and respond to situations in a proactive
manner by maintaining the functionality of the system’s operations.
Critical hazards impacting on operational systems can be analysed proactively. If
a database exists, after careful analysis, an influencing factor for these hazards can be
selected to be represented on the DAGs. In this study, a dynamic BN model hierar-
chical structure was developed from the ranked HFs with most relative weight using
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the UtiSch+ model. For any case of uncertainty, influencing factors and their interre-
lationships were identified through a structured and systematic brainstorming session
conducted using a Hazard and Operability technique and literature review. The level
of detail for these hazards was chosen according to the objective of the study and, if no
relevant historical or experimental data were available, expert’s opinion was sought to
confirm the correctness and completeness of the proposed BNs.
The identified hazards are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. The HFs
are grouped into four categories as shown in Fig 5.2, to ease the computational difficulty
that may be experienced during the modelling process. The importance of each root
node to its associated child node has to be shown. The utilisation of the model is based
on analysing proactively how vulnerable OTOs are, by calculating the likelihood of each
root node to its associate child node with respect to causing disruption of operational
systems under high uncertainty.
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Figure 5.2: A dynamic hierarchical structure with the most relative weight for the
BN model
Following the establishment of a draft BN showing the conditional dependence rela-
tionship among the set of influencing variables, assessment grades were then assigned.
Experts assigned these grades in order to confirm the correctness and completeness of
the proposed BN. More so, the influencing factors had to be transformed into the same
universe such that the experts were able to distribute weights among them. These
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weights define the relative importance of the parent nodes associated with their child
nodes. The DAGs only considered significant weighted influencing variables that could
cause disruptions.
5.3 Representation of Joint Probability Distribution (JPD)
Imagine trying to model a risky situation in which a casual relation plays a role in
the structure of a BN, even though our understanding of what is actually going on
is incomplete. A probabilistic independence assumption determines what probability
information is required to specify the probability distribution for the modelled situation.
A graphical BN is a compact representation of JPD over a set of random variables,
and is uniquely defined by the product of the individual distribution of each random
variable. JPDs can be obtained using the combined qualitative and quantitative variable
relationship in terms of intrinsic conditional distribution.
Suppose a JPD is defined across a set of random variables x1, x2, . . . , xn represented
as P (x1, x2, . . . , xn) for all values of X. If each random variable n is binary valued, one
needs to specify 2n − 1 numbers for the complete distribution of joint probabilities. It
should be obvious that the exponential requirement over X computational complexity
will be based on the chain rule from probability theory. Thus, when defining a JPD,
probabilities need to be assigned to all the possible events in the BN structure. As such,
for a network and any combination of values, the JPD can be calculated in this form:
P (x1, x2, . . . . . . , xn) = P (x1|x2, . . . . . . , xn)× p(x2, . . . . . . , xn) (5.1)
= P (x1|x2, . . . . . . , xn)× P (x2|x3, . . . . . . , xn)× p(x3, . . . . . . , xn)
= P (x1|x2, . . . . . . , xn)× P (x2|x3, . . . . . . , xn)× . . . P (x(n− 1)|xn)P (xn)
Assuming the variables in X = (x1, x2, x3, x4) are dependent on each other, as rep-
resented in Fig 5.3, the JPD of the BN can be calculated as:
p(x1, x2, x3, x4) = P (x1x2)× P (x2x3, x4)× p(x3)× p(x4) (5.2)
x1
x2
x3 x4
Figure 5.3: Conditional dependence
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5.4 Modelling Concept and Hypotheses
5.4.1 Definition and Description of the Modelling Concept
The The use of a BN model tailored to the resilience improvement of OTOs presents a
more advanced technique to evaluate complex operational hazards or risk. This in turn
optimises stochastic behaviours of subsequent operations on oil terminals, even after a
major disruption.
The BN established for the purpose of resilience improvement is based on a presented
model. It is composed of critical variables categorised into four different groups by
their function: (a) Goal, (b) starting nodes, (c) intermediate nodes and (d) target
nodes (Bayraktar and Hastak, 2009; Riahi et al., 2012). Goal nodes are nodes that
are added to accommodate the outcome of the UtiSch+; they are nodes that define
the problem under consideration, and are dependent on other nodes in the network.
Meanwhile, starting nodes are nodes with no parents, and cannot be easily modified when
modelling, although they are input nodes which are reflected in the child nodes through
conditional probabilities. The intermediate nodes are the nodes that convey conditional
probabilities, from the decision and starting nodes to the target nodes. They have both
parent and child nodes. Finally, the target nodes represent performance indicators, and
they have both parent and child nodes.
5.4.2 Hypotheses
In the proposed BN, three main hypotheses are to be considered.
• H1: Nodes with at least one parent node can only be influenced by their parent
node(s); thus they are conditionally dependant.
• H2: A node without a parent variable denotes marginal probability, which may be
made available by expert(s).
• H3: The child nodes in the influence pattern provide the mutual exclusivity of the node
required for analysis; this is ideal for the use of certain probability distributions
during the course of analysis.
The developed hypotheses will ease computational complexities as well as create
flexibility in the modelling process.
5.5 BN Processes
To assess the influence of each critical variable on accident scenarios in OTOs under
high uncertainty in order to test the resilience, the use of a BN as a model is proposed
(see Fig 5.1). The processes involved in the development of the BN model for decision
support consist of two major steps: identification of critical variables and their causal
network, and quantification of the significant interrelationship among critical variables.
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Section 4.3 highlighted the preliminary questions and problems on how an holis-
tic approach could be used to enhance the ability to process large volumes of data in
real-time situations. However, the dependency of critical variables was not considered
in the hierarchical relationship, as referred to in Chapter 3, so, to overcome this dif-
ficulty, a Bayesian Network Sensitivity Analysis Method (+BN − SAM) is presented
using a Bayesian reasoning mechanism to conduct analysis. Therefore, to transform
experts’ opinions into subjective conditional probabilities in the BN model remains the
prerequisite of this approach.
When considering a group of variables for evaluation, judgements on the relative
importance of these variables should be considered, in order to permit a quantitative
interpretation of them. Based on this compromise, the methodology follows four major
steps:
Step 1: Establish potential hazards of relative importance
◦ Mapping process
Step 2: Establish the BN model
◦ Update the values of all the variables
◦ Graphical representation of the relationship between nodes
◦ Specify states and assign inputs for CPT of each variable
Step 3: Analyse the model
◦ Elicit CPT for the child nodes in the BN using the symmetric model
◦ Marginal probability for the root nodes
Step 4: Model validation
◦ Sensitivity analysis
5.5.1 Step 1: Establish potential hazards of relative importance
The formulation of the problem to capture what can go wrong and why this is a potential
hazard with relative importance to OTOs and their potential consequences will provide
inputs concerning what should be investigated and included in the modelling. A mapping
process (see Subsection 2.5.5) by transforming data from UtiSch+ into a BN is adopted
as shown in Fig 5.4. The details of the UtiSch+ can be seen in Chapters 2 and 4
respectively.
Mapping algorithm
The important degree of influencing variables (T and X ) on a system failure can be
assessed using the UtiSch+ model. The mutual information between UtiSch+ and BN
is the total uncertainty reducing potential of X, given the original uncertainty in T prior
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to consulting X. Intuitively, mutual information is the information that variables T and
X share.
The influencing variables are divided into ten sub-criteria with parent nodes associ-
ated with the intermediate and target nodes at the first stage, and are defined as the
starting node in the equivalent BN. Let A be a qualitative sub-sub-criterion and nth be
an associated qualitative sub-criterion, by formulating a mapping process and having
all the information in the same universe, A at the ith stage (level 3) is converted to
an associated b qualitative criterion at the (i+ 1)th stage (level 2). Then the resultant
criterion undergoes another mapping process into an associated c qualitative criterion
(if any) at the (i+ 2)th stage. The process continues until the (i+ n)th stage and up to
the decision node (level 1), with all the influencing variables having a place in the DAG
as well as each nodes being accounted for. βiA stand for the degree of expert elicitation
(if any) and it signify the relationship between qualitative variables of different levels.
Fig 5.4 shows an example of a mapping process.
Consequences
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Consequence
Node 
Intermediate 
Nodes
Target 
Nodes
Starting
 Nodes
UtSch+ Mapping
Bayesian 
Network
𝛽1
1 
𝛽2
2 
𝛽3
3 
𝛽1
2 
𝛽2
3 
𝛽3
4 
Figure 5.4: Using the D-Separation concept in mapping UtiSch+ into BN as adapted
in Khakzad et al. (2013)
5.5.2 Step 2: Establish the BN model
To establish the BN model, a sub-hierarchical structure was designed from the output
of the prioritised variables (UtiSch+) according to their relative weights. This serves as
an input for the proposed BN structure. Given these occurrences, developing a kernel
generic BN model for solving issues relating to a specific operational resilience system
requires the model to have the ability to adjust to any change of input. The causal
relationships among hazard variables are then demonstrated; they are organised by
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acyclic arrows to represent what possibility could lead to disruption. Having certified
that, a qualitative graphical representation will be constructed using the BN model as
shown in Fig ??.
The states of the variables in the network established will be specified, with the sole
objective being to appropriately assign prior probabilities. The threat or attempted
threat of the variable will become the premise for defining the actual state. Further
consolidation of the qualitative description of the BN process will then be properly
understood for the construction of the CPT.
5.5.3 Step 3: Analyse the Model
To analyse the model, the conditional and unconditional probabilities will be calculated
in the CPT. A symmetrical model will be used to synthesise the mapped UtiSch+ to
determine the conditional probabilities.
(a) Determining the Unconditional Probabilities Table (UCPT) of Starting nodes
To determine the unconditional probabilities of each starting node, ranked variables
were used as a mirror image for the unconditional probabilities (Fenton et al., 2007)
prior to empirical analysis (see Chapter 4). However, this denotes the input value
for each parameter to enable the calculation of the actual prior probabilities, which
comprises of 10 parent nodes with utmost relative weights. All ranked nodes are
labelled and defined on an underlying unit interval [0, 1]. In attempting to construct
a UCPT for parent variable Xr(wherer = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) indicated by the assigned
weight Ww( where w = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) for the n
th number of state, normalising the
weights assigned by experts Ei( where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) is considered a natural
function that could be used as a measure of central tendency associated with the
causal network model. The normalising process can be calculated as
P (Xr, V ) = P (V/Xr)
n∏
r=1
P (Xr) (5.3)
to normalisze the nth number of states:
P (Xr, V ) = Tnth(
∑n
i=1w1∑n
r=1Wwmax
(5.4)
to calculate for x1
P (X1, V1) = Tnth(
w1∑n
r=1Wx1+x2+,...,xn
(5.5)
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where:
X1serves as the parent variable
W1 represents the weight for the value of X1
V represents the state for the value of X1 represented by Ww
Tnth is assumed to be the truncated normalised distribution of X1
nth represents the number of states, and
P represents the probability value of the nth outcome on an underlying unit interval [0, 1]
(b) Determining the Conditional Probabilities Table (CPT)
The Symmetrical model best reveals the relationship among variables and it is more
concerned about the causal mechanism of each parent node in a normalised space, to
its associated child nodes. Given that the conditional probability of a child variable
Z, upon a parent variable Xr( where r = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) indicated by their assigned
normalised weight (ξ1, ξ2, . . . . . . , ξn), this can be estimated as follows (Riahi et al.,
2012; Salleh et al., 2014):
P (Z = present|X1 = present) = ξ1
P (Z = present|X2 = present) = ξ2
... (5.6)
P (Z = present|Xn = present) = ξn
n∑
r=1
ξr = 1
Based on (??) and considering the status quo of the symmetry approach (i.e. nor-
malised space), the probability of the variable Z upon parent variable Xr(wherer =
1, 2, 3, . . . , n) can be evaluated as follows:
P (Z = present|Xn = present) =
n∑
r=1
ξr = 1 (5.7)
ξr = ξr
If the state of the rth parent variable is identical to the state of its child
(ξr) = 0, and
If the state of the rth parent variable is different from the state of its child
The amount of data that needs to be input in a CPT can be calculated using:
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Ny+1 (5.8)
(c) Determining the marginal probabilities
To generate the marginal probability for the consequence node, the JPD in the
CPT is evaluated and aggregated. Once the structure and parameters have been
determined in the CPT, the BN is ready to draw inferences. Thus, the marginal
probability of all hazard variables can be calculated using the marginalisation rule:
P ∗y = yi ∼=
n∑
r
P (X = xr)× P (Y = yi|X = Xr) (5.9)
5.5.4 Step 4: Model Validation
In order to ensure consistency in tackling inaccuracies or incompleteness on OTOs,
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is utilised. SA is a process used as a partial model validation,
particularly for investigating model performance by changing the parameters’ values.
The analysis allows the studying of uncertainties in the output of a model. It further
tests the logicality and sensitivity of the output result. The model can be verified by
satisfying certain axioms tailored to at least reflect logical and robust inference reasoning,
and also monitoring the effects of these changes on the posterior probabilities. The
following two axioms must be met in order to achieve consistent SA processes:
Axiom 1 : A slight increase or decrease of any states of an input variable will
result in a relative increase or decrease in the states of the model output. Axiom 2
: A minor decrease or increment in the input data, i.e. belief degrees for any individ-
ual hazard factor, should result in a decrease or increase in the overall average scores
correspondingly.
5.6 An Empirical Study on the Applicability of the Model
To investigate the uncertainties of oil terminal operational hazards, a BN model has
been developed. The developed model provided a set of values in order to simulate
the model. However, this chapter intends to investigate the top 10 HFs whose relative
weights are most significant to cause unexpected events on oil terminal platforms. This
study was executed in four phases: (1) questionnaire formulation and pilot study, (2)
choosing the right experts, (3) survey data collection and description and (4) BN model
and results. We discuss each of the phases below.
5.6.1 Questionnaire Formulation and Pilot Study
The BN was systematically constructed with the help of the dynamic hierarchical struc-
ture. Based on the information, the relationship of the connecting nodes at a particular
level has to be modified or adjusted. Our discussion in Chapter 3 formed the basis for
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the initial hazard and uncertainty modelling. Prior to actual data collection, content
validity was performed to improve the clarity of the questionnaire. A cover letter and
a questionnaire was drafted specifically for the BN to reflect the significant result from
the UtiSch+ model. The drafted version of the questionnaire was further examined by
three academicians and two specialists to comment on any ambiguity of the questions.
Their feedbacks was useful for the final drafted questionnaire, which was used for a pilot
study. See subsection 4.7.1 on how the questionnaire was measured and approved as
well as the conducted pilot study. The final questionnaire included in Appendix 4C was
used for data collection.
5.6.2 Choosing the right Experts (DMs) for OTOs
A cross-section of decision makers (DMs) were considered to participate in the survey.
See subsection 4.7.2 for the criteria and the randomness for choosing experts (John et al.,
2014b). Experts where identified based on LinkedIn, publicly available directories, and
recommendation designated by oil and gas industry consultants.
5.6.3 Survey Data Collection and Description
The questionnaire was web-based and a link was e-mailed to the targeted expert par-
ticipants. A cover letter appeared to respondents prior to the main question page (see
Appendix 5C). Experts assigned possible outcomes regarding the 10 parent variables
considered for the BN given their experience. A number of undelivered, incompleted
and completed questionnaires were returned. In all, 5 valid responses were obtained
yielding the final response rate of 20%. This response rate can be compared to other
studies conducted in the literatures Mokhtari et al. (2012); Hammitt and Zhang (2013);
Alyami et al. (2014); John et al. (2016). The five experts selected at random have the
following backgrounds:
• A senior safety consultant in an oil and gas industry with experience of more than 20
years; having an onshore/offshore industrial experience in the field of oil and gas
terminal operations.
• A senior maritime Health and Safety Executive (HSE) with a Masters degree who has
been involved in offshore oil installation and port safety for more than 20 years.
• A General Purpose tanker captain who has been involved with (off)loading operation
on offshore/onshore oil terminal platforms for 16 years.
• A senior operation manager who has been involved with offshore oil platforms opera-
tion for more than 20 years.
• A senior maritime engineering lecturer with a PhD, having both academic and indus-
trial experience for more than 20 years.
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Similarly, when these 5 experts made their judgements, they assigned values to each
question. The evaluation for each question is presented in Fig 5.6 .
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Figure 5.5: Representation of a terminal operational platform requiring resilience
improvements
A port’s infrastructure system takes a long time to design, construct and opera-
tionalise. Upon its completion, it becomes a facilitating national and international hub
for economic activities. Oil terminal platforms provide fundamental activities through
enabling the transfer of goods and providing services for national and international
economies to sustain and grow their economies. Fig 5.5 is a representation of a ter-
minal operational platform as envisaged according to available conference papers and
professional and academic journal articles. There is therefore the need for such a com-
plex infrastructure system to be subjected to a variety of operational and environmental
uncertainties to show resilience in the face of major operational disruption.
From the questionnaire feedback, it was revealed that 100% of the participants dis-
cerned the Hazard Factors (HFs), as well as the possible consequences of these HFs to
OTOs. In addition, Table 5.1 above shows the consistency of participants’ responses.
The participants are all senior employees with experience all over the world, which also
represents around 90% of the whole sample. In order to eliminate the presence of re-
sponse bias, participants were chosen from the United Kingdom, Angola, Saudi Arabia,
Russia and the USA. These represent the major oil importing and exporting countries
where OTO activities are being performed at a large scale.
According to participants, as shown in Fig 5.6, the probability of these HFs occurring
on oil terminal platforms spans averagely across somewhat unlikely (3) to somewhat
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Table 5.1: Consistency of HFs based on empirical study for BN inputs
Hazards/Failures HFs Arithmetic mean
Major Accident Hazards 4.00
Man-related Hazard Duty Holders Error 4.40
Maintenance Event Hazards 5.00
Machine-related Hazard Equipment Failure 5.40
Well Control System Failure 3.80
Coordination and correspondence- Platform Communication Misinterpretation 5.20
related Hazard Situation Awareness 5.20
Hydrologic 4.40
Nature-related Hazard Seismic 3.60
Atmospheric 4.40
Figure 5.6: A graph showing the empirical evaluation of HFs for BN inputs
likely (5). The quantitative data collected were used for the proposed BN model and its
application, to determine the likelihood of accident for OTOs.
5.7 BN model and Application
As previously discussed in section 5.6.3, the HFs from the UtiSch+ model with the most
relative weights were further justified by expert’s opinion. The HFs are thus established
as potential hazards that could lead to major disruption in OTOs. Given what should be
investigated and included in the model, a mapping process was conducted by converting
the outcome from the UtiSch+ model into a BN. The concept of mapping (see section
5.5.1) was used for transforming the qualitative criterion of the sub-dynamic hierarchical
structure (Fig 5.4) with a belief degree at 100% to a BN model (Khakzad et al., 2013).
Therefore, it is a mirror image of the hierarchical structure. The belief degree (if any)
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varies (Riahi et al., 2012) with the relationship between qualitative variables at different
levels of the mapping process.
A BN model provides a platform for graphical representation of the causal relations
between HFs. As part of a resilience strategy framework, the network captures the
uncertain dependencies between HFs via a list of probability distributions. Normally, a
BN consists of a set of variables, causal links and a probability. A number of specific
compelling reasons are responsible for mapping the UtiSch+ model into BN: (1) BNs
can be executed to predict as well as diagnose a failure given evidence of the starting or
intermediate nodes, (2) the calculations in BN is exact where the network is discrete, (3)
BNs guarantee a richer, more realistic model due to their flexible nature and robustness
and (4) BNs assume that all nodes are dependent, especially in the presence of a common
cause of failures.
Based on the mapping process, potential hazards as input data are fed into the
Netica BN software to showcase the qualitative graphical representation of a customised
BN model for OTOs. As presented in Fig 41, the outcome with the most relative weight
from the UtiSch+ is mapped into a BN.
5.7.1 (Step 1)
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Figure 5.7: A BN model of an accident scenario for OTOs
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Table 5.2: Generated normalised weight for HFs
HFs expr 1 expr 2 expr 3 expr 4 expr 5 Rw Nw
R1 0.2206 0.3250 0.2619 0.3513 0.3513 0.3020 0.4898
R2 0.2206 0.3250 0.3513 0.3250 0.3513 0.3146 0.5102
R11 0.2361 0.3513 0.3250 0.2619 0.2619 0.2872 0.3308
R12 0.2361 0.3250 0.2206 0.3250 0.3250 0.2863 0.3298
R13 0.2361 0.3250 0.2619 0.3250 0.3250 0.2946 0.3394
R21 0.1746 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2342 0.2118 0.4854
R22 0.1471 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2168 0.2245 0.5146
R41 0.2619 0.2958 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2730 0.3337
R42 0.2619 0.2619 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2662 0.3254
R43 0.2619 0.3250 0.2619 0.2206 0.3250 0.2788 0.3408
5.7.2 Customised BNs (Step 2)
The causal relationships among the HFs variables are demonstrated; they are the acyclic
arrows which represent what possibility would lead to the goal. Nodes can be assigned
to various states according to their individual characteristics. In hazard-based nodes,
the BN constructed was assigned two exclusive states, ”Yes and No” and ”high and
Low”. ”No” means the probability of a related node being safe and ”Yes” means the
probability of the corresponding nodes being unsafe.”High” means the probability of
occurrence of an unwanted event is significant and ”Low” means the likelihood of the
occurrence of an unwanted event is insignificant. It was possible to choose these states
based on the fact that the ”likelihood” nature of the event occurrence frequency well
matches the probability requirements in the BN. The weights of the states (High and
Low) of the parent nodes was determined by the relative weight (Rw) generated in Table
5.2.
The Netica software is a robust, widely used tool, which comes with a Bayesian
network software package that provides an applicable programmer’s interface (API).
The user has to define the model structure but the software provides an Expectation-
Maximisation (EM) algorithm to support the execution of probability calculations (CPT).
Given the data and the model structure being known beforehand, the EM algorithm in
Netica repetitively calculate maximum likelihood estimates for the variables. The EM
algorithm in Netica can also handle randomly missing data problems which are depen-
dent on the states of other variables. Netica also supports the use of decision and utility
variables, and, once the bins in the network are defined, it allocates continuous data
into the correct bins. Netica and its influence diagram features have been used in many
Chapter 5: Priority Assessment For OTOs Hazards Using Bayesian Networks 148
Table 5.3: List of Influencing HFs for OTOs disruption
Abbreviations Hazard Factors (HFs) Node Type
R1 Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) Starting node
R2 Duty Holders Error (DHE) Starting node
R11 Maintenance Event Hazards (MEHs) Starting node
R12 Equipment Failure (EF) Starting node
R13 Well Control System Failure (WCSF) Starting node
R21 Platform Communication Misinterpretation (PCM) Starting node
R22 Situation Awareness (SA) Starting node
R41 Seismic Hazard (SH) Starting node
R42 Hydrologic Hazard (HH) Starting node
R43 Atmospheric Hazard (AH) Starting node
R51 Man-related Hazards Intermediate node
R52 Machine-related Hazards Intermediate node
R53 Coordination and Correspondence-related Hazards Intermediate node
R54 Nature-related Hazards Intermediate node
Goal Accident scenario on OTOs Target Node
studies (Ramin et al., 2012a, 2012b; Saleh et al., 2014). The general strategy for using
a Netica BN model can be seen in section 4.2. Fig 5.8 shows a tailored BN for the
resilience improvement of an accident scenario for an oil terminal platform.
Figure 5.8: A BN model of an accident scenario for OTOs
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5.7.3 Evaluation of Analysis and Results (Step 3)
To analyse the model, the Netica software enables the computation of the conditional and
unconditional probabilities for the child and parent nodes respectively in the Conditional
Probability Table (CPT). The symmetrical model was used to synthesise the mapped
UtiSch+ to determine the conditional probabilities.
Symmetrical model : Expert’s opinion is distributed by relative importance of each
parent node for their associated child nodes. The strength of direct dependence of each
child node to its associated parent is indicated by their normalised weights (Nw) (Eq.
5.7, Table 5.2). Thus, in normalised space P (Z = present|X1 = present) = P ( ˙̂B1)
represents the relative importance of the first parent node for its associated child node
as an entity ?; therefore:
P (Z = present|X1 = present) = P ( ˙̂B1) = P (B1)∑n
a=1 p(B1)
... (5.10)
P (Z = present|Xn = present) = P ( ˙̂B1) = P (B1)∑n
a=1 p(B1)
˙¨
P (
˙̂
B1) + P (
˙̂
B2) + P (
˙̂
B3) + · · ·+ P ( ˙̂Bn) = 1
Based on the axioms of probability theory, and owing to normaliszation and in
normalised space,
˙̂
B1,
˙̂
B2,
˙̂
B3, . . . ,
˙̂
Bn remain disjointed:
P (
˙̂
B1 ∩ ˙̂B2) = P ( ˙̂B2 ∩ ˙̂B3) = · · · = 0
˙¨ (5.11)
P (
˙̂
B1 ∪ ˙̂B2 ∪ ˙̂B3 ∪ · · · ∪ ˙̂Bn) = P ( ˙̂B1) + P ( ˙̂B2) + P ( ˙̂B3) + · · ·+ P ( ˙̂Bn)
Thus, based on Eq. (5.4), and according to the probability distribution, the following
can be obtained within the CPT:
P (Z = Likely|X1, X2, . . . . . . , Xn) = 0
P (Z = Unlikely|X1, X2, . . . . . . , Xn) = 1
P (Z = Likely|X1, X2, . . . . . . , Xn) = 1
P (Z = Unlikely|X1, X2, . . . . . . , Xn) = 0
Accordingly, the results obtained by evaluating a CPT based on synthesising the
”symmetric” methodology and using the relative weight in Table 5.2, an illustrated
example is presented to obtain the values of probability distribution
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ω1 =
w1
w1 + w2 + w3
=
0.2872
0.2872 + 0.2863 + 0.2946
≈ 0.3308,
ω2 =
0.2863
0.2872 + 0.2863 + 0.2946
≈ 0.3298,
ω3 =
0.2946
0.2872 + 0.2863 + 0.2946
≈ 0.3394,
P (
˙̂
B1) + P (
˙̂
B2) + P (
˙̂
B3) = 1, therefore, 0.3308 + 0.3298 + 0.3394 = 1
Based on Eq. 5.7, the CPT, as shown in Fig 5.9 can be computed.
Figure 5.9: Aggregated result for an accident scenario for OTOs
where:
Ω(High) = P ( Machine-related hazard = Likely|R13, R12, R11)
Ω(¬Low) = P ( Machine-related hazard = Unlikely|R13, R12, R11)
Based on the Bayes chain rule, the marginal probabilities of likelihood of Machine-
related hazard can be calculated as:
P ( Machine-related hazard = Likely) = 0.5
P ( Machine-related hazard = Unlikely) = 0.5
The total number amount of data that is needed to be imputed input into the CPT
can be determined using equation (5) as 23, 24, 23, 24 and 25 (i.e. 80 data). The above
calculation is true for any number of parent nodes therefore if there is any uncertainty
about the validity and invalidity of a child’s parents, one should also remain uncertain
about the validity and invalidity its child. However, one major use of BNs is in reviewing
probability in the light of actual observation of events.
Once the structure and parameters have been determined in the CPT, the BN is
ready to draw inferences. The obtained result from the experiment is presented in Fig
5.10, the extent of disruption obtained at the target node or goal is evaluated as: Goal
= {(Yes = 0.2910 or 29.1%), (No = 0.7090 or 70.9%)}.
Assume that R2, R21 and R42 are known with 100% certainty. These conditions
haves an important effect on the occurrence probability of the overall effect on the acci-
dent scenarios. By using the Netica Software to simulate the effect of R2, R21 and R42
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Figure 5.10: Aggregated result for an accident scenario for OTOs
on the model, the occurrence probabilities can be estimated.
Figure 5.11: The effect of R2 and R21 on the occurrence probability of an accident
for OTOs
In the first scenario Fig 5.11, if R2(Duty Holders Error) and R21(Platform Com-
munication Misinterpretation) are known with 100% certainty, it can be observed that
the total likelihood of an accident occurrence increases to 0.4740 or 47.4%. However,
based on the second scenario Fig 5.12, the values are different due to a new evidence
R42 (Atmospheric hazards) which tends to infer the likelihood to 0.5670 or 56.7% of an
accident occurrence.
Prior to the instantiation of the state of a variable, the obtained results as presented
yields a marginal probability. It is worth mentioning that whatever form of interference
is exploited, the output for the probed variable is a probability distribution in each state.
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Figure 5.12: The effect of R2, R21 and R42 on the occurrence probability of an
accident scenario for OTOs
5.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis (+BN− SAM)(Step 4)
The robustness of this BN model is demonstrated using a Sensitivity Analysis (SA).
SA was used to logically identify the effects of inaccuracies and incompleteness of the
variables influence of the model outputs on the decision node. The most logical way of
conducting this analysis is to change the parameters data, based on the axiom discussed
in Section 5.5.4. All the input variables (10 nodes) as shown in Tables 24 and 25 given a
slight variation in probability values. An increase or decrease by 10%, 20% and 30% was
done accordingly in respect to each node, and the results were obtained. It is noteworthy
to mention that an increase to the nth lowest preference state of a parent variable β,
simultaneously decreases the nth highest preference state of a parent variable β. This
process continues for all other parameter variables.
For example, given that R2 ”Yes” was increased by 20% ”DHE = increase”, the
probability occurrence of the model output (i.e. accident scenario outcome) is evaluated
as ”0.3203 or 32.03% Yes” and ”0.6797 or 67.97% No”. This implies that the initial
outcome increases from ”Yes = 29.1%” to ”Yes = 32.03%”. However, by increasing
R2 ”No” by 20% ”DHE= decreased”, the probability occurrence of the model output
decreases from ”Yes = 29.1%” to ”Yes = 26.32%”. As shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, the
results of all other parameter variables are presented. More so, while changing the value
of a variable, all other input variables are left unchanged.
All obtained results are in harmony with Axioms 1 and 2. However, if the probability
occurrence of the outcome is insensitive to a changed variable, the input variable is
considered to be insignificant and to be removed.
Based on the obtained results in Table 5.4, the sensitivity of the model output to
the increment variation of each individual parameter variable as illustrated in Fig 5.13
is assessed.
The correlation between the SA of an increment and decrement of the parameter
variable output data shows the range of variation of each node on the system. Based
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Table 5.4: Increment of parameter variable’s likelihood
Sensitivity Analysis at
HF 10% 20% 30%
R1 0.3051 0.3191 0.3323
R2 0.3053 0.3203 0.3342
R11 0.2963 0.3013 0.3062
R12 0.2961 0.3011 0.3061
R13 0.3054 0.3183 0.3324
R21 0.3011 0.3112 0.3214
R22 0.3021 0.3122 0.3234
R41 0.2960 0.3000 0.3050
R42 0.3042 0.3174 0.3300
R43 0.2964 0.3014 0.3180
Figure 5.13: Sensitivity of the model output based on increment variation
on Fig 5.13, the behaviours of several inferences prior to changed values highlighted the
most sensitive node that could trigger an accident on oil terminal platforms. The lines
reveal the range value of the nodes and highlight a threshold for a significant action to
be taken due to an increment in the likelihood of accident occurring or examining the
effect of a decreased likelihood. As shown in Table 5.5, the results of all other nodes due
to decrement are presented as follows:
Based on the obtained results in Tables 5.13 and 5.5, the sensitivity of the model
output due to the increment/decrement variation of each individual parameter variable
as illustrated in Fig 5.14 is assessed.
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Table 5.5: Increment of parameter variable’s likelihood
Sensitivity Analysis at
HF -10% -20% -30%
R1 0.2770 0.2632 0.2494
R2 0.2762 0.2621 0.2472
R11 0.2861 0.2813 0.2763
R12 0.2860 0.2810 0.2762
R13 0.2771 0.2632 0.2500
R21 0.2810 0.2710 0.2614
R22 0.2800 0.2691 0.2670
R41 1 0.2860 0.2810 0.2780
R42 0.2782 0.2653 0.2564
R43 0.2864 0.2813 0.2770
Figure 5.14: Sensitivity analysis results showing a range due to changes in the input
data
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that BN model is an effective technique for dynamic
hazard analysis of OTOs for resilience improvements. An empirical study was conducted
on the HFs to establish the customised BN model tailored for OTOs. It was gathered
from the analysis that such HFs play a significant role ion the build-up of an unexpected
events with high operational disruptions. Given a particular case with known HFs, the
occurrence probability of an accident for OTOs can be determined with a BN. In real
practice, CMOs on oil terminal infrastructures under uncertainties can use BNs in such
a way that they can add or drop any node or parameter variable based on the situation
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they faced. The implementation of the proposed BN process shows that, by mapping
the data from UtiSch+ model into BNs, the limitations of the UtiSch+ model can be
relaxed. Furthermore, it was envisaged to be an intelligent tool for analysing different
variables in a dynamic environment.
The ”Symmetrical model” was used to determine the CPT of the child node using
weighted sum algorithm (See section 5.8). The reason why the weighted sum algorithm is
more attractive to use is its kernel, a linear process. The weighted sum algorithm enables
probability adapting; a second type of probability updating in which the conditional
probability distribution are adapted using new evidence collected during a time interval.
This allows oil terminal platform operators to employ a sound and coherent approach
to exploit the customised BN model.
The results presented in this chapter provided an in-depth understanding in com-
plementing the UtiSch+ model, and also the relationships among the ten HFs with the
most relative weights. Based on the input data and the results obtained for probability
occurrence of the goal, it is evident that the variations and influence magnitude of each
parameter variable is Goal = (Yes = 0.2910 or 29.1%) to occur. It is more interesting
to know that the behaviours of several inferences i.e. (R2, R21) and (R2, R21 and R42),
when analysed at 100% likelihood as shown in Fig 5.13 and 5.14 increased the likely
occurrence probability of the goal/target node.
Apart from the above, like all other models, the sensitive analysis (+BN − SAM)
was used to determine the robustness of this BN model. Based on Tables 5.13 and 5.5,
it can be concluded that the input data of all the 10 variables or nodes was increased by
the same amount of 10%, 20% and 30% respectively. If the occurrence probability is not
influenced by a parameter variable, it is considered insensitive and will be eliminated. It
is evident that the model is more sensitive to R2(Duty holders error). However, experi-
ence has shown that R1 (Major accident hazards) on CMOs can be very demoraliszing,
thereby wreaking severe havoc on operation with lasting consequences. Also, by decreas-
ing the 10 variables by the same amount of 10%, 20% and 30% respectively, a correlation
between the (+BN − SAM) increment and decrement of the parameter variable shows
a range of variation of each node on the system (Fig 5.14). This highlights a threshold
for action to be taken due to an increment or examining the effect due to a decrement.
Subsequently, the developed BN forms part of a larger framework for assisting scien-
tist and decision makers to understand CMOs in order to develop ideal strategies towards
improving the resilience of their system. The BN provides a robust platform where both
qualitative and quantitative datasets can be integrated. The proposed BN approach
ensures that the computational analysis succumbs to the concept of d-separation and
the results aggregation are easy to understand. The quantitative analysis of accident
scenarios for OTOs using BN accounts for the occurrence of accidents in oil terminals,
thus, crucial HFs can be taken into account to facilitate a resilient strategy for improving
the resilience of OTOs.

Chapter 6
STRATEGIC DECISION
SUPPORT FOR OTOS
RESILIENCE STRATEGY
SELECTION
Summary
The analysis of various alternatives that can be adopted to ensure OTOs resilience
optimisation can be seen as a multi-attribute decision process. In view of this, this re-
search aims to provide a logical approach in identification of important alternatives from
the overall set of alternatives using Analytical Hierarchical Process and Prospect Theory
(AHP-PT). The attributes and alternatives are represented on the hierarchical structure
of the Plan Inspect Monitor and Manage (PIMMs) resilience investment strategy. An
AHP model is used to determine the weight of the attribute, while PT provided the needed
ranking and order of the PIMMs resilience strategy for OTOs resilience improvement.
6.1 Introduction
As a typical Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) problem, the selection of an
appropriate resilience investment strategy often requires the decision analyst to provide
data in the form of a qualitative or quantitative assessment or both. As there are various
ways to determine each alternative with respect to each of the attributes in question,
the rationale in handling these data usually results in uncertain, indefinite or missing in-
formation that makes the decision-making process more complex and challenging (Yang
and Xu, 2002; Kuo et al., 2007). In a decision-making process where subjective and
imprecise data are represented, certain conditions have to be taken into consideration
simultaneously in evaluating the suitability of alternative(s). A decision maker (DM)
can use an existing or improved decision-making algorithm or develop a new decision
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algorithm in order to effectively make a decision among existing alternatives for a precise
choice. Therefore, effective decisions can be made on the basis of consistent evaluation,
which is simple in both concept and computation.
Many real-life complex socio-technical system problems have imprecise information
about the required alternative strategies with respect to attributes for hazard prevention,
control or mitigation. Numerous studies on complex systems require DMs to make
strategic decisional judgements in order to handle the imprecision associated with the
operation of these systems under uncertainty. DMs also have to reconcile group decisions
by modifying incomplete evidence or information, to arrive at a final decision. In order
to complete the predefined hazard-based model for resilience improvement, selecting
the best strategic alternative feasible for accident scenarios for OTOs is an important
priority. This can be achieved using an appropriate MADM tool.
Potential HFs affecting OTOs were identified and assessed in the previous chapters.
A hazard-based model was developed and, in the later stage, the most significant HFs
were analysed using a Bayesian Network (BN). There are no best or worst techniques for
MADM, but some techniques are more suitable for a particular decision problem than
others (Mergias et al., 2007). A facilitated process can also be developed and introduced
for resilience management decision making to assist the DM to build resilience into a
system in a way that it is easily understood by workers on oil terminal platforms when
responding to crises.
Some of the essential problems faced in a decision-making process include: 1) the
group setting, in which all participants do not have equal expertise about the problem
domain, 2) the facilitation of systematic and objective decision making towards selection,
alteration and additional designs, 3) whether to support or reject strategic resilience
alternatives due to losses/gains, 4) whether decision making needs to be further informed
by techniques fit for the retroactive change, and 5) how feasible is the application of these
formal techniques.
To this end, this study proposes a simple yet effective novel modelling technique
that can be used to solve these problems, and also enrich resilience strategic selection
literature on OTOs in stochastic and deterministic terminal behaviour dynamics under
uncertainty.
6.2 Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Decision making is a process of selecting a possible course of action from all available
alternatives (Lai et al., 1994). The selection of an appropriate alternative for decision
making has previously been a task for the decision analyst, to derive rational decisions
involving risk and probabilities which are contained in different quantitative and qualita-
tive forms. The PT concept is an essential process for selecting a suitable and applicable
choice to provide a possible solution for Multiple attribute decision making (MADM)
problems under uncertainty (Fan et al., 2013). A wide range of studies (see section 2.6)
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have been proposed to determine the selection of attributes and alternatives with respect
to the overall goal of a realistic selection scenario. One of them is known to consider sev-
eral strategies to support different conflicting criteria relating to a resilience investment
selection problem for seaport operations (John et al., 2014b). MADM is an algorithm
deployed to solve problems involving selection from a list of alternatives. It describes
each alternative by using multiple attributes. For a given set of alternatives, MADM
models try to choose the best alternative among them, rank the alternatives from the
best to the worst or classify them into classes (OG˘UZTI˙MUR, 2011). It specifies how
criteria or attribute information can be processed in order to arrive at a choice suitable
for investment (Lavasani et al., 2012). MADM methods generally require comparisons
of attributes with respect to alternatives for efficient trade-off. In a MADM process,
each decision table (also called a matrix) has four main parts, which are summarised as
follows:
• Alternatives
• Criteria or Attributes
• Weight of experts or relative importance of each attribute
• Performance measure of alternatives with respect to criteria
Based on the analysis of MCDM methods, the basic information in a MADM model
can be represented in the matrix presented below:
C1 C2 · · ·Cm
(w1 w2 · · ·wm)
Z =

A1
A2
...
Am


y1,1 y1,2 · · · y1,m
y1,1 y1,2 · · · y1,m
...
...
. . .
...
yn,1 yn,2 · · · yn,m
 (6.1)
Where Ai (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) is the i
th alternative; Ci (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m) is the i
th
set of criteria with which each alternatives performance can be measured; y(i, j)(i =
1, 2, 3, . . . , n), (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m) is the measure of performance of the ith alternative
with respect to the mth criterion; and wj (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m) is the i
th criterion weight.
It is essential to emphasise that all elements in the decision matrix must be normalised
to the same units, so that all the possible attributes in the decision problem can be
dealt with easily to eliminate any computational difficulty. As evidenced in Lavasani et
al. (2012), there are four means of normalisation in a MADM problem; the two most
popular methods are summarised as follows:
• Linear Normalisation: this approach divides the rating of n attribute by its maximum
value. Usually, the normalised value pi,j can be obtained using:
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pi,j =
yi,j
y∗j
, 1, 2, 3, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m (6.2)
• Vector Normalisation: this approach divides the rating of each attribute by its average,
so that each normalised rating of yi,j can be obtained using:
pi,j =
yi,j√∑
i = 1ny2i.j
, 1, 2, 3, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m (6.3)
Normally, an alternative in a MADM problem is often described using qualitative
variables expressed by DMs. However, when no criteria evidence or information is
available, the preferred approach is to use PT, which has the capability of handling such
a situation under varying constraints.
6.3 Resilience Strategies for OTOs Systems
According to Liddell and Scott (1940) and Andrews and Roland (1987), a strategy is
a high-level plan or method of action designed for obtaining a specific goal or result
under conditions of uncertainty. Strategy is all about a pattern in a stream of decisions
for gaining a position of advantage over evident operational scenarios or, at best, ex-
ploiting emerging possibilities. A strategy is more a set of strategic choices (options) an
organisations adapts to than a fixed plan.
Based on the assessment of OTOs in Chapters 4 and 5, the two elements that need
to be addressed in enhancing resilience are increasing their adaptive capacity and de-
creasing their vulnerability to hazards and uncertainty (Dekker et al., 2008; Aven, 2011).
Therefore, reducing a systems vulnerability at the operational phase makes it less prone
to disruptions, and increasing its adaptive capacity allows it to recognise/respond to
shocks (Omer et al., 2012).
According to Mansouri et al. (2009), integrating resilience into the design and oper-
ation of complex systems can be potentially costly. However, experience has shown that
a total loss of the whole system in the face of severe disruption could lead to long-term
consequences. To this end, most DMs are faced with a high degree of strategic decisions
that involve major resource implications regarding investment and uncertainty for an
appropriate resilience strategies.
Strategic decisions involve different levels of many individual elements, and this inter-
relationship among choices has become a major source of decision complexity. Bolstering
the effectiveness of operational decisions requires an in-depth and step-by-step analysis
of the utilisation of a risk management algorithm, taking into account the complexities of
operational uncertainty within a system. More importantly, the decision selection pro-
cesses are challenging due to the fact that numerous events need to be modelled (Wang
and Trbojevic, 2006). The conditions for attaining an ideal level of strategic decision
making on resilience in CMOs involve an ample understanding of both the system and
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the attributes influencing its performance (Mostashari et al., 2011). Since the objective
of a decision-making process is to obtain the best combination of attributes for rational
decision making, effort needs to be tailored towards efficiently developing, structuring
and assessing those attributes that influence alternative selection. It is significantly im-
portant to mention that the selection of the right alternative will enhance resilience of
OTOs under high uncertainty.
Furthermore, the resilience strategies were suggested based on the uncertainties iden-
tified in the literature on oil terminal platforms, resilience conceptual framework review,
and terminal failure mode analysis as discussed in the preceding chapters. Also, these
chapters facilitated the selection procedure to identify an applicable strategy that can
be implemented for CMOs under investigation. As a result, the exploration of differ-
ent decision-making tools, algorithms, and approaches to propose a robust yet flexible
decision-making approach based on a wide range of issues related to accidents, hazards,
failures, planning and management will help to evaluate and rank operational efficiency
for a given oil terminal platform (Rao and Davim, 2008).
The proposed strategies are tested against multiple scenarios, as presented in Sub-
section 6.3.1 and Table 1, to enhance a coherent decision-making process. This allows
decision makers to share their strategic concerns and increase their understanding of the
oil terminal operational systems, appreciating the potential impact of different alterna-
tives before subsequently arriving at a strategic decision for resilience improvement and
management of OTOs.
6.3.1 Assessment of OTOs for Strategic Resilience Improvement
Based on the analysis in sections 4.6 and 5.6, a critical aspect of a decision-making
process lies in measuring and monitoring information about key attributes that facili-
tate disruptions to OTOs. Clearly, providing theoretical understanding of and empirical
support for how significant hazards contribute to major disruptions and have enormous
consequences has enabled real-time demand forecasting for monitoring, control and mit-
igation. In spite of the application of mathematical algorithms, utilising subjective
judgement principles often make decisions imprecise for MADM problems.
It is important to emphasise that an early examination of the OTOs systems vulner-
ability to natural and subsequent related hazards was conducted and its failure modes
were identified and modelled. Based on the obtained results presented in Figs 5.9, and
the relative weight obtained using the novel UtiSch+ model to establish the magnitude
of uncertainty within oil terminal platforms/ship interface, a measured and evaluated
study is required for strategic resilience decision. Thus, DMs need to suggest strategies
for implementation that can adapt to, survive and recover from minor/major shocks or
disruption to re-organise and resume functionality of operations under high uncertainty.
Following an intensive investigation into OTOs platforms, it is apparent that Man-
, Machine- and Nature-related hazards have been fundamental in most accidents in
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complex maritime operations. Such an evaluation helps to measure the operational ef-
ficiency, robustness and flexibility of oil terminal platforms. Consequently, aided by a
combination of qualitative and quantitative data, a single model framework was estab-
lished to reduce the occurrence of accidents and system vulnerability; a set of strategies
aligned with the evaluation of identified attributes may constitute a hierarchy (Yang
and Sen, 1994). A similar concept has also been pointed out in John et al., (2014) for
resilience investment strategy. It is noteworthy to mention that addressing the complex-
ities of OTOs hazards/accidents requires the formidable task of understanding offshore
and onshore oil terminal operations and thus (off)loading of crude oil, kerosene, diesel
and petrol. Furthermore, using a proven methodology to investigate the acknowledged
causes of hazards/accidents on OTOs establishes a group of dominant safety concerns
for oil terminal platforms.
Following the investigation, ranking and analysis of hazards on OTOs, resilience
strategies were identified based on a robust literature review and brainstorming ses-
sions conducted with experts. These strategies were subsequently suggested to increase
adaptive capacity, aid system recovery and reduce OTOs vulnerability. The identified
strategies are summarised as follows (?Ronza et al., 2007; ?; Madni and Sievers, 2014;
Mansouri et al., 2010; Zhang and Lin, 2010; Aven, 2011; Berle et al., 2011; ?; Dinh et al.,
2012; Lavasani et al., 2012; Omer et al., 2012; John et al., 2014b):
• Implement policies that manage the consequences of threats
◦ Policy changes for a resilient system: Safety first, security checks and monitoring.
◦ Safe workplace and safe system of work: HSE (ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001).
Operate a hierarchical approach to risk. Provide information, instruction and
a plan to prepare for seamless transition. Encourage employees to report un-
safe activity and provide information on their duty of care, and responsibility
for their own safety and that of any other(s) who may be affected by their
acts or omission.
◦ Commitment: Objective and target will be set annually to promote and com-
municate throughout the organisation the need for quality, safety and en-
viron awareness. A fully integrated commitment management team should
be adopted, independently verifying that integral operation is in accordance
with requirements. There must be an absolute desire to reduce accident and
work-related hazards.
◦ State a clear code of responsibility: Operational responsibility should rest solely
and absolutely with the master. Personnel to operate valves and to ensure
safe and secure connection of all transfer apparatus to the ship manifold.
All operation should be conducted in the spirit of mutual agreement for the
completion of a safe and successful cargo-handling operation dependent upon
effective cooperation, coordination and communication between all the parties
involved.
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◦ Risk assessments audit: Revise and document where necessary a regularly in-
spected and tested automatic prevention system to ensure its proper opera-
tion. Ensure that the automatic prevention system follows Recognised And
Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP).
• Creating modularity in systems:
◦ Setting up a terminal operation group: Responsible for creating operating ex-
pense synergies by sharing of personnel and resources, reducing safety risks
due to a fully integrated, centrally coordinated operation, achieving capital
investment cost saving by maximising the use of shared facilities. Aiming to
reduce the overall investment on facilities (berths, tanks, etc.) in both capital
and operational cost yet fits best with the shared facilities concept. Estab-
lishing a centre of excellence focused on OTOs. Making sure that the neces-
sary resources, processes and support are available and employed effectively
to achieve the target. Developing detailed implementation plans and sched-
ules and where possible consolidating related recommendations into larger,
project implementation with the plan to implement them as resources become
available.
◦ Replacement/repairing of primary and secondary well failure systems
◦ Integral safety strategies: (a) Optimising transfer time: automatic path finding,
automatic movement execution, optimised resources management of asset
and people, (b) Marine time at berth: integrated order management, flexible
jetty planning, alignment with additional services, (c) Marine movement:
agile planning, comprehensive logistic movement, (d) Accuracy: precision
measurement, custody transfer proof data, and (e) Clear operational records:
integrated inventory management, track and trace in history.
• Providing redundancy in systems
◦ Sweep arm system: Brought alongside vessels by means of thruster propulsion,
with the aim of facilitating offshore loading and oﬄoading operations. Sweep
arm comprises a loading platform which will be positioned alongside mid-
ship manifolds, where the loading arm is winched towards the manifold. It is
credible, practical and safe.
◦ Proper allocation of resources to the various components of the system to en-
hance its operations.
◦ Investing in weather-tracking technology with higher reliability and accuracy of
operation.
◦ Special platform built for the transfer of equipment.
◦ Redundant-level monitoring system with independent high-level alarms that
would trigger automated shut off/diversion system and monitor the history
of incidents at the facilities, with or without consequence.
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• Robust enforcement and implementation of:
◦ International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT).
◦ Enforcement and implementation of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods
(IMDG) code.
◦ Oil Company International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
• Making Complex Marine Operations (CMOs) more cognitive:
◦ Prioritise training on complex terminal operation in order to increase knowledge,
experience and flexibility for duty operators.
◦ Staff training: Training of staff and simulations on the line of defence against
disasters. Regular training on working knowledge for situation awareness and
contingency procedures. Undergo a formal safety programme and/or safety
skill certification training.
◦ Strict operational protocol to ensure safe loading operations: Port standards
and communication between ship and shore are key and paramount and are
the difference between safety and disaster; following guidelines laid down by
the Oil Company International Marine Forum (OCIMF), there should be
key meetings between ship/shore interface so that everyone knows what they
should do, that mooring is correct and safe, and there is an insinuator on-
board ship for taking away hazardous vapours. Foreseeing problems before
they occur is based on expertise and experience, continuous monitoring and
improvement.
• Hazard management and plant monitoring:
◦ Check proofing systems: Checklist methodology for inspection of safety equip-
ment and installations at oil terminal platforms. This allows for systematic
verification of safety standards for each inspected installation and a sim-
ple identification of deficiencies. A relevant checklist includes: storage and
shipment, transhipment, sailing system and oil separator, fire and flood pro-
tection, hazard management and plant monitoring. The checklist should be
further tested by different regional inspectors, and new inspectors should be
trained in its application.
◦ Third safety systems: Organisational measures and monitoring. This includes
crisis management, aftercare management, operating data monitoring, capac-
ity of operating resistance, mechanical resistance and resistance of facilities,
mode of function of separators, internal emergency and danger prevention
plans, technical measures to limit maximum pressure and efficiency of the
safety equipment.
◦ Establish a hazard analysis and mechanical integrity management system ele-
ment to ensure that facilities are subject to RAGAGEP.
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◦ Terminal internal monitoring: Terminal operators and duty holders at every
change of shift should check the installation and joint proneness. Initiation
of constant monitoring during usage and revision, and a repair plan should
be used during maintenance work.
◦ Promote Plan Inspect Monitor and Manage (PIMMs) strategy for safety opti-
misation.
• Defence plan in case of disaster: Intervention teams that will operate under
procedures and guidelines.
◦ Berth emergency plan: Bring engine to standby. Inform all ships in the vicinity.
Stand by to disconnect hoses or loading arms. Where corrective action is
needed, terminal may not agree to operations or demand immediate cessa-
tion of operation until the situation is rectified. When safety is endangered,
operation may be required to be stopped.
◦ Facilities proneness: Installations, wagons and vessels connected to plugs, and
grounding systems against electrostatic energy.
◦ Emergency and intervention teams that will combat flooding, earthquakes, land-
slides, fires, etc., and operate under procedures and guidelines for intervention
in case of natural disasters.
◦ Emergency disconnect system (EDS): The activation of emergency release sys-
tem results to sweep arm pulling away from vessel, then bow mooring is
released and vessels leaves.
◦ Internal alarm and hazard control monitoring: Consideration of impact, mea-
sures to limit the effects of accidents, measures by operators upon accidents.
◦ Conduct a survey of randomly selected platforms and facilities at terminals in
high-risk locations (facility response plan) to determine the nature of possible
hazards due to uncertainty.
◦ Promote structural integrity.
• Handle the dynamic nature of the operation: Regular client interaction and
verification. Confirm, test and verify functionality.
◦ Work procedures: Specific instruction and work procedure should be communi-
cated by means of anti-explosion two-way radio transceivers. Communication
should be monitored by the berth operator and advisor of hazardous goods,
who can also allow time for additional safety measures to be implemented to
ensure no occurrence or recurrence of the incident in the future.
◦ Strict surveillance: Control plan to detect the basic responsibilities of terminal
operators and duty holders (head of shifts) ignorance of which can lead to an
accident or by an accident that has already occurred.
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◦ Overflowing signalisation: Overflow signal to trigger an automatic shutdown of
pumps, retention task equipped with tank park closing valves designed to
limit the area affected by accidental spills, and protection wall against floods
set up in certain areas.
◦ Visual signal: Monitoring sealing faces, lighting protection system, mobile detec-
tors, control system for measuring levels of vapour and constant monitoring.
◦ High integrity prevention system which can be separated physically, electroni-
cally and independently.
◦ Safety integrity: Having realistic, reliable equipment, operating procedures and
preventive maintenance, extent/rigour of operation monitoring, nature and
intensity of facility operations. Engineer, operate and maintain automatic
prevention system to achieve appropriate safety integrity level.
• Handle the dynamic nature of the operation: (1) Automatic movement con-
trol: automatic line up, avoid product contamination, lowest-cost operations, (2)
Product blending: blend property control, automatic line up of multiple streams,
(3) Additional service: line flushes, schedule and track additional service, and
(4) Process safety control: keep process within safety limit, automatic pre- and
post-processing.
◦ Selection of material: Expected mechanical stress, tight and resistant.
◦ Automation: Trans-loading technological installations such as automatic safety
device and automatic detachment provided to interrupt the flow of substances
in case of accident when loading and oﬄoading is in progress.
◦ Conduct a survey of randomly selected platforms and facilities at terminals in
high-risk locations (facility response plan) to determine the nature of possible
hazards due to uncertainty.
◦ Minimising the days lost due to Lost Time Accident (LTA).
◦ Additional safety measures to be implemented for breakdown of contractors
safety system.
6.3.2 Strategies to Enhance Resilience Measures
Resilience has its exclusive distinctiveness. It different to safety, reliability and robust-
ness (Zhang and Lin, 2010). The generic property of a resilient system is the recovery
of system failure after damage. Thus, one of the most important aspects of a resilience
strategy is the principles embedded within it. Zhang and Lin (2010) proposed five prin-
ciples to design a preferred decision alternative based on four axioms learned from a
biological system. Madni and Jackson (2009) proposed a conceptual framework for a
resilience vision. It is important to note that resilience comes at a cost, as with all inno-
vative engineering decision proposals. Thus, the rationale behind an enhanced resilience
measure for MADM problems is to allow decision makers to focus on applying the most
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preferred decision alternative on impacting system attributes. To this end, five general
principles that must be embedded in the alternative(s) as shown in Table 6.1.
• Principle I: A certain degree of functional redundancy. The more redundancy a system
has, the higher the degree of resilience.
• Principle II: A certain degree of functional learning and redundancy management.
• Principle III: An ability to monitor the system’s functions and performance, demands
and the utilisation of system capacity.
• Principle IV: Emergent response to system’s internal vulnerability and external mishap.
• Principle V: A physical entity to perform a new function for implementing changes in
both cognitive and physical domains.
The identified resilience strategies as referred in Subsection (6.3.1) where then grouped
into 6 alternatives, with all principles embedded in each alternative. The grouping of
each alternative was based on literatures and brainstorming session with six judges,
where a strategy which represent a principle was randomly chosen and allocated to an
alternative (see Fig 6.5, Fig 6.6 and Fig 6.7 for grouping consistency). The procedure
continued until all 6 alternatives was complete. Based on the numeric allocation of each
principle, each strategy was allocated an identical numeration as represented in all al-
ternatives. The output for the creation and grouping of all strategies and alternatives
can be deduced in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Resilience strategy selection based on five general resilience principles
Alternatives Strategies Strategic decision description
P1 Sweep arm system: Brought alongside vessels by
means of thruster propulsion, with the aim to
facilitate offshore loading and oﬄoading opera-
tions. Sweep arm comprises of a loading plat-
form which will be positioned alongside mid-
ship manifolds, where loading arm is winched
towards manifold. It is credible, practical and
safe.
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F1 Setting up a terminal operation group: Respon-
sible for creating operating expense synergies
by sharing of personnel and resources, reduc-
ing safety risks due to a fully integrated, cen-
trally coordinated operation, achieving capital
investment cost saving by maximising the use of
shared facilities. Aiming to reduce the overall
investment on facilities (berths, tanks etc.) in
both capital and operational cost yet fits best
with the shared facilities concept. Establishing
a centre of excellence focused on OTOs. Making
sure that the necessary resources, processes and
support are available and employed effectively to
achieve the target. Developing detailed imple-
mentation plans and schedules and where pos-
sible consolidate related recommendations into
larger, project implementation with the plan to
implement them as resources become available.
A1 D3 Robust enforcement and implementation: Inter-
national Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Ter-
minals (ISGOTT).
T4 Emergency and intervention teams: that will
combat flooding, earthquakes, landslides, fire
etc. and operate under procedure and guidelines
for intervention in case of natural disasters.
S5 Policy changes for a resilient system: Safety
first, security checks and monitoring.
K2 Proper allocation of resources to the various
components of the system to enhance its opera-
tions.
J2 Safety integrity: Having realistic reliability
equipment, operating procedures and preventive
maintenance, extent/rigor of operation monitor-
ing, nature and intensity of facility operations.
Engineer, operate and maintain automatic pre-
vention system to achieve appropriate safety in-
tegrity level.
A2 V3 Robust enforcement and implementation: In-
ternational Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG)
code.
Chapter 6. Strategic Decision Support for OTOs Resilience Strategy Selection 169
Q4 Conduct a survey of random selected platforms
and facilities at terminals in high-risk locations
(facility response plan) to determine the nature
of possible hazards due to uncertainty.
W5 Safe workplace and safe system of work: HS & E
(ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001). Operate a hier-
archical approach to risk. Provide information,
instruction, and a plan to prepare for seamless
transition. Encourage employees to report un-
safe activity and provide information on their
duty of care responsibility for their own safety
and that of any other who may be affected by
their acts or omission.
B3 Investing on weather tracking technology with
higher reliability and accuracy of operation.
E3 Integral safety strategies: (a) Optimising trans-
fer time; automatic path finding, automatic
movement execution, optimised resources man-
agement of asset and people, (b) Marine time
at berth; integrated order management, flex-
ible jetty planning, alignment with additional
services, (c) Marine movement; agile planning,
comprehensive logistic movement, (d) Accuracy;
precision measurement, custody transfer proof
data, and (e) Clear operational records; inte-
grated inventory management, track and trace
in history.
A3 L3 Robust enforcement and implementation: oil
company international marine forum (OCIMF)
R4 Emergency disconnect system (EDS): Activa-
tion of emergency release system, e.g. sweep
arm pulls away from vessel, bow mooring is re-
leased and vessels leaves
Chapter 6. Strategic Decision Support for OTOs Resilience Strategy Selection 170
U5 Commitment: Objective and target will be set
annually to promote and communicate through-
out the organisation the need for quality, safety
and environ awareness. A fully integrated com-
mitment management team should be adopted,
independently verifying integral operation is in
accordance with requirements. An absolute de-
sire to reduce accident and work-related haz-
ards.
C4 Redundant level monitoring system with inde-
pendent high level alarms: that would trigger
automated shut off/ diversion system and moni-
tor the history of incidents at the facilities, with
or without consequence.
G4 Check proofing systems: Checklist methodol-
ogy for inspection of safety equipment and in-
stallations at oil terminal platforms. This al-
lows for systematic verification of safety stan-
dards of each inspected installation and a simple
identification of deficiencies. Relevant checklist
includes; storage and shipment, transhipment,
sailing system and oil separator, fire and flood
protection, hazard management and plant mon-
itoring. Checklist should be further tested by
different regional inspectors, and training of new
inspectors.
A4 Y3 Work procedures: Specific instruction and work
procedure should be communicated by means of
anti-explosion two-way radio transceivers. Com-
munication should be monitored by the berth
operator and advisor of hazardous goods whom
can also allow time for additional safety mea-
sure to be implemented to ensure no occurrence
or recurrence of incident in the future.
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X4 Third safety systems: Organisational measures
and monitoring; crisis management, aftercare
management, operating data monitoring, ca-
pacity of operating resistance, mechanical resis-
tance and resistance of facilities, mode of func-
tion of separators, internal emergency and dan-
ger prevention plans, technical measures to limit
maximum pressure and efficiency of the safety
equipment.
Z5 State a clear code of responsibility: Responsi-
bility of operation should rest solely and abso-
lutely with the master. Personnel to operate
valves and to ensure safe and secure connec-
tion of all transfer apparatus to the ship mani-
fold. All operation should be conducted in the
spirit of mutual agreement for the completion of
a safe and successful cargo handling operation
dependent upon effective cooperation, coordina-
tion and communication between all the parties
involved.
H5 Special platform built for the transfer of equip-
ment.
O5 Prioritise training on complex terminal opera-
tion in order to increase knowledge, experience
and flexibility for duty operators.
A5 M3 Terminal internal monitoring: Terminal opera-
tors and duty holders at every change of shift
check the installation and joint proneness. Ini-
tiation of constant monitoring during usage and
revision and repair plan should be used during
maintenance work.
N4 Staff training: Training of staff and simulations
on the line of defence against disasters. Reg-
ular training on working knowledge for situa-
tion awareness and contingency procedures. Un-
dergo a formal safety programme and/or safety
skill certification training.
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I5 Risk assessments audit: Revise and document
where necessary regular inspected and tested
automatic prevention system to ensure there
proper operation. Ensure that automatic pre-
vention system follows RAGAGEP
i Additional safety measures to be implemented
for breakdown on contractors safety system.
ii Hazard management and plant monitoring: Es-
tablish hazard analysis and mechanical integrity
management system element to ensure that fa-
cilities are subject to Recognised and Gener-
ally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RA-
GAGEP).
A6 iii Strict surveillance: Control plan to detect the
basic responsibilities of terminal operators and
duty holders (head of shifts) which can lead to
accident or can be caused by an accident that
has already occurred.
iv Berth emergency plan: Bring engine to standby.
Inform all ships in the vicinity. Stand by to dis-
connect hoses or loading arms. Where correc-
tive action is needed, terminal may not agree
to operations or demand immediate cessation of
operation until the situation is rectified. When
safety is endangered operation may be required
to be stopped.
v Strict operational protocol to ensures safe load-
ing operations: Ports standards and com-
munication between ship and shore is key
and paramount and it is the difference be-
tween safety and not. Key meetings between
ship/shore interface knowing exactly what it
should do, proper mooring in a safe stan-
dard, and insinuator for taking away hazardous
vapours. Foresing problems before they occur
based on expertise and experience, continuous
monitoring and improvement.
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A1 (P1, F1, D3, T4, S5)
A2 (K2, J2, V3, Q4, W5)
A3 (B3, E3, L3, R4, U5)
A4 (C4, G4, Y3, X4, Z5)
A5 (H5, O5, M3, N4, IV)
A6 (i, ii, iii, vi, ix)
PIMMs approach 
for OTOs resilience 
strategy selection 
System functionality
 Cognitive functioning
Facility proneness 
 Systems modularity
 System redundancy
Communication
Policy implementation 
High integrity prevention 
system 
Structural integrity
Objective Attributes Alternatives
Automation
Figure 6.1: Hierarchical structure for Plan Inspect Monitor and Manage (PIMMs)
resilience investment strategy.
6.4 Modelling using Prospect Theory (PT)
PT has been demonstrated to be a robust tool for handling complex and real-life prob-
lems for decision-making processes in an uncertain environment. PT uses complex
mathematical algorithms for analysis, hence this chapter proposes a simplified strate-
gic decision-support system using a PT approach for resilience strategy selection. The
PT approach will also significantly optimise performance effectiveness on oil terminal
platforms when subjected to stochastic terminal behaviours operational constraints. In
addition, it is important to mention that the capability and efficiency of PT in handling
complex engineering solutions, its flexibility in computational analysis, and its ability
to simultaneously consider a positive or negative ideal solutions, as well as its system-
atic and logical results’ evaluation, necessitate the use of PT as a tool for resilience
strategy selection. For further information on PT, refer to section 2.6 and Tversky and
Kahneman (1979, 1992).
PT relies on subjects’ behaviour and it shows that preferences are non-liner. An
increase in the Probability Weighting Function (PWF) p1 to be gained from prospect
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x1 from 0.99 to 1.0 has more impact on a subject than an increase in PWF p2 to gain
from a prospect x2 from 0.10 to 0.11. More so, subjects are more sensitive to losses
from a given prospect than gains of the same magnitude. However, subjects tend to
be risk averse over moderate probability gains, i.e. they typically prefer a certain gain
on a prospect to a 50% chance of a better prospect, and are risk seeking over losses,
i.e. subjects tend to prefer a 50% chance of a negative prospect to a certain negative
prospect. Subject’ behavioural sensitivity on gains and losses is represented by the value
function (VF) v over a prospect x, thus v(x). This motivates concave up over a positive
prospect v(+x1) and concave down (convex shape) over a negative prospect v(−x1).
𝑣(+𝑥) 
Gain
Losses
0
VF
𝑣(−𝑥) 
𝑥 
-𝑥 
= −2𝑣(+𝑥) 
Figure 6.2: An S-shaped value function as adapted from Tversky and Kahneman
(1979)
Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1992) demonstrated the importance of the value
function (VF), which represents the reference point, to explain why subjects tend to be
risk seeking in the realm of loss. The reference point is created by different circumstances
(e.g. framing effect) and can be manipulated. It serves as a boundary that distinguishes
gains from losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), but from what point can a subject
estimate positive and negative prospects? The reference point is the subject’s neutral
point ”0” and it is based on psychology; it is the subject’s present decisions, wealth or
something else. Equivalent to risk aversion on gain and risk seeking on losses, Fig 6.2
shows a common S-shaped curve, concave above the reference point (v+(x) ≤ 0, x ≥ 0)
and convex with a steeper curve (a kink) on the negative prospect (losses) below the
reference point (v−(x) ≥ 0, x ≤ 0). Empirically, the difference between the negative
and the positive prospect is often a factor of 2, i.e. a steeper one means two losses
happen together. When a subject is offered a positive probability of not having a
negative prospect for certain, the subject makes a choice and accepts the decision. Thus,
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given the curve is steeper by a factor of 2 in Fig 6.2, the value of a negative prospect
v(−x) ∼= −2xvalue of a positive prospect of x(v+(x) < v−(−x)textforx ≥ 0), i.e. the
marginal value of a negative prospect is always halved by 2.
Following the outcomes as expressed in PT as positive or negative deviations from
a neutral reference point, if xi ≥ rp0 it denotes a gain and if xi < rp0 it denotes a loss.
The emphasis is on the VF and PWF specification by a number of authors (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, 1992; Gonza´lvez-Gallego et al., 2015;
Fan et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2014). The reflective form of the VF is given by:
v(x) =
{
f(si)
α ifxi ≥ rp0
−λ[−f(si)β ifxi < rp0
(6.4)
Where α and β measure the concavity and convexity of the value function for positive
(gains) and negative (losses) prospects respectively, and 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. λ is the coefficient
of loss aversion with much larger values of λ > 1.
The properties of the probability weighting function was defined by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) included that subjects tend to psychologically overweight small prob-
abilities (i.e. if a probability is small enough, subjects round it up to 0) and under-
weight large probabilities (i.e.) especially depending on the context as shown in Fig
46. Thus, the PWF observes nonlinear voilation near the endpoint 0 and 1 (where
[w(p1) +w(1− p2) < 1]) due to psycological weight. PT uses decision weight . The deci-
sion weight multiplies the value for a higher prospect outcome w(p) and 1− w(p) for a
lower prospect outcome. They are much as subjective probabilities inferred from choices
between prospects. However, they are not probabilities and as such they do not obey
the probability axioms (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but how does it corresponds to
objective probabilities?
P (objective probability)
w
(p
)
0 10.5
0.5
1
CE
Figure 6.3: Probability Weighting Function (PWF) adapted from Tversky and Kah-
neman (1979)
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If subjects are rational enough, the mapping from objective probability to decision
weight will be the 45 degree line. Given an overweighting phenomenon of a really small
probability, subjects psychologically round it up to 0. If a probability is small enough
yet significant and large enough that it cannot be ignored, subjects tend to overweight
it. We tend to overweight above the 45 degrees line and underweight below the 45
degree line. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that a hypothetical shape develops,
i.e. the overweighting at the beginning (0-0.5) has to be cancelled out to some degree
by underweighting (0.5 − 1.0). Technically, if we have to introduce a certainty effect
into a graph, by the time we get to the probability of 1.0, we have another discontinuity
towards the top because we are overweighting the probability of 1.
The additivity of decision weight means the probabilities have to add to 1(P1 +P2 =
1) i.e. if we have just two prospect outcomes, the probabilities of those outcomes have to
add up to 1. However, due to uncertainty about decision weights, we can no longer make
the assumption that, just because the probabilities add up to 1, the sum of the decision
weight on these probabilities must also add up to 1, i.e. w(P1) +w(P2) = 1. Therefore,
unless there is a very specific probability, decision weights are generally w(P1)+w(P2) <
1 and this is referred to as the sub-additivity of decision weight. It is important to keep
this point about decision weight in mind, because it becomes somewhat of a psychological
distinction which describes behaviours. For example, there are two different ways of
getting something wrong: 1) overweight: one could literary think that the chances of
being in a plane crash are larger than they are, or 2) underweight: one could also
objectively know the risk of being in a plane crash and just psychologically decide that
the probability is more important than it actually is. Thus, having a certainty effect on a
risk but psychologically deciding that the probability is more important than it actually
is. Either way (overweighting or underweighting) will definitely make the subject achieve
the goal but for different reason.
It is important to be clear that subjects aren’t actually overestimating the proba-
bilities of outcomes, they are just subjectively overweighting or underweighting them in
their decision-making processes. Subjects tend to sometimes overestimate probabilities
as well, i.e. not perceiving them in an objective way but rather in a subjective way, even
though the objective probabilities are known. It is important to note that subjects can
make these errors at the same time and this compounds the deviation irrationally. A
subject’s perception of probabilities changes over time and, as such, the respective PWS
for the gains and losses domains are:
w+(P ) =
(pxi)
r+
(pxi)r+ + (1− pxi)r+)
1
r+
(6.5)
w−(P ) =
(pxi)
r−
(pxi)r− + (1− pxi)r−)
1
r−
(6.6)
Decision weight measures the impact of events on the desirability of prospects, and
not merely the perceived likelihood of these events. The decision weight associated with
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an outcome can be interpreted as the marginal contribution of the respective event,
defined in terms of the capacities W+ and W− i.e. i.e. for a positive prospect outcome,
pi+i is the difference between the capacities of the events ”the outcome is at least as
good xi ” and ”the outcome is strictly better than xi”, whereas, for negative prospect
outcomes, pi−i is the difference between the capacities of the events ”the outcome is at
least as bad as xi and ”the outcome is strictly worse than xi. If each W is additive and
hence a probability measure, then pii is simply the probability of Ai. It follows readily
from the definitions of pi and W that, for both positive and negative prospects, the
decision weights add to 1. However, for mixed prospects, decision weights for gains and
losses are defined by separate capacities and, as such, the sum can be either smaller or
greater than 1.
The prospect value is calculated with the combination of the VF and PWF. Let S
be a finite set of states of nature; subsets of S are called events. It is assumed that
exactly one state obtains, which is unknown to the decision maker. Let X be a set
of consequences, also called outcomes. We assume that X includes a neutral outcome
denoted by 0, and we interpret all other elements of X as gains or losses, denoted
by x+i or x
−
i consequences, respectively. An uncertain prospect f is a function from
S into X that assigns to each state sεS, such that a consequence f(s) = x in X. A
prospect f is then represented as a sequence of pairs (xi, Ai) which yields xi if Ai occurs,
where xi > xj iff i > j, and Ai (probability) is a partition of S. We use positive and
negative subscripts to denote positive and negative outcomes, then 0 to index the neutral
outcome. A prospect is called strictly positive or positive, respectively, if its outcomes
are all positive or non-negative, and strictly negative and non-positive prospects are
defined similarly; all other prospects are called mixed. The positive part of f, denoted
f+, is obtained by letting f+(s) = f(s) iff f(s) > 0, and f+(s) = 0 iff f(s) ≤ 0. The
negative part of f, denoted f−, is defined similarly. We assign to each prospect f a
number V(f) such that f is preferred to or indifferent to fi iff V (f) ≥ V (fi). Therefore
the prospect U(R) is given as:
U(R) =
n∑
i=0
(pxi)v(xi) +
i=0∑
n
w−(pxi)v(xi) (6.7)
U(R) =
n∑
i=0
w∗(pxi)v(xi) (6.8)
u(xi) =
n∑
i=1
v[f(si)]w(pxi) (6.9)
PT outlines a framework and provides a menu of the different ways that subjects’
use mental heuristics or how they perceive prospects based on gains and losses to come
up with a unifying theory for decision making under risk
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6.5 PT Process
The resolve procedure of PT for a MADM problem in this study is based on the format
of a DMs attribute aspirations (Lotfi et al., 1992; Nowak, 2006; Brown et al., 2012; Fan
et al., 2013). It is assumed that DMS determine their level of aspiration for different
attributes that describe each alternative. Fan et al. (2013) presented a method to
solve MADM problems with three formats of attribute aspirations to obtain an overall
prospect value. This value helps to determine the ranking of an alternative from a set
of alternatives. In addition, the motivation for the use of attribute aspiration in a PT
process is that it plays an important role in the decision process. More so, it provides a
simple model that can be related to and used in a generic oil terminal platforms.
It is acknowledged that PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) needs a resilient con-
dition for gain-loss separability (Brown et al., 2012) because it has shown a systematic
violation in experimental studies Wu and Markle (2008). But Brown et al. (2012)
demonstrated that there is sufficient empirical evidence that suggests that attribute as-
piration provides a satisfactory approach resolution for gain-loss systematic violation.
Attribute aspirations are expressed in multiple formats by DMs, but formally in the
following ways: (1) ”would better not be over an nth term”, (2) ”would better be over
an nth term” and (3) ”would better be between kth and nth term” (Lotfi et al., 1992;
Kulak, 2005; Kulak and Kahraman, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Fan et al., 2013). On the other
hand, some practical examples have shown that the aspiration level of a DM could be
regarded as his/her reference point. A decision analyst is critical on the deviation of the
attribute value (gain-loss), where in some cases it is over/under the reference point or
indifferent within.
According to Fan et al. (2013), based on the objective or subjective measure of
achievement for each attribute that describe each alternative from a set of alternatives,
Let A = 1, 2, . . . , aandN = 1, 2, , n. Let M = M1,M2, . . . ,Ma be a finite alternative set,
where Mi denotes the i
th alternative, i ∈ A;C = C1, C2, . . . , Cn be a finite attribute set,
where Cj denotes the j
th attribute, j ∈ N . Let w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)T be an attribute
weight vector, where wj denotes the weight or the importance degree of attribute Cj ,
such that
∑n
j=1wj = 1and0 ≤ wj ≤ 1, j ∈ N . Let k = [kij ]a×n be a decision matrix,
where Kij is an attribute value, i.e., the consequence for alternative Mi with respect to
attribute Cj , i ∈ M, j ∈ N . We consider that Kij is a crisp value, and the attribute
aspirations provided by a DM are represented as following:
• Aspiration format I : The attribute value Kij would better not be over boj , where boj is
the aspiration level of attribute Cj provided by the DM, and it is a crisp number.
For example, when an oil company needs to select a piece of equipment based on
reliability, the DM wants the price of the equipment to be no more than £50,000.
• Aspiration format II : The attribute value Kij would better be over b∗j , whereb∗j is a
crisp number. For example, when selecting operation equipment, the DM wants
the quality of the equipment to be over 6 (0: the worst; 10: the best).
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• Aspiration format III : The attribute value Kij would better be in the range of
[bcj , b
f
j ], b
f
j > b
c
j , and any possible value in the range is equally acceptable to the
DM. For example, the DM requires the load capacity of the equipment to be in
the range of 2 to 2.5t.
where Kij ≥ 0, boj ≥ 0, b∗j ≥ 0andbcj ≥ 0.
According to different attributes corresponding with the above three attribute as-
piration formats, attribute set C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} can be divided into three sub-
sets: CI , CII and CIIICI
⋃
CII
⋃
CIII = C, where CI = {C1, C2, . . . , Cl1}, CII =
{Cl1+1 , Cl1+2 , . . . , Cl2}, and CIII = {Cl2 , Cl1+2 , . . . , Cn} are the attribute sets with
regard to aspiration formats I, II and III, respectively. Then, subscripts of these three
subsets can be denoted as N I = {1, 2, . . . , l1}, N II = {l1 + 1, l1 + 2, . . . , l2}, and N III =
{l2 + 1, l2 + 2, . . . , n} respectively. Obviously, N I
⋃
N II
⋃
N III = N,N I ∩ N II =
φ,N II ∩ N III = φ,N I ∩ N III = φ. If the psychological behaviour of the DM reflects
the aforementioned attribute aspiration formats, then the ranking of the most desirable
alternative(s) from the finite set M using decision matrix K and attribute weight vector
w can be determined. Thus, the processes involved for solving an MADM problem with
multiple formats of attribute aspirations was mostly done by manual calculations, and
are given as follows:
• Determine the decision weight of attributes by aggregation, according to experts’
preference judgements.
• Determine reference points according to DM’s attribute aspirations.
• Construct gainloss matrix.
• Construct prospect value matrix.
• Construct normalized matrix.
• Calculate the overall prospect value of each alternative.
• Determine the ranking of alternatives according to the obtained overall prospect val-
ues.
6.6 Application of PT for the selection of a strategic re-
silience alternative for OTOs
6.6.1 Step 1: Determine the Decision Weight Obtained by Aggrega-
tion, according to Experts’ Preference Judgements
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) has been an exciting research subject in many
different fields (logistics, finance, refineries, operations, transportation, marketing, etc.)
due to its wide range of application (OG˘UZTI˙MUR, 2011). Introduced by Saaty (1977,
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1980), AHP involves aggregation of various comparisons to obtain a rational vector
that reflects the decisions revealed by preference data provided by DMs judgements
on the different attributes. Additionally, it is suited for complex decisions that involve
comparison of decision elements (Kabir and Hasin, 2011; Ben´ıtez et al., 2012). The basis
of AHP as a tool for decision making is its ability to determine relative weights to rank
decision attributes in any application. Also, it helps to model subjective decision-making
processes based on multiple attributes in a hierarchical system. AHP provides pairwise
comparisons amongst attributes.
The process involved in AHP is based on a matrix of pairwise comparisons between
attributes (Cao et al., 2008). In summary, AHP has three main steps: (1) structuring
the hierarchy, (2) pairwise comparisons (determining the weights) and (3) decision phase
(selection of the best alternative among the others) (?Kabir and Hasin, 2011; John et al.,
2014b).
Let m be a decision point number assigned to a defined decision-making problem, and
n be a number assigned to attributes (denoted by a1, a2, . . . , an) that are affecting these
decision points. It is very important to correctly determine the number of attributes that
will affect the result in order to perform consistent and rational pairwise comparisons.
Forming a Comparison Matrix between attributes: For n × n pairwise comparison, a
dimensional square matrix between attributes formed. When i = j, the components on
the diagonal of the comparison matrix take a value of 1 value because related attributes
compare within themselves in such situations. The comparison matrix is shown below.
A =

a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,n
a1,1 a2,2 · · · a2,n
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
an,1 an,2 · · · an,n

(6.10)
When comparing attributes to each other, it is done on one-to-one and reciprocally
in accordance to their importance value. This comparison could be performed using the
importance scale as shown in Table 6.2.
If a DM deems i to be more important than j (i.e. i = 1,j = 3), then the comparison
matrix takes 3 as a value. Otherwise, the comparison takes a 1/3 value if the more
important option is used for j, such that i = 3, j = 1. In the same comparison for
i and j, if the attributes have equal importance, then the component will take 1 as a
value. Therefore, comparisons are performed when attribute are not equally important.
Suppose there are m DMs with equal weights, the components in the row and column
pairwise comparison matrix can be determined using the following formula for all values
of i and j :
aij =
1
aij
(6.11)
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Table 6.2: Importance Scale
Numbers (aij) Value Description
1 Equal i and j are equally important (E)
3 Moderately more important i is moderately more important than j (MI)
5 Strongly important i is strongly important than j (ST)
7 Very strongly more important i is strongly more important than j (SV)
9 Absolutely important i is absolutely important than j (AI)
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values Used when a comparison is needed (iNa, iNb, iNc, iNd )
Where aij is the relative importance by comparing attributes i and j (6.12)
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , nandj = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n
A = aij =

1 a1,2 · · · a1,n
1/a2,n 1 · · · a2,n
· · · · · ·
1/an,1 an,2 · · · 1
 (6.13)
Determine the percentage Importance Distributions of Attributes: This refers to the
weights of these attributes in total; a column vectors w with a set of numerical weight de-
noted by w1, w2, . . . , wn which constitute the comparison matrix and, a vector Wk which
constitute the weight matrix. It is noteworthy to mention that, in realistic situations,
wi/wj is usually not known. Therefore, the weight vector is given as:
Wk =

W1,1
W2,1
·
·
· · ·
Wn,1

(6.14)
In general, weights w1, w2, . . . , wn can be determined using the following equation
(Pillary and Wang, 2003):
Wk =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
akj∑n
i=1 aij
)(k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) (6.15)
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Where aij stands for the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of
order n.
Ensure consistency in attributes comparisons pairwise judgement : Naturally, the
authenticity of the results will depend on the consistency of the decision maker’s pairwise
comparisons between attributes. For consistency, aij = k implies that aij = 1/k. Thus,
AHP provides a process to measure the consistency of these pairwise comparisons by
computing a Consistency Ratio (CR). The essence of the CR calculation is such that, if
the value is more than 0.10, either there could be a calculation error or it indicates an
inconsistency in the pairwise comparisons of the DMs’ judgements; thus, the pairwise
judgements need to be reviewed. But, when the calculated CR value is 0.10 or less,
the pairwise comparisons made by the DMs are consistent and considered reasonable,
and the computation of the weight vectors holds. The CR is obtained according to the
following equations Eq. (6.16), Eq. (6.17) and Eq. (6.18)
CR =
CI
RI
(6.16)
CR =
λ−nmax
n− 1 (6.17)
λmax =
n∑
j=1
∑n
k=1 wkajk
wj
n
(6.18)
Where CI is the consistency index, RI represents the average random index as shown
in Table 6.5, ”n” is the matrix order, and λmax stands for maximum weight value of the
”(n×n)” comparison matrix A. For example, the RI value of three criteria comparisons
will be 0.58 as shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: RI Values for Comparisons
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49
6.6.2 Step 2: Determine the Reference Points according to DM’s At-
tribute Aspirations
As proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992), a DM is often apprehensive about
the deviations of attribute values from attribute aspirations. Therefore according to
prospect theory, a DM’s attribute aspirations can be regarded as reference points (Fan
et al., 2013) If rp0 denotes the reference point concerning attribute Cj , j ∈ N , then as
proposed by Fen et al. (2013) the following ways can be used to determine the reference
points for aspiration formats I, II and III, respectively (Fan et al., 2013).
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• Aspiration format I: For Cj ∈ CI , boj can be regarded as the reference point rp0, i.e.
rp0 = b
o
j , j ∈ N I . If Kij is over the reference point b∗j , such that Kij > boj , the
surplus can be deemed as the DM’s ’loss’; but if Kij underachieves, such that
Kij < b
o
j , the deficient can be deemed as the DM’s ’gain’.
• Aspiration format II: For Cj ∈ CII , b∗j can be regarded as the reference point rp0 ,
i.e., rp0 = b
∗
j , j ∈ N II . For this case, a slight difference can be observed from (1).
If Kij is over the reference point b
∗
j , i.e., Kij > b
∗
j , the surplus can be deemed as
the DM’s ’gain’; if Kij is under b
∗
j , i.e.,Kij < b
∗
j , the lacking part can be regarded
as the DM’s ’loss’
• Aspiration format III: For Cj ∈ CIII , [bcj , bfj ] can be regarded as the reference point
rp0, i.e., rp0 = [b
c
j , b
f
j ], j ∈ N III . For this case, if Kij is in the range of [bcj , bfj ], i.e.,
bfj ≤ Kij ≤ bcj , there is neither a ’gain’ nor a ’loss’ for the DM; if Kij is not in the
range of [bcj , b
f
j ], i.e., Kij < b
f
j or Kij > b
c
j , the deviation of Kij and [b
c
j , b
f
j ], can be
deemed as the DM’s ’loss’.
where:
Kij is the attribute value
boj , b
∗
j , and [b
c
j , b
f
j ]are the aspiration level for different conditions i.e.
”would better not be over”, ”would better be over” and ”would better be in the range of”
respectively
rp0 represents the reference point
In summary, the reference points for aspiration formats I, II and III are boj , j ∈
N I , b∗j , j ∈ N II and [bcj , bfj ], j ∈ N III respectively.
6.6.3 Step 3: Construct a Gain –Loss Matrix
To calculate the gain and loss matrix, we consider the aspiration formats I, II and III
respectively, which are described as follows (Fan et al., 2013):
1) Aspiration-format I: we know that rp0 = b
o
j , j ∈ N I , but if Kij > boj , i.e., the conse-
quence for alternative Mi concerning attribute Cj fails to meet the DM’s aspiration,
then the DM will be unsatisfied; if Kij < b
o
j , i.e., the consequence for alternative
Mi concerning attribute Cj exceeds the DM’s aspiration, then the DM will be sat-
isfied. The deviation of Kij from b
o
j can be regarded as the DM’s gain/loss. Thus,
a gain-loss function is created for aspiration format I, represented as,
S(k) = boj − k, j ∈ N I (6.19)
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where:
k denotes a variable about the attribute value
boj denotes the reference point,
S(k) denotes the gain or loss
i.e., for alternative Mi the DM’s gain/loss concerning attribute Cj is given using Eq.
(6.19), as shown in Eq. (6.20):
Sij = b
o
j − kij , i ∈ A, j ∈ N I (6.20)
Therefore, if Kij > b
o
j , Sij can be deemed as the DM’s loss; if Kij < b
o
j , Sij can be
deemed as the DM’s gain.
2) Aspiration-format II: we know rp0 = b
∗
j , j ∈ N II ; If Kij > b∗j , the DM will be
satisfied; if Kij < b
∗
j , the DM will be unsatisfied. Thus, a gain-loss function is
created for aspiration format II, represented as,
Sk = k − b∗j , j ∈ N II (6.21)
i.e., for alternative Mi the DM’s gain/loss concerning attribute Cj is given using
Eq.(6.21), as shown in (6.22):
Sij = kij − b∗j , i ∈ A, j ∈ N II (6.22)
Therefore, if Kij > b
∗
j , Sij can be deemed as the DM’s gain; if Kij < b
∗
j , Sij can be
deemed as the DM’s loss.
3) Aspiration format III: Since rp0 is an interval number, i.e., rp0 = [b
c
j , b
f
j ], j ∈ N III ,
there are three possible position relationships between Kij and rp0 , i.e., (1) Kij < b
f
j
, (2) bfj ≤ Kij ≤ bcj , and (3) Kij > bcj . The gain-loss functions for the three positional
forms are created for aspiration format III.
I. For the first possible position, let y be an arbitrary value in interval [bcj , b
f
j ], and
k be a variable about attribute value, then the perceived difference between k
and y can be expressed by:
d(ky) = d(k, bfj ) + d(b
f
j , y), i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.23)
Where d(k, bfj ) is the perceived difference between k and b
f
j , and d(b
f
j , y) is
that between bfj and y. While d(b
f
j , y) = 0, d(k, b
f
j ) can be expressed by the
deviation of k from bfj , i.e.:
d(k, bfj ) = γj(k − bfj ), i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.24)
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d(ky) = γj(k − bfj ), i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.25)
where γj is the parameter reflecting the sensitivity of the DM to the deviation,
γj > 0. If 0 < γ < 1 , it means that the perceived difference between k and b
f
j
is smaller than the absolute equivalent deviation between them, but if γj > 1 it
means that the perceived difference is greater than the absolute equivalent de-
viation. Therefore Eq.(6.24) can be changed to Eq.(6.25). Apparently, d(k, y)
is also the perceived difference between k and [bcj , b
f
j ] because of the randomness
of y i.e. d(k, rp0) = γj(k − bfj ). Therefore, the gain-loss function for the first
possible position is:
S(k) = γj(k − bfj ), i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.26)
II. For the second possible position, i.e. bfj ≤ Kij ≤ bcj there is no perceived
difference between k and rp0 to the DM because k is in the range of [b
c
j , b
f
j ].
Therefore, the gain-loss function for the second possible position is:
S(k) = 0, i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.27)
III. For the third possible position, i.e. Kij > b
c
j , the gain-loss function can be
built, i.e.
S(k) = ηj(b
c
j − k), i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.28)
Where ηj is the parameter reflecting the sensitivity of the DM to the deviation
between k and bcj , ηj > 0. If 0 < ηj < 1, it means that the perceived difference
between k and bcj is smaller than the absolute equivalent deviation between
them, but if ηj > 1, it means that the perceived difference is greater than the
absolute equivalent deviation. In summary, the gain-loss function is created
for aspiration format III, and is expressed by:
s(k) =

γj(kij − bfj ) k < bfj
0, bfj ≤ k ≤ bcj , i ∈ A, j ∈ N III
η(bcj − kij) k > bcj
(6.29)
Obviously, the DM’s gain/loss for alternative Mi concerning attribute Cj is given
using Eq. (6.29)
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sij =

γj(kij − bfj ) k < bfj
0, bfj ≤ kij ≤ bcj , i ∈ A, j ∈ N III
η(bcj − kij) kij > bcj
(6.30)
Hence, if Kij < b
f
j or Kij > b
c
j , then Sij can be deemed to be the DM’s loss; if
bfj ≤ Kij ≤ bcj , then Sij = 0, the DM is indifferent.
The concept in Eqs.(6.29) and (6.30) suggest that parameters γj and ηj reflect the
DM’s attitudes for the deficient (γj > ηj) and surplus (γj > ηj) parts, relative to the
reference point, respectively; for the former, the DM is more sensitive to a deficiency
than a surplus if γj > ηj , and for the later, the DM is more sensitive to a surplus than
a deficiency if γj > ηj .
Therefore, to construct the gain-loss matrix for all alternatives concerning attributes
(Cj , j ∈ N), a combination of Eqs. (6.20), (6.22) and (6.30) can be utilized:
Mgl = [Sij ]a×n (6.31)
6.6.4 Construct Prospect Value Matrix
In practical MADM problems, DMs have different psychological views of gains and losses
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999;
Fan et al., 2013). As such, according to prospect theory each alternative’s gain/loss
is transformed into a prospect value. The prospect value of alternative Mi concerning
attribute Cj is given in Eq. (6.32):
Vij =
{
f(sij)
α if sij ≥ rp0
−λ[−f(sij ]β if sij < rp0
i ∈ A, j ∈ N III (6.32)
Where α and β measure the concavity and convexity of the value function for positive
(gains) and negative (losses) prospects respectively,0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1 . λ is the coefficient of
loss aversion, λ > 1. Based on the experimental data given by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), the the coefficients of α, β and λ are α = β = 0.88 and λ = 2.25, a prospect
value matrix (Mv) can be constructed using Eq. (6.33).
Mv = [Vij ]a×n (6.33)
6.6.5 Step 5: Construct Normalised Matrix
Since prospect values concerning different attributes are generally vague, the prospect
value matrix (Mv) needs to be normalized (n
∗) in order to transform the prospect values
into the comparable values. This is achieved by normalising every element in matrix Mv
into a corresponding element M∗v as shown in Eq. (6.34). Such that:
Chapter 6. Strategic Decision Support for OTOs Resilience Strategy Selection 187
n∗ = M∗v = [V
∗
ij ]
{
Vij)
∗ = vijvmaxj , i ∈ A, j ∈ N
III (6.34)
where V maxj denotes maxi∈A{|Vij|}, j ∈ N .
6.6.6 Step 6: Calculate the Overall Prospect Value of each Alternative
Then, using the simple additive weighting method (Tzeng and Huang, 2011) the overall
prospect value of alternative Mi, can be calculated using Eq. (6.35):
U(R) =
n∑
j=1
[f(V ∗ij)]w(pij), i ∈ A (6.35)
6.6.7 Step 7: Determine the Ranking of Alternatives according to the
Obtained Overall Prospect Values
Based on the results and according to Fan et al. (2013), considering the obtained overall
prospect values of all alternatives, the greater the U(R) from the set of alternatives, the
better an alternative Mi will be. Therefore, in an ascending or descending order of the
overall prospect values of all alternatives, we can select the desirable alternative(s) from
the alternative set M.
6.7 Empirical Study
As discussed in section 6.3, a survey was conducted to facilitate a general understanding
and knowledge of the significance of the developed resilience strategic decision to investi-
gate the relationships between alternatives and attributes and whether alternatives have
a positive or negative prospect effect on attributes. This study was conducted in four
phases: (1) questionnaire formulation and pilot study, (2) choosing the right experts (3)
survey data collection and description, and (4) case study. We discuss each of the phases
below.
6.7.1 Questionnaire formulation and Pilot Study
Prior to actual data collection and, to eliminate content ambiguity in the questions, a
pilot study was instigated to validate the questionnaire. First, a draft version of the
questionnaire and cover letter was developed. The questionnaire was examined by an
academician and five specialists to comment on the appropriateness of the questions
and whether any were unclear. Based on their feedback, the questionnaire was re-
drafted for the pilot study. The pilot study was conducted by asking randomly selected
”judges” drawn from the maritime domain and an oil terminal focus group to pre-asses
the questionnaire’s effectiveness, accuracy and unambiguous communication with tar-
geted respondents. A total of six ”judges” were selected. The questions were measured
Chapter 6. Strategic Decision Support for OTOs Resilience Strategy Selection 188
on a four-point Likert-type scale with response options ranging from 1 (unsatisfied and
negative prospect) to 4 (satisfied and positive prospect). The ratio of judges’ correct
agreement was considered good and the discriminant validity feedback from the pilot
study was eliminated. Ethical approval was also obtained to further validate question-
naire contents and participant consent. The questionnaire as represented at the end of
the pilot study was used for data collection (see Apendix 6C for final questionnaire).
6.7.2 Choosing the Right Experts (DMs) for OTOs
A cross-section of experts or decision makers (DMs) was considered to participate in
the survey. Consultants and experts with relative (onshore/offshore oil fields) and vast
(academic, maritime domain, oil and gas refineries) experience related to this research
were selected at random. Experts service times and academic qualifications were used
as thresholds (John et al., 2014b).For more information, see Chapter 3.
6.7.3 Survey Data Collection and Description
The questionnaire was web-based and a link was e-mailed to targeted expert partici-
pants. A cover letter was offered to respondents prior to the main question page (see
Appendix 6C). After a follow-up process, data were collected via the internet, using
eSurvey. 25 respondent participated in the survey out of which 9 were completed, 10
were uncompleted and 6 with no response. Out of the 9 respondent, 5 were part of
the senior management team while the remaining 4 were below the criteria as stated
by the research sampling frame (see Subsection 3.3.1). In all, five valid responses were
obtained, yielding a final response rate of around 20%. This response rate is comparable
to other studies conducted in the literature (Mokhtari et al., 2012; Hammitt and Zhang,
2013; Alyami et al., 2014; John et al., 2016). The following are the background of the
five experts assigned to participate in the survey:
• A Senior operation manager who has been involved with oil terminal operational
services for more than 20 years.
• A Junior marine operation manager who has been involved with (off) loading opera-
tions on offshore/onshore oil terminal platforms for more than 12 years.
• A Consultant on oil terminal operational risk assessment, with a vast amount of
experience in marine operation, who has been involved in port management and
applicability of modelling tools for OTOs for more than 20 years.
• A Senior maritime safety engineer with a PhD who has been involved with QHSE on
offshore oil installation and port safety for more than 20 years.
• A Doctor of maritime technology who has been involved in the marine industry for
more than 20 years, having both academic and onshore/offshore industrial expe-
rience in the field of oil terminal management and marine operations.
Chapter 6. Strategic Decision Support for OTOs Resilience Strategy Selection 189
When these experts made their judgements, they assigned values to each question.
Table 6.4 shows the evaluation for each question.
As shown in Fig ?? the empirical study revealed that the attributes proposed for
OTOs resilience strategy for decision making have over a 50% positive influence and
will have a significant impact on achieving system resilience. More so, the arithmetic
mean for all alternatives spans across unsatisfied but positive prospect to satisfied and
positive prospect, as seen in Fig 6.5, Fig 6.6 and Fig 6.7 based on Table 6.4 and Table 6.5.
Therefore, the evaluation of the attribute and alternative prospects reveal the industry
experts level of acceptance, general understanding and knowledge of the significance of
these proposed resilience strategies.
According to the experts judgement, all the attributes will significantly improve
OTOs resilience when combined with the alternative(s) for positive prospects; therefore,
selecting the best alternative(s) for OTOs resilience optimisation is key.
Figure 6.4: Consistency of prospect attributes for OTOs based on expert judgements
6.8 Case Study
The case study was conducted at the BAP offshore and onshore oil terminal group of
companies, in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. It is a large terminal platform built with state-of-
the-art engineering facilities and has been in operation since 1998. BAP is responsible
for the supply of crude oil, refined crude, oil exploration, maintenance and modification
work. The personnel working on the terminal platform are proud of the facilities and
feel a strong ownership of their working environment. The BAP oil terminal has a good
reputation with regard to safety.
Although BAPs statistics on occupational accidents are low compared to other in-
dustries, the frequency of unexpected events, such as near miss/incidents/accidents, has
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Table 6.4: Consistency of prospects based on empirical study for resilience strategy
selection
Alternatives Prospects Arithmetic
mean
Attributes Arithmetic
mean
A1 P1
F1
D3
T4
S5
5.00
3.80
4.20
3.00
4.20
Policy implementations
Communication
82.6%
78.8%
A2 k2
J2
V3
Q4
W5
4.60
4.60
5.00
5.00
4.20
Automation
System functionality
74%
86%
A3 B3
E3
L3
R4
U5
5.00
4.60
3.80
3.60
5.00
Cognitive functioning
Structural integrity
75%
73%
A4 C4
G4
Y3
X4
Z5
4.00
4.20
4.00
4.60
5.00
Facility proneness
System modularity
81.2%
53.4%
A5 H5
O5
M3
N4
I5
4.20
5.00
4.20
5.00
5.00
System redundancy
High integrity prevention
system
68%
73.2%
A6 i
ii
iii
vi
ix
4.20
4.30
3.80
3.40
4.20
Table 6.5: Alternatives linguistic terms assessment for OTOs
Prospect linguistic terms Values
Satisfied and positive prospect 4.5− 5
Satisfied but negative prospect 3.5− 4.49
Unsatisfied but positive prospect 2.4− 3.49
Unsatisfied and negative prospect 0− 2.39
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Figure 6.5: Experts judgements on the consistency of A1 and A2 prospect alternatives
for OTOs strategic decision.
Figure 6.6: Experts judgements on the consistency of A3 and A4 prospect alternatives
for OTOs strategic decision.
increased during the last year. There may be a number of reasons for this. The manage-
ment of BAP by mutual reflection upon how to strengthen certain operational qualities
that could make all oil terminal platforms more resilient. Their approach was to choose
a recommended alternative for resilience optimisation. Five expert were invited to form
a committee, and the committee was tasked with developing a list of alternatives and to
determine the attributes. After thorough investigation, the committee presented six al-
ternatives (A1, A2, . . . , A6). The committee also finalised the attributes after a thorough
evaluation. Ten attributes were considered, which were:
• RS1: Policy implementation
• RS2: Communication
• RS3: Automation.
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Figure 6.7: Experts judgements on the consistency of A5 and A6 prospect alternatives
for OTOs strategic decision.
• RS4: System functionality
• RS5: Cognitive functioning
• RS6: Structural integrity
• RS7: Facilities proneness
• RS8: System modularity
• RS9: System redundancy
• RS10: High integrity prevention system
The data concerning the 10 attributes were obtained from the committees evaluation
using a qualitative and quantitative data collection method. According to historical data
from a resilience engineering perspective, BAP provided the objective for each attribute,
i.e. this was based on the committee that had been set up and attribute aspirations
were proposed as shown in Table 6.6. The decision matrix for the five participants is
presented in Table 6.7; for the overall obtained results to be used for the computation of
the decision matrix for all attributes and alternatives, see Appendix 6B. A PT process
was used to select the anticipated strategic alternative for BAPs offshore and onshore
OTOs resilience optimisation.
6.9 Results Analysis
Step 1: A rational pairwise comparison was conducted for all attributes in order to
determine the weights. Fig 6.8 shows the aggregated numerical values of all five experts,
and was developed using a comparison matrix, and calculated manually (see Appendix
6A).
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Table 6.6: The DM’s attribute aspirations
Attributes Aspirations
RS1 Policy implementation would better be over 63%
RS2 Communication would better not be under 64%
RS3 Automation would better be over 60%
RS4 System functionality would better be over 70%
RS5 Cognitive functioning would better be over 60%
RS6 Structural integrity would better be over 60%
RS7 Facilities proneness rate would better be in the range of [1, . . . , 10]%
RS8 System modularity would better be in the range of [21, . . . , 30]%
RS9 System redundancy would better be in the range of [21, . . . , 30]%
RS10 High integrity prevention system would better not be over 65%
Table 6.7: DMs assessment of an attribute with respect to alternatives
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
52 75 87 50 63 63 expr 1
44 81 14 80 6 24 expr 2
Policy implementation 75 75 82 75 86 74 expr 3
80 44 80 68 46 64 expr 4
32 11 47 56 80 47 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
56.6 57.2 62 65.8 56.2 47.8
For RS1 pairwise comparison with RS2 for all experts, the Geomean is thus calcu-
lated based on experts judgements (see Appendix 6C ), the following values were ob-
tained for the pairwise comparison: expr expr 1 = 12 , expr 2 = 1, expr 3 = 3, expr 4 =
1
2 , expr 5 = 1
Geomean = 5
√
1
2 × 1× 3× 12 × 1 = 0.9440875
Fig 6.9 was determined using equation 6.13, where the weights (i.e. w1, w2, . . . , w10)
were calculated using Fig 6.8.
For RS2, the sum of the column as seen in the weight matrix (6.12) is determined in
Fig 6.9, where wn,2 = 9.9093. Thus
0.9440875
9.9093 = 0.0953
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Figure 6.8: Results for the pairwise comparisons
Figure 6.9: Percentage importance distribution of attributes for all experts
The weight w1( for RS1)is = (
1.0000
8.4608 +
0.9440875
9.9093 +, . . . , . . . ,
1.0844718
9.0343 ) = 0.1192. This
procedure is repeated for w2, . . . , w10. Table 6.9 represents the weight ofRS1, RS2, . . . , . . . , RS10
relative to their importance value.
To ensure the consistency in all attributes pairwise comparisons, a multiplicative
computation of attribute weight with each numerical value rating in the columns in Fig
6.9 was performed. Fig 6.10 and Table 6.9 describes the process for obtaining numerical
value and the results obtained, respectively.
Figure 6.10: Multiplicative computation of Attributes weights to determine the con-
sistency ratio
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Table 6.8: The weights of all attributes
No Attribute Weights
1 Policy implementation 0.1192
2 Communication 0.1022
3 Automation 0.0939
4 System functionality 0.1349
5 Cognitive functioning 0.0905
6 Facilities proneness 0.1285
7 Structural Integrity 0.1039
8 System modularity 0.0463
9 System redundancy 0.0691
10 High integrity prevention system 0.1116
Table 6.9: Results of multiplicative computation
Attributes Total
RS1 0.1192 0.0965 0.1295 0.1349 0.1295 0.1119 0.1064 0.1218 0.1336 0.1210 0.1986
RS2 0.1263 0.1022 0.1079 0.0821 0.1040 0.1032 0.0854 0.0978 0.1072 0.1116 0.0275
RS3 0.0903 0.0890 0.0939 0.0943 0.1040 0.0974 0.0926 0.1089 0.0934 0.0789 0.9435
RS4 0.1192 0.1680 0.1344 0.1349 0.1194 0.1213 0.1353 0.1281 0.1567 0.1390 0.3563
RS5 0.0833 0.0890 0.0817 0.1022 0.0905 0.0738 0.0981 0.0895 0.1047 0.0972 0.9100
RS6 0.1369 0.1273 0.1239 0.1429 0.1576 0.1285 0.1193 0.1089 0.1232 0.1236 0.2921
RS7 0.1164 0.1243 0.1054 0.1036 0.0959 0.1119 0.1039 0.1004 0.0861 0.0972 0.0450
RS8 0.0453 0.0484 0.0399 0.0488 0.0468 0.0546 0.0479 0.0463 0.0483 0.0395 0.4658
RS9 0.0617 0.0659 0.0695 0.0595 0.0597 0.0721 0.0834 0.0663 0.0691 0.0877 0.6948
RS10 0.1099 0.1022 0.1312 0.1083 0.1040 0.1160 0.1193 0.1308 0.0879 0.1116 0.1213
CR is defined in Eq.(6.16) but when calculating the CR value, the consistency index
(CI ) has to be determined. Eq. (6.17) is used to calculate the value for CI as follows:
CI =
λ−n
n− 1 (6.36)
where λmax stands for maximum weight value and is given as:
λmax =
∑n
j=1
∑n
k=1 wkajk
wj
n
(6.37)
This implies that, using Table 6.9, λmax for RS1 =
1.1986
0.1192 = 10.0554
Thus , λmax =
10.0554+10.0538+10.0479+10.0541+10.0552+10.0553+10.0577+10.0605+10.0549+10.0474
10
λmax = 10.0542 Therefore, CI =
10.0542−10
10−1 = 0.0060
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Table 6.10: The weights of all attributes
No Attribute λmax values
1 RS1 10.0554
2 RS2 10.0538
3 RS3 10.0479
4 RS4 10.0541
5 RS5 10.0552
6 RS6 10.0553
7 RS7 10.0577
8 RS8 10.0605
9 RS9 10.0549
10 RS10 10.0474
The CR value will then be calculated using Eq. (6.16) and Table 6.5. The RI
value represents the average random index as shown in Table 6.5. Since there is 10
attributes, the RI value will be 1.49; thus, the estimation of the CR value is shown
below: CR = CIRI =
0.0060
1.49 = 0.004
Step 2: According to prospect theory, the DMs’ attribute aspirations can be used
to determine reference points; thus, Table 6.6 provides the reference points, i.e. rp1 =
63, rp2 = 64, rp3 = 60, rp4 = 70, rp5 = 60, rp6 = 60, rp7 = [1, ..10], rp8 = [21, . . . , 30], rp9 =
[21, . . . , 30] and rp10 = 65 . These reference points are based on BAP’s given objective.
The decision data for all five expert participants are shown in the decision matrix, Table
6.11.
Table 6.11: The Decision Matrix
Attributes
Alternatives RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
A1 56.6 68.6 69.6 82.6 65.2 71.6 8.00 18.0 28.0 60.2
A2 57.2 60.8 67.6 68.2 63.4 59.8 3.00 38.0 18.0 66.0
A3 62.0 83.6 66.2 78.4 74.4 80.2 13.0 57.0 23.0 64.4
A4 65.8 78.8 62.2 60.4 60.4 64.0 18.0 13.0 13.0 65.8
A5 56.2 42.4 44.2 73.4 54.4 72.0 23.0 23.0 39.0 58.2
A6 47.8 57.6 56.8 83.4 54.4 50.2 8.00 3.00 28.0 65.2
Step 3: Using Eqs. (6.20), (6.22) and (6.30) and as shown in Fig 6.1, according to
Fan et al. (2013) the gain-loss matrix was calculated manually, and can be constructed
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Table 6.12: The Gain-Loss Matrix
Mgl =

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6


−6.4 4 9.6 12.6 5.2 11.6 0 −9.6 0 −4.8
−5.8 −3.2 7.6 −1.8 3.4 −0.2 0 −12 −9.6 1
−1 19.6 6.2 8.4 14.4 20.2 −4.5 −40.5 0 −0.6
2.8 14.8 2.2 −9.6 0.4 4 −12 −13.6 −13.6 0.8
−6.8 −21.6 −15.8 3.4 −5.6 12 −19.5 0 −13.5 −6.8
−15.2 −6.4 −3.2 13.4 −5.6 −9.6 0 −21.6 0 0.2

Table 6.13: Prospect Value Matrix
Mv =

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6


−11.5 3.39 7.32 9.29 4.27 8.64 0 −16.47 0 −8.95
−10.57 −6.26 5.96 −3.77 2.94 −0.55 0 −20.04 −16.47 1
−2.25 13.71 4.98 6.51 10.46 14.08 −8.45 −58.44 0 −1.44
2.47 10.71 2 −16.47 0.45 3.39 −20.04 −22.37 −22.37 0.82
−12.16 −33.61 −25.53 2.94 −10.25 8.91 −30.72 0 −22.37 −12.16
−24.67 −11.52 −6.26 9.81 −10.25 −16.77 0 −33.61 0 0.24

using Eq. (6.31), as shown in Table 6.12.
for RS1 ∈ A1, . . . , A6, using the equation Sij = boj − Kij where Kij = 56.6, boj =
rp1 = 63
therefore, Sij = 56.6− 63 = −6.4
Where for attributes RS7, RS8, RS9, we take j = 0.8andj = 1.5 in Eq. (6.30) ( Fan et
al., 2013), thus for RS7 ∈ A1, . . . , A6, using Eq. (6.30) where bcj = 10,Kij = 18. This
implies that Kij > b
c
j and, as such, Eq. (6.28) applies.
therefore, 1.5(10− 18) = −12
Step 4: To construct the prospect value matrix (Mv), we take the coefficients,
α, β and γ based on the estimate given by Tversky and Kahnemans (1992) experimental
data, i.e. α = β = 0.88 and λ = 2.25. Then, using Table 6.12 and by applying Eq.
(6.32), Mv can be constructed as shown in Table 6.13, i.e., done by manual calculation:
for RS1 ∈ A1, using the equation −λ[−f(Sij)]β, if Sij < 0, Sij = −6.4,
therefore, Vij = −2.25[−6.4]0.88 = −11.52
for RS1 ∈ A4 , if Sij ≥ 0 such that Sij = 2.8, the Eq. f(Sij)α applies:
therefore, Vij = [2.8]
0.88 = 2.47
Step 5: The normalised values (n∗) for Table 6.13 can be constructed using Eq.
(6.34). This can be determined as shown in Table 6.14, and as follows:
for RS3 ∈ A1, . . . , A6, using the equation V ∗ij = VijVmaxj , where V
max
j = 25.53, Vij = 7.32
therefore, V ∗ij =
7.32
25.53 = 0.29
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Table 6.14: Normalised Matrix
n∗ =

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6


−0.47 0.1 0.29 0.56 0.41 0.52 0 −0.28 0 −0.74
−0.43 −0.19 0.23 −0.23 0.28 −0.03 0 −0.34 −0.74 0.08
−0.09 0.41 0.19 0.4 1 0.84 −0.28 −1 0 −0.12
0.1 0.32 0.08 −1 0.04 0.2 −0.65 −0.38 −1 0.07
−0.49 −1 −1 0.18 −0.98 0.53 −1 0 −0.99 −1
−1 0.34 −0.19 0.59 −0.98 −1 0 −0.58 0 0.02

Table 6.15: Overall Prospect Value using the Simple Additive Weighting Method
U(R) =

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
Weight


−0.47 0.1 0.29 0.56 0.41 0.52 0 −0.28 0 −0.74
−0.43 −0.19 0.23 −0.23 0.28 −0.03 0 −0.34 −0.74 0.08
−0.09 0.41 0.19 0.4 1 0.84 −0.28 −1 0 −0.12
0.1 0.32 0.08 −1 0.04 0.2 −0.65 −0.38 −1 0.07
−0.49 −1 −1 0.18 −0.98 0.53 −1 0 −0.99 −1
−1 0.34 −0.19 0.59 −0.98 −1 0 −0.58 0 0.02
0.1192 0.1022 0.0939 0.1349 0.0905 0.1285 0.1039 0.0463 0.0691 0.1116

Step 6: The overall prospect value [U(R)] can be obtained by manual calculation,
using Eq. (6.35), i.e. as shown in Table 6.15
U(R) = A1 = −0.47× 0.1192 + 0.1× 0.1022 + 0.29× 0.0939 + 0.56× 0.1349 + 0.41× 0.0905+
0.52× 0.1285 + 0× 0.1039− 0.28× 0.0463 + 00.0691− 0.74× 0.1116 = 0.0653
Table 6.16: Overall Prospect Value results and Ranking Order of resilience
Alternatives Prospect Values [U(R)] Ranking
A1 0.0653 2
A2 -0.1166 3
A3 0.2126 1
A4 -0.1999 4
A5 -0.3979 6
A6 -0.2645 5
Step 7: The ranking of the six alternatives as shown in Table 6.16 for a strategic deci-
sion making for resilience improvement is in the order A3 > A1 > A2 > A4 > A6 > A5.
Evidently, the result revealed that A1, and A2 produce different values, which corre-
sponds to a better resilience strategy compared to A4, A5 and A6. It is noteworthy
to mention that A3 is regarded as the best strategy for resilience improvement com-
pared to the remaining alternatives. As outlined in the proposed resilience conceptual
framework, A3, A1 and A2 seem reasonable and appropriate for investment by the oil
terminal under investigation to improve OTOs resilience in order to monitor, control
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and mitigate incident/hazards or risk. These strategies have overall prospect values of
0.2121, 0.0653 and − 0.1166 respectively. Therefore, the proposed method contributes
to using PT as a proposed additional safety choice in method for resilience optimisation
of oil terminal infrastructures.
6.10 Discussion and Conclusion
6.10.1 Discussion
Choosing the right alternative for improvement to a resilience strategy seems to be
an important paradigm in mitigating CMO failures due to man-, machine-, nature-,
coordination- and correspondence-related hazards. Such failures can have a catastrophic
impact on onshore/offshore oil terminal platforms if the right resilience investment strat-
egy is not adopted. An empirical study was conducted to investigate all six identified
alternative strategies (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6) in relation to 10 attributes (policy im-
plementation, communication, automation, system functionality, cognitive functioning,
structural integrity, facility proneness, modularity of system, system redundancy and
high integrity prevention system) in the real world. A PT-based methodology was
employed to choose the right alternative strategy. The advantage of the proposed PT
model is that it enables aggregation of both qualitative and quantitative data. The AHP
method was used to investigate the weight values of all attributes considered for all the
alternatives. The mechanism of the PT model was used to analyse five expert’s subjec-
tive judgements. Based on the result obtained, the resilience of the oil terminal under
investigation can be improved by implementing alternative A3(B3, E3, L3, R4 and U5),
i.e. Investing in weather-tracking technology with higher reliability and accuracy of op-
eration; Integral safety strategies: (a) Optimising transfer time, automatic path finding,
automatic movement execution, optimised resources management of assets and people,
(b) Marine time at berth: integrated order management, flexible jetty planning, align-
ment with additional services, (c) Marine movement: agile planning, comprehensive
logistic movement, (d) Accuracy: precision measurement, custody transfer proof data,
and (e) Clear operational records: integrated inventory management, track and trace in
history; Robust enforcement and implementation of OCIMF; Emergency disconnect sys-
tem: Activation of emergency release system; and Commitment: Objective and target
will be set annually to promote and communicate throughout the organisation the need
for quality, safety and environ awareness. A fully integrated, committed management
team should be put in place, able to independently verify that integral operation is in
accordance with requirements. This management team should have an absolute desire to
reduce accidents and work-related hazards. However, by implementing additional layers
of barrier in the form of alternative A1(P1, F1, D3, T4, S5) and A2(K2, J2, V 3, Q4,W5)
respectively, parallel system resilience will be enhanced to further help optimise a re-
silient OTOs system under high uncertainty (A1, i.e. Sweep arm system, setting up a
terminal operation group, enforcement and implementation of ISGOTT, emergency and
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intervention teams, policy changes for a resilient system; and A2, i.e. Proper allocation
of resources to the various components of the system to enhance its operations, safety
integrity, enforcement and implementation of the IMDG code, conduct a survey of ran-
dom selected platforms and facilities at terminals, and ensure a safe workplace and safe
system of work).
6.10.2 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a strategic decision-support, multiple-attribute, decision-
making method based on aspiration level that can be implemented for resilience strategy
selection for OTOs. The method has been tested in a logical, succinct and transparent
manner against multiple scenarios where information available is subjective and impre-
cise. The strength of this strategic decision-making approach is in the fact that both
heterogeneous and homogeneous groups of experts can be utilised and their subjective
opinions can be aggregated in a simplified manner even if there is only partial or incom-
plete information available. In the evaluation process, the AHP is applied to determine
the weights of the influencing attributes, and a PT algorithm is implemented to rank
the resilience strategies or alternatives in a flexible and straightforward manner. To
support a strategic decision on resilience strategy selection, PT needs to be utilised
to handle multiple organisational objectives, complex decision making and long-term
consequences of disruption to oil terminal platforms in an uncertain environment. The
proposed approach can be applied to situations where both qualitative and quantitative
data have to be integrated and synthesised for evaluation processes during complex and
multiple decision making involving CMOs. Since the result of the calculation is sensitive
to attribute weights, these should be carefully chosen by oil terminal management and
safety analysts to avoid misrepresentation and information loss during ship and terminal
interface.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Summary
This chapter highlights the developed conceptual framework and models with an at-
tempt to integrate them in a logical relationship. The chapter discusses and summarises
the importance of the integrated model, the basis for the development of the conceptual
framework as an advanced risk assessment technique for OTOs and the need to select
the right strategic resilience decision for OTOs optimisation. It also explains the thesis
limitations as well as proposed possible opportunities for future research to improve on
the developed methodologies and system resilience framework.
7.1 Introduction
The impact of various operational hazards on oil terminal infrastructures could likely be
catastrophic disruption with major consequences. The effectiveness of oil terminal op-
erational systems depends on their degree of soundness and resilient effectuation under
high uncertainties. Therefore, evaluation, analysis and multi-attribute decision making
methods have become inevitable for OTOs. Thus, a conceptual resilience framework and
novel models tailored to optimise the resilience optimisation of OTOs in offshore/on-
shore oil terminals have been developed in this study. The validation of these proposed
hazard/risk-based models has also been demonstrated. It is now appropriate to reflect
on the previous chapters detailing of this research.
7.2 Research Summary
This research aimed at investigating the uncertainties for OTOs in order to monitor,
control and mitigate its operational risk. The research aim was achieved as follows:
• The literature review conducted revealed that OTOs are continually exposed to di-
verse risks because they usually operate in a dynamic environment in which ac-
cident barriers are sometimes surpassed, leading to the disruption of operations
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due to high uncertainties. Uncertainties and the unpredictability of events during
OTOs can lead to system disruption with potential to cause major fire outbreaks,
explosion and transit accidents; damaging infrastructure, the environment and loss
of life with high consequences. Previous literature also provided an insight into
the modelling of past accident scenarios of CMOs in order to reveal their vul-
nerabilities. The common operational hazards that have become an issue within
the risk management as reviewed in the literature on oil terminals and OTOs can
be categorised into: (a) Man-related hazards, (b) Machine-related hazards, (c)
Communication- and Correspondence-related hazards, (d) Management-related
hazards and (e) Nature-related hazards. A dynamic Hierarchical structure for
resilience improvement was also developed based on the categorised identified un-
certainties.
• A novel resilience framework was developed to proactive improve OTOs in controlling
losses from operational hazards. Applying a novel resilience framework to off-
shore/onshore oil terminal installations, where different hazardous materials such
as crude oil, petrol, kerosene and diesel are being transported remains a more re-
alistic way of improving the ability of an operational system to avoid, adapt and
recover to a stable state as well as to improve its defence capabilities. A Resilience
framework also provide a flexible yet robust model for OTOs to address disruption
particularly as new hazards are constantly evolving.
• Models were also developed to support the proposed novel resilience framework, such
as:
◦ An innovative approach towards integrating Utility Theory and Swiss Cheese
Model into oil terminal risk assessment has been presented. The (UtiSch+)
model was used to determine the relative weight of the identified HFs.
◦ A BN tailored to fit into the framework to construct a causal relationship model
for OTOs. Ten HFs with the most relative weights served as input for the
developed BN model. By evaluating the BNs, overall probability that a spe-
cific hazard is present were calculated. The robustness of the BN model was
demonstrated using a Sensitivity Analysis (SA) to test its validity. The result
demonstrated that the BN model is an effective technique for dynamic hazard
probability evaluation of OTOs for resilience improvements.
◦ To select the appropriate strategy aimed at improving the resilience of OTOs,
it is necessary to rank these strategies in an order of importance. This study
proposed a strategic Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP)-Prospect Theory
(PT) approach to demonstrate such an important strategy selection process.
An AHP technique was used to determine the weights of the influencing at-
tributes and a PT algorithm was implemented to rank the resilience strategies
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in a flexible and straightforward manner. The result revealed seems rea-
sonable and appropriate to support strategic decisions on resilience strategy
selection for OTOs resilience improvement.
• Empirical study was conducted to justify the proposed models. The empirical study
for chapter 4 was independent from that of Chapter 6. Empirical evaluations shows
the consistencies of all HFs, significant HFs and proposed resilience strategies fro
OTOs improvement with participant responses in the real-world (see Fig 4.8, 5.7,
6.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7).
• A case study was conducted to validate the (UtiSch+) model (see Section 4.8) and
a test case was also conducted to justify the selection process of all identified
resilience strategies (see Section 6.8). The results indicate that this model tack-
les complex decision problems on oil terminal platforms in a simple and efficient
manner.
7.2.1 Discussion
The resilience optimisation of OTOs has become an area of interest in the 21st century.
It has become the best possible option by which to tackle uncertainties in the real world.
The resilience of OTOs in this study is based on the resilience engineering perspective
of operational studies. It provides system flexibility, robustness and the ability to cope
with incident/hazard/accident when and after they occur. In this study, a resilience
conceptual framework has been developed for OTOs. The hazard identification phase
in the framework analyses system attributes such as OTOs facilities, complexities and
functionality as well as other principal causes of safety problems with the potential
to cause major disruption; the assessment phase evaluates the resilience level of the
system and then analyses the uncertainty within the system; while the mitigation phase
proffers strategic resilience decision solutions for proactive hazard/risk management.
OTOs resilience depends on tools and techniques to ensure the operation can cope with
unforeseen situations, anticipate failure, resist destruction and restore the operation to
as close to its original state as possible. This study proposes some traditional modelling
techniques suited to tackle uncertainties which are in turn tailored for OTOs resilience
improvement in onshore/offshore oil terminals.
Additionally, the result established that human factors, technical failure and nature
are the major sources of uncertainties in oil terminal infrastructures. It is crucial to
identify the hazards within oil terminal operational infrastructures in order to address
them and the uncertainty they create, and improve the resilience of the infrastructures.
The applicability of the innovative model in the real world can assist the oil industry
in achieving robust and resilient CMOs under high uncertainty. The resilience conceptual
framework and model has been tested and validated to be dynamic with the addition of
any new evidence. In addition, a more profound implication of the results of this study
is that they empirically show that there is a wide spread of uncertainty variables in the
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oil industry. However, a more interesting outcome of this study is the fact that the
oil industry is taking extensive measures to prevent, control and mitigate hazard/risk
during operations.
The selection of a strategic decision for OTOs resilience improvement has become
a critical aspect of the decision-making process in the real world. Making a strategic
resilience decision enables a real-time forecast for OTOs resilience. Following the inves-
tigation, ranking and evaluation of hazards in OTOs, tailored resilience strategies were
identified based on a robust literature review, accident reports, workshop seminar reports
and a brainstorming session conducted with relevant specialists. A Plan Inspect Monitor
and Manage (PIMMs) approach was proposed as a resilience strategy for OTOs. The
PIMMs strategy consists of multiple attributes and this makes it a MADM problem. As
outlined in the proposed resilience conceptual framework and models, the MADM prob-
lem was solved based on AHP-PT, thus improving on the traditional decision-making
approaches for maritime safety.
In all, this research has demonstrated that the developed framework and models
have the potential to prevent, control and mitigate hazard/risk. In other words, feasible
answers to system vulnerability, adaptability, survival and recovery issues are possible.
The importance of this finding is that it enables the major oil firms to be sustainable,
increases a companys reputation for safety and risk management, and enables it to
continue to be an economically attractive asset for positive revenue impacts. More
importantly, no previous research has studied the impact of high uncertainty and a
resilience strategic optimisation for OTOs.
7.2.2 Main Conclusion
There is a need for a proactive, robust yet flexible approach to the resolution of uncer-
tainties in OTOs. A resilience strategy is an advanced-level plan of action which should
be adopted to address the adaptive capacity and increased vulnerability of a system due
to hazards. Resilience optimisation requires an in-depth and step-by-step hazard/risk
analysis to attain an ideal level of system scrutiny. As such, proven methodologies to
investigate and evaluate hazards/accident on oil terminal facilities, facilitate the process
of achieving a resilient system. A novel resilience framework was proposed in this study,
tailored for OTOs. Models were developed to support the proposed framework, method-
ologies were proposed that provided a platform where OTOs can be assessed effectively
and efficiently, and the empirical study results which are fundamental to forming logical
and valid conclusions have demonstrated the significance of the study.
It is noteworthy to mention that all the important research questions such as: Will
the proposed research framework and models affect operations at oil terminals? What
are the risks involved in oil terminal operations? What are the values of the proposed
novel risk models to oil terminal operations? How do we implement the proposed re-
search framework and models in case studies? Should operators attribute loss to normal
errors in measuring hazards, other than improved techniques to rectify measuring of
Chapter 7. Conclusion 205
errors? have been answered in this study. The selection of the right resilience strategic
alternatives for decision making investment will enhance the resilient properties of OTOs
under high uncertainty.
7.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge
The main contribution of the research is the creation of the generic resilience conceptual
framework and analytical model, capable of performing advanced risk assessment. The
proposed holistic framework comprises relevant tools and techniques for structuring, as-
sessing, analysing, managing and mitigating hazard factors that affect OTOs. A key
aspect of this study is the integration of the Utility Theory and the Swiss Cheese Model
as well as the use of AHP-PT, which are based on decision makers’ behavioural psy-
chology, to facilitate decision-making processes for OTOs resilience improvement. The
robustness of the developed models can be tailored to practical applications, enabling oil
terminal industrial risk management professionals such as terminal risk managers and
auditors to deal with safety and risk problems. More so, it will help to guide oil terminal
risk analysts through a series of well-defined structured phases and steps necessary to
improve resilient effectuation, especially in situations where a high level of uncertainty
exists. The implemented framework provides a logical and organised procedure, and
benefits can be gained from using the defined resilience conceptual framework. The goal
of the study was focused on resilience as a strategy to achieve a high level of safety and
continuity of operations, it became a basis for improving managerial decision making
and enhanced procedures for OTOs. The deficiency of risk assessment literature for
OTOs and uncertainty treatment within the marine industry highlights the importance
of the subject matter; thus, the research will enrich the knowledge base for OTOs. The
resilience conceptual framework adopted means that there is a shift in thinking, from
probability estimation to uncertainty assessment. Resilience is recommended as a suit-
able strategy to cope with shocks and safety-related issues and, as such, the discussion of
the results in the light of the theories and practical applications has enabled the resolve
of the research to the body of knowledge.
7.4 Research Limitation
The study has not investigated accidents scenarios as a result of storage tank farms,
mooring operations and manoeuvring for berthing and unberthing operations leading to
disruption, due to time constraints for the analysis of OTOs in the real world. In relation
to risk assessment and resilience improvements in oil terminals, it has not been possible
to find any proven benchmark result to fully validate the research outcomes. Given such
difficulty and due to lack of data, a possible method of partial validation of the models
can be achieved through conducting more industrial case studies, as demonstrated in the
BN and PT sensitivity analysis performed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Experts’
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relative experience and vast knowledge prowess are vital in the application of the novel
framework to real industrial case studies as described in this research; thus, the criteria
for choosing these experts is crucial. Finally, the confidential nature of oil terminals when
conducting an empirical study highlights the difficulty of gathering secondary data for
the identified hazard factors.
7.5 Recommendation and Future Research
The research has attempted to provide a structure that links risk and resilience, as well
as to formulate a conceptual framework for resilience improvement of OTOs. Avenues
to further enhance the implementation of the developed framework and models in a
different context have been identified to include:
• A Formal Resilience Assessment (FRA) with an holistic framework as a primary
method for uncertainty assessment is recommended for future research. This
will be suggested to container terminals, storage tank farms and other process
industries, as a standard for resilience improvement. This will encourage other
researchers to apply the assessment method to other areas of interest.
• The application of the developed novel framework and models to other high reliability
industries such as construction, petrochemical and gas plants, will be useful for
future research. This could give rise to interesting findings and will boost the
confidence of the obtained thesis result. Other multi-attribute decision-making
techniques such as TOPSIS, VIKOR and, fuzzy set can be employed in testing
how sound the decision model is, and may further enrich the deficient literature
on resilience modelling in complex marine operations.
• The proposed risk-based model could be extended to incorporate other categories of
hazard-related factors such as political risk and security risk that were not included
in the present study. Furthermore, when extending the certainty equivalent status
quo to a 4x4 matrix to determine the utility context of a DM, the Utility Swiss
Cheese algorithm will be much more reliable to obtain an optimal value for the
considered DM.
• Due to the complexity of the analytical results obtained under conditions of scarce
data, the application of computer simulation and analysis-related software with
inputs from secondary/historic data is recommended to evaluate and facilitate the
process of data compilation at the operational phase. This will further improve
the resilience of OTOs due to unforeseen events.
• The combination of expert judgement and historical data in a fuzzy environment
to evaluate hazard and risk factors capable of dealing with uncertainty will help
in firming up the structures for resilience improvement. The use of diverse but
powerful intelligent tools and algorithms from other fields and concepts will open
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promising new pathways for developing and optimising OTOs resilience under
uncertainty.
• From within the participants, five experts were selected at random to participate in
the risk assessment process for OTOs. However, it is recommended to increase
the number of experts for more collaborative modelling and compare the obtained
results with this study to reassure other researchers about the effectiveness of the
original results. This will further validate and reinforce the applicability of the
hazard/risk-based models for use in other industry.

Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 4
A.1 Appendix 4A: DMs decision on risk attributes and
attributes for Utility assessment
where: (Expr) = expert, and(HF ) = Hazard factor
where: (UCC) = Utility context of comparison,(Y OE) = years of experience,
(RM) = response mood,(IP ) = individual perspective, and(RO) = recurrence
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Table A.1: DMs’ decision on hazard attributes
Experts
HF Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5
MAHs (R1) 2 5 3 6 6
DHE (R2) 2 5 6 5 6
PI (R3) 1 6 5 5 5
S (R4) 1 5 2 5 5
ICF (R5) 1 5 5 3 5
MEHs (R11) 2 6 5 3 3
EF (R12) 2 5 2 5 5
WCSF (R13) 2 5 3 5 5
PCM (R21) 3 5 5 5 6
SA (R22) 2 5 5 5 5
PCI (R23) 2 6 5 5 3
HRE (R31) 2 5 3 6 4
JSSR (R32) 1 6 2 5 5
LE (R33) 2 6 2 6 4
DE (R34) 2 5 2 3 6
BR (R35) 2 6 2 2 6
HH (R41) 3 4 3 2 5
SH (R42) 3 3 3 2 5
AH (R43) 3 5 3 2 5
EH (R44) 3 5 3 2 5
Table A.2: DMs’ Utility assessments
Experts
UCC Expr 1 Expr 2 Expr 3 Expr 4 Expr 5
YOE 20 yrs 20 yrs 12 yrs 20 yrs 21 yrs
RM 7 5 3 6 6
IP 7 5 3 4 6
RO 1 5 1 3 5
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A.2 Appendix 4B: Extent of failure of barriers for each
risk factor in the proposed model
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Figure A.1: Extent of barriers failure for each HFs in the proposed model
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Table A.3: Experts assessments using the UtiSch+ model (R11-R13)
Expr 1(C) Expr 2(B)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R11 0.4197 c1 < 0.75 0.2361 1 0.9368 c1 < 0.75 0.3513 1
R12 0.4197 c2 < 0.75 0.2361 1 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 2
R13 0.4197 c3 < 0.75 0.2361 3 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.3250 3
Expr 3(D) Expr 4(Q)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R11 0.8671 c1 < 0.75 0.3250 1 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.2619 3
R12 0.5882 c2 < 0.75 0.2206 3 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R13 0.6984 c3 < 0.75 0.2619 2 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.3250 1
Expr 5(W)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R11 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.2619 3
R12 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R13 0.8671 c3 < 0.75 0.3250 1
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Table A.4: R21−R23
Expr 1(C) Expr 2(B)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R21 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.1746 1 0.8671 c1 < 0.50 0.2168 2
R22 0.5882 c2 < 0.75 0.1471 2 0.8671 c2 < 0.50 0.2168 2
R23 0.5882 c3 < 0.75 0.1471 2 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.2342 1
Expr 3(D) Expr 4(Q)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R21 0.8671 c1 < 0.75 0.2168 1 0.6984 c1 < 0.50 0.2168 1
R22 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.2168 1 0.8671 c2 < 0.50 0.2168 1
R23 0.8671 c3 < 0.75 0.2168 1 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.3250 1
Expr 5(W)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R21 0.9368 c1 < 0.50 0.2342 1
R22 0.8671 c2 < 0.50 0.2168 2
R23 0.8671 c3 < 0.50 0.1746 3
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Table A.5: R31−R35
Expr 1(C) Expr 2(B)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R31 0.5882 c1 < 0.50 0.1471 1 0.8671 c1 < 0.75 0.2168 4
R32 0.4385 c2 < 0.50 0.2206 5 0.9368 c2 < 0.75 0.2342 1
R33 0.5882 c3 < 0.50 0.1471 1 0.9368 c3 < 0.50 0.2342 1
R34 0.5882 c4 < 0.50 0.1471 1 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.2168 4
R35 0.5882 c5 < 0.50 0.1471 1 0.9368 c5 < 0.50 0.2342 1
Expr 3(D) Expr 4(Q)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R31 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.1746 1 0.9368 c1 < 0.75 0.2342 1
R32 0.5882 c2 < 0.75 0.1471 2 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.2168 3
R33 0.5882 c3 < 0.50 0.1471 2 0.9368 c3 < 0.50 0.2342 1
R34 0.5882 c4 < 0.50 0.1471 2 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.6984 4
R35 0.5882 c5 < 0.50 0.1471 2 0.6984 c5 < 0.50 0.5882 5
Expr 5(W)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R31 0.7889 c1 < 0.50 0.1973 4
R32 0.8671 c2 < 0.50 0.2168 3
R33 0.7889 c3 < 0.50 0.1973 4
R34 0.9368 c4 < 0.50 0.2342 1
R35 0.9368 c5 < 0.50 0.2342 1
A.3 Appendix 4C: Final Questionnaire and feedbacks for
UtiSch+ Model (Fig A.6 - A.20)
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A Resilience Modelling Approach on Oil Terminal Operations under
High Uncertainty
Page 1
My name is Ambisire Y. Usman, I am carrying out a research project at Liverpool Logistics, Offshore and Marine (LOOM) Research
Institute. You are being selected to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important that you understand why the research
is being done and what it involves. Please take time to read the following information. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if
you would like more information. Take time to decide if you want to take part or not.
1. What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the above research topic is to investigate the uncertainties of oil terminals operations in order to monitor, mitigate and
control the operational risks. The analysis of these risks are capable of helping decision makers and stakeholders in oil terminal
operations to critically evaluate risk attributes in order to rank them according to the outcome(s) leading to a disruption.The scope of
this questionnaire considers as far as reasonable practicable offshore and onshore oil terminals operations platforms with satisfactory
and very good safety standards. This research is student led, and in order to improve the quality and relevance of the research, the
researcher would greatly appreciate your views by completing the provided questionnaire.
2.Do I have to take part?
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do, you have consented to be part of this study. You are still free to
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw will not affect your rights/any future treatment/service you
receive.
3.What will happen to me if I take part?
The questionnaires takes a maximum of 20 minutes of your time, however it is vital to the research development. Within the next 4
weeks, the researcher hopes to have collected significant data. The duration of this research is 36 months, although a significant
amount of time have elapsed.
4.Are there any risks / benefits involved? No risk involved
5.Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
The information provided will be treated with confidentiality.
A tooltip is provided for further information to provide more clarity about the meaning of each question. Thank you for taking time to
read through this introduction.
Page 2
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Figure A.6
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Table A.6: R41 −R44
Expr 1(C) Expr 2(B)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R41 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.26191 1 0.7889 c1 < 0.75 0.2958 2
R42 0.6984 c2 < 0.75 0.2619 1 0.6984 c2 < 0.75 0.2619 3
R43 0.6984 c3 < 0.75 0.2619 1 0.8671 c3 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R44 0.6984 c4 < 0.50 0.1746 4 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.2168 4
Expr 3(D) Expr 4(Q)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R41 0.6984 c1 < 0.75 0.2619 1 0.5882 c1 < 0.75 0.2206 1
R42 0.6984 c2 < 0.75 0.2619 1 0.5882 c2 < 0.75 0.2206 1
R43 0.6984 c3 < 0.75 0.2619 1 0.5882 c3 < 0.75 0.2206 1
R44 0.6984 c4 < 0.50 0.1746 4 0.5882 c4 < 0.50 0.1471 4
Expr 5(W)
HFs u(x) UtiSch+ W R
R41 0.8671 c1 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R42 0.8671 c2 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R43 0.8671 c3 < 0.75 0.3250 1
R44 0.8671 c4 < 0.50 0.2168 4
Figure A.7
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Figure A.8
Figure A.9
Figure A.10
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Figure A.11
Figure A.12
Figure A.13
Figure A.14
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Figure A.15
Figure A.16
Figure A.17
Figure A.18
Figure A.19
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Figure A.20
Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter 5
B.1 Appendix 5A: BN Sensitivity Analysis (SA) results
for Increment and Decrement of Parameter Variable
Likelihood
R1 R2 R11 R12 R13 R21 R22 R41 R42 R43
30% 0.3342 0.3323 0.3062 0.3061 0.3324 0.3214 0.3234 0.305 0.33 0.318
0.2494 0.2472 0.2763 0.2762 0.25 0.2614 0.267 0.278 0.2564 0.277
20% 0.3191 0.3203 0.3013 0.3011 0.3183 0.3112 0.3122 0.3 0.3174 0.3014
0.2632 0.2621 0.2813 0.281 0.2632 0.271 0.2691 0.281 0.2653 0.2813
10% 0.3051 0.3053 0.2963 0.2961 0.3054 0.3011 0.3021 0.296 0.3042 0.2964
0.277 0.2762 0.2861 0.286 0.2771 0.281 0.28 0.286 0.2782 0.2864
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B.2 Appendix 5B: The correlation between the SA of an
increment and decrement parameter
R1 R2 R42 R13 R22 R21 R43 R41 R12 R11
30% 0.3342 0.3323 0.33 0.3324 0.3234 0.3214 0.318 0.305 0.3061 0.3062
20% 0.2632 0.2621 0.2653 0.2632 0.2691 0.271 0.2813 0.281 0.281 0.2813
Minus 30% 0.2494 0.2472 0.2564 0.25 0.267 0.2614 0.277 0.278 0.2762 0.2763
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B.3 Appendix 5C: Final Questionnaire for BN
Figure B.1
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Figure B.2
Appendix A. Appendices for Chapter 5 227
Figure B.3

Appendix C
Appendices for Chapter 6
C.1 Appendix 6A: Pairwise Comparison for all Attributes
Table C.1
Academic + Industrial (21+)
RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
RS1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2 1/2
RS2 2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 2 1
RS3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2 1/2
RS4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2 1/2
RS5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2 1
RS6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1/2
RS7 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
RS8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 2 1/2
RS9 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1/2
RS10 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1
Table C.2
Senior Manager (16-20)
RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
RS1 1 1 4 1 1 1/2 1/2 7 3 4
RS2 1 1 4 1 1 1/2 1/2 7 3 4
RS3 1/4 1/4 1 1/3 1/3 1/4 1/4 4 1/2 1/2
RS4 1 1 3 1 1 1/2 1/2 6 3 3
RS5 1 1 3 1 1 1/2 1/2 6 2 2
RS6 2 2 4 2 2 1 1 8 3 5
RS7 2 2 4 2 2 1 1 8 3 5
RS8 1/7 1/7 1/4 1/6 1/6 1/8 1/8 1 1/4 1/5
RS9 1/3 1/3 2 1/3 1/2 1/3 1/3 4 1 3
RS10 1/4 1/4 2 1/3 1/2 1/5 1/5 5 1/3 1
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Table C.3
Senior Safety Manager (16-20)
RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
RS1 1 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 3
RS2 1/3 1 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 1/2 1/2
RS3 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 3
RS4 1/2 3 1/2 1 1 1/2 3 3 2 2
RS5 1/2 3 1/2 1 1 1/2 3 3 2 2
RS6 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 2
RS7 1/3 2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 2 1/2 1/2
RS8 1/3 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1 1/2 1/2
RS9 1/3 2 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 2 2 1 1
RS10 1/3 2 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 2 2 1 1
Table C.4
Junior Manager (11-15)
RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
RS1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 3 1/2 1/2
RS2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1
RS3 1 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 3 1/2 1/2
RS4 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
RS5 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 3 1/2 1/2
RS6 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1
RS7 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1
RS8 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 1/3
RS9 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1
RS10 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1
Table C.5
Consultant (20+)
RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 RS5 RS6 RS7 RS8 RS9 RS10
RS1 1 1 1 1/2 3 2 3 2 3 1/2
RS2 1 1 1 1/2 3 2 3 2 3 1/2
RS3 1 1 1 1/2 3 2 3 2 3 1/2
RS4 2 2 2 1 4 3 5 3 5 1
RS5 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/4 1 1/2 2 1/2 2 1/4
RS6 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2 1 2 1 3 1/3
RS7 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/5 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/5
RS8 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2 1 2 1 2 1/3
RS9 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/5 1/2 1/3 1 1/2 1 1/5
RS10 2 2 2 1 4 3 5 3 5 1
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C.2 Appendix 6B: DMs Assessment of Attribute with re-
spect to Alternatives
Table C.6
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
75 79 88 89 60 87 expr 1
60 81 74 67 44 60 expr 2
Communication 77 75 83 86 47 56 expr 3
81 45 80 93 50 53 expr 4
50 24 93 59 11 32 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
68.6 60.8 83.6 78.8 42.4 57.6
Table C.7
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
75 77 79 65 30 74 expr 1
71 82 78 62 43 62 expr 2
Automation 70 75 79 82 57 75 expr 3
81 74 82 57 84 64 expr 4
51 30 13 45 7 9 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
69.6 67.6 66.2 62.2 44.2 56.8
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Table C.8
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
85 84 75 57 82 92 expr 1
79 81 80 56 63 89 expr 2
System Functionality 86 78 79 45 68 73 expr 3
70 23 81 59 93 82 expr 4
51 30 13 45 7 9 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
65.2 63.4 74.4 60.4 54.4 54.4
Table C.9
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
74 77 78 60 22 85 expr 1
93 94 62 51 61 21 expr 2
Cognitive Functioning 18 15 85 77 75 65 expr 3
76 77 84 52 83 9 expr 4
65 54 63 62 31 92 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
65.2 63.4 74.4 60.4 54.4 54.4
Table C.10
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
82 77 80 54 89 49 expr 1
94 95 96 76 44 53 expr 2
Structural Integrity 18 12 77 47 83 60 expr 3
79 77 76 49 64 69 expr 4
85 38 72 94 80 20 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
71.6 59.8 80.2 64 72 50.2
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Table C.11
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
11 btw 15 16 btw 20 16 btw 20 16 btw 20 1 btw 5 6 btw 10 expr 1
6 btw 10 26 btw 30 21 btw 25 16 btw 20 26 btw 30 16 btw 20 expr 2
Facilities Proneness 6 btw 10 1 btw 5 11 btw 15 16 btw 20 21 btw 25 1 btw 5 expr 3
6 btw 10 1 btw 5 11 btw 15 16 btw 20 6 btw 10 6 btw 10 expr 4
6 btw 10 1 btw 5 11 btw 15 16 btw 20 6 btw 10 6 btw 10 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
8 3 13 18 23 8
Table C.12
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
11 btw 15 16 btw 20 21 btw 25 16 btw 20 11 btw 15 1 btw 5 expr 1
16 btw 20 21 btw 25 41 btw 59 31 btw 40 21 btw 25 16 btw 20 expr 2
Modularity in Systems 16 btw 20 31 btw 40 16 btw 20 11 btw 15 21 btw 25 1 btw 5 expr 3
16 btw 20 31 btw 40 41 btw 59 11 btw 15 16 btw 20 6 btw 10 expr 4
16 btw 20 31 btw 40 41 btw 59 11 btw 15 21 btw 25 31 btw 40 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
18 38 57 13 23 3
Table C.13
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
26 btw 30 11 btw 15 31 btw 40 21 btw 25 16 btw 20 26 btw 30 expr 1
26 btw 30 16 btw 20 21 btw 25 26 btw 30 31 btw 40 11 btw 15 expr 2
System Redundancy 31 btw 40 26 btw 30 11 btw 15 11 btw 15 31 btw 40 26 btw 30 expr 3
26 btw 30 16 btw 20 21 btw 25 11 btw 15 11 btw 15 26 btw 30 expr 4
26 btw 30 16 btw 20 21 btw 25 11 btw 15 31 btw 40 21 btw 25 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
28 18 23 13 39 28
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Table C.14
Alternatives
Attribute A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
70 76 80 59 85 82 expr 1
23 83 76 84 22 70 expr 2
High integrity Prevention 73 70 21 55 65 85 expr 3
83 84 62 52 60 58 expr 4
52 17 83 79 59 31 expr 5
M =
∑
x 1
n
60.2 66 64.4 65.8 58.2 65.2
C.3 Appendix 6C:Final Questionnaire and Feedbacks for
PT Assessment
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